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1. Abbreviations 
 
CEDEFOP - European Center for the Development of the Vocational Training 
founded in 1975.  
CEE countries – countries of Central and Eastern Europe - EU 2004 and 2007 
entrants minus Cyprus and Malta: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
CES (production function) – Constant Elasticity of Substitution production function 
used in economics. 
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States  
CMR – Comprehensive Monitoring Report (usually prepared by the European 
Commission concerning specific area in specific country). 
COMECON/CMEA (1949-1991) - Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, also 
known as Organization for International Economic Cooperation (since 1991). 
Members: Soviet Union (USSR), Eastern Bloc countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
East Germany (since 1950), Hungary, Poland, Romania), and extra regional socialist 
countries – Mongolia (since 1962), Cuba (since 1972), Vietnam (since 1978). Albania 
participated in 1949-1961; number of other countries had observer status (Yugoslavia 
(since 1964), Finland (since 1973), Iraq, Mexico (both since 1975), Nicaragua (since 
1984), Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Laos, South Yemen (all since 1986)). 
EaP – Eastern Partnership, Initiative launched in May 2009 as an enhanced regional 
cooperation policy developed by the European Union for Eastern European and 
Southern Caucasus states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine (EaP countries). 
EEA – European Economic Area comprising EU Member States, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway. 
EC – European Commission. 
Eurostat – Statistical Office of the European Union.  
EU – the European Union. 
EU27 – all current EU Member States: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), 
Cyprus (CY), the Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), 
France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), 
Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg, (LU)  Malta (MT), the Netherlands (NL), 
Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), 
Sweden (SE), and the United Kingdom (UK). 
EU15 – EU Member States before 2004 and 2007 enlargements: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
EU15+ – EU15, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 
EU12 – EU 2004 and EU 2007 entrants: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
EU10 – EU 2004 entrants: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
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EU8 – EU 2004 entrants minus Cyprus and Malta: the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
EU2 - EU 2007 entrants: Bulgaria and Romania. 
EU8+2 – EU 2004 and 2007 entrants minus Cyprus and Malta: Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia. 
EU14 – EU 15 Member States minus Luxembourg: Austria, Belgium Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
EU25 – 27 EU Member States minus Bulgaria and Romania: Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,  Malta, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
EU LFS - European Union Labour Force Survey. 
EU SILC - European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions. 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product. 
GDP (pc) – Gross Domestic Product per capita. 
GDP (PPP) - Gross Domestic Product derived from Purchasing Power Parity. 
FE – Fixed Effects Model used in econometrics and statistics. 
IV – Instrumental Variables estimating method used in econometrics and statistics. 
ICTWSS database - Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, 
Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts between1960 and 2007 in 34 
countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Malta, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
INTAS - International Association for the promotion of cooperation with scientists 
from the newly independent states (NIS), i.e. former Soviet Union Republics 
excluding 3 Baltic States. 
ISCED - International Standard Classification of Education designed by UNESCO in 
1970’s. 
ISCO – International Standard Classification of Occupations adopted in 1957 by 
International Labour Organization (ILO). 
Istat LFS – Italian National Institute of Statistics, Labour Force Survey. 
IT – Information Technology (industry). 
MAC - Migration Advisory Committee (UK). 
MIPEX  – Migrant Integration Policy Index, tool used to measure integration 
policies in EU Member States, Norway, Switzerland, Canada and the USA. 
NACE classification – Statistical classification of economic activities in the 
European Community (derived from French “Nomenclature statistique des activités 
économiques dans la Communauté européenne”). 
NAIRU – Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment; type of unemployment 
level analysis used in economics. 
NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation. 
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NIESR – National Institute of Economic and Social Research (UK). 
NiGEM - National Institute Global Econometric Model (developed by NIESR). 
NINo – National Insurance Number, Ireland 
OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development; founded in 1961, 
includes 34 members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. 
OLS - Ordinary Least Squares method used for unknown parameters estimation in 
statistics. 
PBS - Points Based System (migration scheme applied in UK). 
PCI - Per Capita Income. 
PCI ratio – Per capita income in destination country divided by per capita income in 
country of origin. 
PPP - Purchasing Power Parity. 
RDS – Research, Development and Statistical Directorate (UK). 
SAWS - Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (migration scheme applied in UK). 
SBS –Sector Based Schemes (migration scheme applied in UK). 
2 SLS – Two Stage Least Squares Estimating Method used in econometrics. 
STEM subjects – subjects in the fields of Science, Technology, Engineering, and 
Mathematics. 
UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
established in 1945, including 195 Members and 8 Associate Members. 
USSR – Union of 15 Soviet Socialist Republics (formally dissolved in 1991) 
including current Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.  
WDI - World Development Indicators, primary World Bank collection of 
development indicators, compiled from officially-recognised international sources. 
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2. Executive Summary  
 
Aims 
This report measures and evaluates the costs and benefits of migration from Eastern 
Partnership countries to Europe in the past and in the medium-term future (up to 
2020), considering different scenarios of economic development and alternative 
migration frameworks, in order to inform policy about possible recommendations on 
labour migration management framework between the EU and EaP region. It relies 
on complex and diverse set of methodologies, and gathers rich and systematic 
empirical material. The report points out that policy intervention needs to go beyond 
migration policy alone in order to achieve better labour market matching and to bring 
most benefits and least costs to receiving countries, sending countries and migrants.   
 
Key argument  
Evaluating the lessons from multiple contexts and employing a robust projection 
model, we estimate that it is reasonable to expect steady (and rather modest 
compared to other immigrant groups) migration flows from EaP countries (mostly 
Ukraine) to the European Union over the next decade. Temporarily increased flows 
should be expected if a more liberal migration framework between the EU Member 
States and Eastern Partnership countries is put in place. Based on assessment of EU’s 
labour market needs, learning from the experience of EU’s Eastern enlargements and 
finding a generally positive effect of EaP migration to Europe so far, we conclude that 
migration from EaP countries is a positive and desirable phenomenon.  Moreover, a 
general finding consistent with all the applied methodological approaches is that the 
effects of migration are more positive in case of liberalisation of migrant’s access to 
host countries’ labour markets, as it provides for better matching and so more 
favourable impacts on sending and receiving countries and migrants.  
 
What do we know about EaP migration to Europe so far?  
Current EaP migration to Europe is not sizeable, but has grown in absolute numbers 
during the last decade, up to the Great Recession. In 2010, migrants from EaP 
countries represent only 3.58% of total immigration to EU25 countries, which equals 
a total of about 1.5 million. EaP migrants are distributed across the EU countries 
unevenly and due to its size originate mainly from Ukraine. The recent EU 
enlargements have re-directed EaP migrant flows within Europe. As EU8 + EU2 
migrants have been filling low-skilled vacancies, some EU15 countries (e.g. UK) 
hardened the entry of EaP migrants. Legal frameworks in EU8 countries have on the 
other hand become more open towards EaP migrants. Due to historical reasons, EaP 
migrant presence in EU8 countries is currently relatively more prominent than in the 
EU15 when compared to other immigrant groups.    
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In all countries, the EaP migrants are found to be rather well educated, often 
exceeding the education attainment levels of natives and other immigrants. Most EaP 
migration appears temporary. EaP migration is gendered along sectors of 
employment, with males dominating e.g. construction and agriculture and females 
overrepresented in e.g. domestic and care services. Some of the strong push factors 
for emigration from EaP region are a risk of unemployment and poor career 
prospects in home countries even for highly skilled migrants. 
In spite of high level of educational attainment, EaP migrants predominantly find 
employment in low-skilled and unskilled sectors, such as agriculture, construction 
and domestic and care services.  Allocation of EaP migrants to low-skilled sectors can 
be explained by existence of demand in these sectors, constraints of legal framework 
in the receiving countries, and difficulties with recognition of qualifications. 
Downskilling is also a function of the length of stay in labour market and EaP 
migrants tend to integrate with time. Poor quality of education in the sending 
countries and poor knowledge of the host country language could be additional 
factors for downskilling. 
 
What have been the costs and benefits of EaP migration for Europe?  
EaP migrants enter the EU predominantly for employment purposes, which is 
reflected in their favourable employment rates, especially when compared to 
immigrants from other third countries. Average employment rates are well above 
those of other immigrant groups, ranging between 60 and 70 per cent (e.g. in Spain, 
Italy or Poland).  Our own analysis, in congruence with existing data and literature, 
show that EaP migrants have in general no negative effect on wages or employment 
of other groups of workers in receiving countries. Occupational distribution suggests 
the presence of complementarities rather than substitution between migrants and 
natives. In addition, labour market effects are limited also in view of the relatively 
small size of the EaP migrant populations relative to the host populations or other 
immigrant populations in receiving countries. EaP migrants do not have 
disproportionately higher welfare take-up rates than other migrants as concerns the 
use of social assistance or social benefits. The Great Recession has worsened labour 
market outcomes of EaP migrants. This is a result of their employment in the sectors, 
which have been disproportionally affected by the recession, especially construction. 
Return of EaP migrants was more likely in those countries and contexts, where the 
possibility of re-entry was easier (e.g. temporary migration frameworks in Poland).   
Comparing the effects of EU8+2 migration with past EaP migration to Europe, at the 
macro-level we find positive effects of recent post-enlargement labour mobility on 
EU’s GDP, GDP per capita, as well as employment. This result appears to be 
conditional on free access to the EU’s labour markets, such as in the case of EU8+2 
immigrants.  We observe a small negative effect of migration in case of restricted 
access to EU labour markets, as in the case of EaP immigration. This result could in 
part be driven by restrictive migration policy frameworks towards EaP migrants that 
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appear to hamper migrants’ potential to integrate and improve the allocative 
efficiency across EU labour markets.   
 
What skills does the European Union need in medium-term future?   
Labour market needs are currently very diverse across Europe. Several countries in 
Europe are or will be in need for engineers, health professionals and other highly-
skilled professions in management and business administration. Lack of sufficient 
labour supply is also expected in low-skilled occupations. In particular, a further shift 
towards the service sector and aging of EU societies might further increase the need 
for immigration of domestic and care service workers.   
 
Can EaP migrants fill EU’s skill needs? 
We find that non-EU migrants respond to labour shortages in the EU more flexibly 
than native workers of similar characteristics. EaP migrants in particular fill the 
existing skill gaps, especially in low-skilled sectors: agriculture (Poland), household 
services and personal care (Spain, Italy, Germany), construction (Poland, Italy) and 
retail and hospitality (UK, Germany). EaP migrants, primarily migrant women, have 
played an important positive role in filling shortages in social and care services and 
have enabled native, primarily female, labour force to participate in employment. 
As EaP migrants across the analysed countries represent one of the best educated 
migrant groups, they are generally well suited to fill in demand in high-skilled sectors 
and represent a channel for further human capital development in the EU. However, 
it is relatively seldom that EaP migrants find employment in correspondingly skilled 
occupations. Poor skill matching of EaP migrants with tertiary education is therefore 
a problem from the perspective of EU needs for highly skilled migrants. The reasons 
for downskilling lie in institutional barriers, such as complicated recognition of 
qualifications.  Downskilling may also be an acceptable option for temporary 
migrants, whose time horizon does not permit sufficient returns on investment in 
country-specific human capital, which is then not undertaken. Short-term migrant 
strategies, however, might be responding to barriers in entry and integration into the 
EU societies.  
 
Future migration from EaP region and its predicted effects  
Fears over uncontrollable inflows following liberalisation of labour markets are 
unjustified. Based on an established prediction model taking into account 
demographic, economic and policy variables as well as network effects we project 
modest migration flows from the EaP to the EU until 2020. Our analysis shows that 
between 2011 and 2020 we can expect the following net migration flows from the EaP 
countries to the EU14:  
- under the baseline scenario of no policy change on average about 100 
thousand migrants per annum (1.03 million migrants over 2011-2020), 
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- liberalisation of short-stay visa leads to essentially no additional migration, 
- labour market liberalisation is projected to result in on average 100 to 300 
thousand additional migrants  per annum (0.96 to 3.03 million additional 
migrants over 2011-2020), depending on economic conditions as well as 
migration policies (selective or full liberalisation).   
 
Correspondingly, for the EU8 we can expect: 
- under the baseline scenario of no policy change on average about 40 thousand 
net migrants from the EaP per annum (0.4 million migrants over 2011-2020), 
- essentially no additional migrants if short-stay visa is liberalised, 
- selective labour market liberalisation is projected to result in little additional 
migration, up to 8 thousand migrants per annum; full liberalisation is 
projected to result in on average 37 thousand additional migrants per annum – 
this implies between 0.08 and 0.56 million additional migrants over 2011-
2020, depending on economic conditions as well as migration policies 
(selective or full liberalization) .   
Most migrants are predicted to go to Italy and Germany, and originate from Ukraine. 
 
The policy framework has a key role in affecting observable migration flows. The 
most important variable affecting observable flows of migrants are policy indicators, 
while migration costs and economic conditions matter less. Among policy factors, 
partial liberalisation is less powerful than full liberalisation. Visa liberalisation leads 
to no additional increase in migration. Observed flows follow an inverse U-pattern 
and after an initial rise, they tend to decline.   
An established NiGEM simulation model predicts that the projected migration from 
the EaP to the EU is likely to have a positive impact on host countries’ GDP over the 
2010-2020 period. There may be short-term costs in terms of slightly higher 
unemployment, but migration reduces inflationary pressures. In effect, a more liberal 
migration framework with EaP countries is likely to bring greater benefits to host EU 
countries, especially as concerns host countries’ GDP and inflation. Specifically under 
the baseline scenario “Closed Europe” we find:  
- Positive effects on GDP and GDP per capita, reaching 0.129 percentage points 
in the EU14 and 0.296 percentage points in EU8 above the no-migration 
benchmark by the end of 2020. 
- Anti-inflationary effects, attaining -0.15 percentage points in the EU14 and –
0.297 percentage points in the EU8 by 2020. 
- Small effects on unemployment, increasing it by 0.009 percentage points in 
the EU14 and 0.058 percentage points in the EU8 by 2020.  
Under “Cautious” and “Progressive Europe” scenarios the magnitude of the effects 
increases, yielding: 
- 0.307 percentage point increase of GDP in the EU14 and 0.868 percentage 
point increase of GDP in the EU8 by 2020 under “Cautious Europe” scenario, 
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- 0.490 percentage point increase of GDP in the EU14 and 1.919 percentage 
point increase of GDP in the EU8 by 2020 under “Progressive Europe” 
scenario. 
 
What scope for migration do existing EU and national migration 
frameworks provide?  
The existing labour migration policies across EU are diverse and differ in their scope 
and entry criteria. With a few exceptions, e.g. Poland, in most cases governmental 
programs do not target EaP countries specifically, but rather apply to third country 
nationals generally. This is mainly due to different labour market conditions, 
migration histories with the EaP countries, as well as the impact of the Great 
Recession, which has in some countries led to more restrictive migration policies. 
Existing legal frameworks shape migration patterns by influencing length of stay, 
routes of and selection upon entry, and sectoral allocation. Receiving countries’ 
migration frameworks but also their more general institutional and structural 
environment, especially labour market regulation and available types of contractual 
arrangements, strongly impact upon the possibilities for circular migration, especially 
of migrants employed in low-skilled sectors. Notably, imposition of stricter policies in 
one receiving country has spillover effects on migration trends elsewhere in Europe. 
Regularisations and amnesties targeting irregular migrants have served as 
interventions yielding ex post benefits to migrants as well as host countries, but may 
create an ex ante moral hazard problem. 
There are strong indications that the expensive and burdensome immigration 
procedures and generally restrictive migration policies currently characterizing most 
of the EU Member States are dis-incentivizing migrants from seeking legal routes of 
entry and employment and diverting them into irregularity. Currently applied entry 
regulations tend to complicate the circulation of migrants through ineffective border 
controls, contract-dependent residence permits, and lengthy bureaucratic processes 
of application and renewal of the documents. Another undesirable consequence is 
that migrants often develop various forms of dependencies on employers and 
intermediaries.  
 
Migration policy alternatives 
 
Liberalisation of labour markets with EaP countries 
The first-best policy option, based on the findings that (i) the European Union needs 
EaP migrants to provide the much needed labour force and fill-up skill shortages, (ii) 
liberalization of short-stay visa regimes leads to essentially none, and liberalization of 
access to labour markets to only modest, incremental migration flows, and (iii) labour 
market matching improves if migrants are allowed to freely adjust to changing labour 
market conditions, we propose gradual liberalisation of mobility between the 
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European Union and the Eastern Partnership countries. We evaluate gradual 
liberalisation as a triple-win scenario, in regard of the economic benefits and 
improved allocative efficiency of labour markets in receiving countries, potential for 
brain circulation and remittances for the sending countries and increased range of 
career possibilities for migrants themselves. Additional benefits lie in the relative 
simplicity and low implementation costs of liberalisation policies, lower migration 
costs for migrants and lack of rents for migration intermediaries.  
 
Visa liberalisation and facilitation 
A natural first step in gradual liberalisation is the liberalisation and facilitation of visa 
regimes. We find liberalisation of short-stay visa to have essentially no effect on the 
scale of additional migration inflows. The main benefits of visa liberalisation for 
receiving and sending countries lie in improved potential for circular migration and 
labour market matching, as well as in decreased pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs 
for migrants and their families.  
 
Labour market liberalisation and bilateral temporary migration frameworks  
We propose to extend the Blue Card migration framework to encompass broadly-
defined skilled workers, based on a transparent points system rewarding 
qualifications, job experience, language skills and age. Of central importance are 
complementary provisions for immigration of family members, measures facilitating 
integration into the labour market but also social services and assistance, and 
transparent rules for long-term residence and employment in the EU.  
As a general recommendation we propose the abandonment of the administrative 
labour market test policy in favour of labour market driven selection (i.e. of those 
obtaining a job offer in the country), possibly combined with general universally 
applied selection criteria (See Blue Card). We also propose the adoption of 
transparent policy rules for, and decrease the costs of, work permit acquisition, 
renewal or change. In addition, to further facilitate labour market matching we 
recommend that work permits are not tied to single job, employer, industry or region. 
A related proposal is to provide for grace periods regarding expiration of work and 
residence permits to facilitate adjustment by migrants, e.g. when seeking new 
employment. Similar provisions should govern work and residence permits for 
graduating students and immigration of family members. 
Bilateral and multilateral programmes between EaP countries and Member States 
especially concerning temporary and seasonal migration would allow for targeted 
opening based on needs of receiving countries and the potential of sending countries. 
Considerable scope exists for enhanced special migration provisions between the EaP 
countries and EU countries which are in need of domestic and care service workers, 
or specific types of high-skilled workers. The existing bilateral frameworks on 
transferability of social rights need to be reviewed to identify functional mechanisms 
and possible bottlenecks for different types of migrant workers.   
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Improvements in migrant integration  
The successful implementation of migration policies in terms of improved labour 
market matching requires complementary migrant integration policy frameworks. 
These relate to many spheres of life, including skill transferability, social rights, 
elimination or reduction of informational gaps, management of public opinion, and 
involvement of relevant stakeholders.  
 
Facilitation of skill transferability 
To overcome barriers leading to downskilling, we propose to facilitate recognition of 
qualifications in the spirit of the rules applying to intra-EU mobility. To overcome the 
discrepancies in the scope and quality of formal qualifications in the EaP and the EU, 
this includes the provision of a qualification recognition framework. 
 
Enforcement, equal access, and portability of social rights  
More balanced outcomes of migration for migrants and society as a whole can be 
achieved by better promotion and enforcement of equal social rights and working 
conditions of migrants. Portability of social rights is the backbone of improved 
mobility and labour market matching in the context of mobility between the EU and 
third countries, EaP in particular. It is especially important in regard of temporary 
and circular migration trajectories. We therefore propose that regulations governing 
the access to and portability of social rights for EU citizens are gradually extended to 
apply to EaP migrants as well. An important advantage for receiving countries would 
be the increased incentives to contribute to pension schemes guaranteeing a high 
degree of portability, and thus improved collection of contributions. This proposal 
includes efforts to harmonise national regulations in the sending countries with EU 
regulations. Such measures are likely to incentivise regular migration as well as 
encourage high-skilled mobility and brain circulation. Bilateral frameworks on social 
rights transferability are a useful transitional approach. 
 
Provision of information and ‘one-stop shops’ for migrants  
A lack of information disempowers migrants and exposes them to risk of exclusions 
or abuse. Making free consultancy centres, hot lines and outreach trainings available 
for migrants would help reducing the risk of abuse of the migration system by some 
intermediaries. Offering these services under one roof as ‘one stop shops’ in the EaP 
countries and EU Member States would be cost-effective and convenient for 
migrants. In the labour market a lack of information about job opportunities results 
in poor labour market matching. Strengthening of the capacity of employment 
agencies to provide for the needs of migrants is necessary to ensure better labour 
market matching of migrants in host labour markets.  
 
Invest into legislative improvements in employment and labour regulation in the 
geriatric and care sector  
The need for migrant labour in the geriatric and care sector is likely to grow. More 
supportive employment and labour regulations should be passed that would shelter 
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the migrants in cases of the death of the employer and would allow migrants time, 
shelter and security needed to find a new job.  
 
Reward good behaviour of migrants  
In order to attract skilled migrants to fill up labour market gaps, more stability and 
better prospects for possible full integration need to be available as an option. We 
propose to promote best practices to citizenship/permanent residence path to 
increase the transparency and predictability of migrants’ plans.  
 
Facilitate return migration and integration after return  
Sending countries should assist migrants by providing targeted information on 
various aspects of re-integration in order to facilitate return, circulation and re-
integration.  
 
Involve stakeholders 
The involvement of a broad range of stakeholders who can assist migrants needs to be 
promoted. Governmental and non-governmental organisations, civil society 
organisations, trade unions and the business sector, and migrants’ representatives in 
particular can provide social fabric conducive to migrant integration in receiving and 
sending countries. These actors should be actively involved in design and 
implementation of migration and integration policies. 
   
Strengthen and mobilize diasporas 
Migrants in sending countries (diasporas) can build an important basis for the 
effective attraction of the needed additional temporary and permanent workers. 
Diasporas can support circularity, and strengthen the economic relationships 
between sending and receiving countries through trade (imports, exports), 
investment and innovations. Diaspora organizations can play an important role in 
this. 
 
Inform public opinion about migration  
Negative public opinion about migration represents a key obstacle for Europe 
benefiting more from EaP migration. Improved dissemination of information about 
migration and its costs and benefits can help to break the vicious circle of negative 
attitudes towards migration leading to suboptimal policy reaction, which in turns 
results in adverse socio-economic outcomes, eventually further reinforcing the 
negative attitudes.   
 
Overall message 
 
There is much the EU, EU Member States, and EaP countries can do to enable all the 
involved stakeholders to benefit from increased labour mobility between the EU and 
EaP countries. An overarching paradigm should be that of transparent, participative 
and informed debate with stakeholders including the general public. Evidence-based 
policy making based on best practices should be a central policy paradigm. The role 
of data collection, independent evaluation and dissemination of findings, as well as 
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implementation of the lessons based on these findings into policy making, are all 
essential in this process. As concerns practical policy making, the paradigm of 
migration mainstreaming, whereby all labour and social regulations are scrutinised 
for their effects on mobile workers and all categories of migrants, needs to be 
adopted. Under such an approach the EU and EaP will mutually benefit from 
increased mobility between the two blocs, providing for sustainable prosperity and 
strengthened competitiveness vis-à-vis their global partners. 
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3. Introduction  
 
The goal of this report is to measure and evaluate the costs and benefits of migration 
from Eastern Partnership countries to Europe in the medium-term future (up to 
2020). Considering different scenarios of economic development and alternative 
migration frameworks, we propose policy recommendations on labour migration 
management framework between the EU and EaP region. The report therefore 
focuses on two broad aspects: measurement of current and future costs and benefits 
of migration and recommendations on improvements of labour migration 
management to achieve better labour market matching.  
Relying on complex cross-cutting methodologies, we estimate the impact of current 
immigration from the EaP countries on the labour markets in the EU. Using the EU’s 
experience from Eastern enlargement, we develop a projection model which 
estimates expected flows of EaP migrants under different economic performance and 
migration policy alternatives. As a next step, we quantitatively evaluate the impact of 
different labour market liberalisation scenarios in the time period up to 2020. 
Gathering rich and systematic empirical material at the macro-level as well as micro-
level and critical evaluation of existing EU and country-level policy initiatives helps 
us to propose a range of policy recommendations. These point toward a variety of 
areas that go beyond migration policy itself which need to accompany migration 
management processes in order to bring most benefits and least costs to receiving 
countries, sending countries and migrants.   
We argue that it is reasonable to expect modest migration flows from EaP countries 
(mostly from Ukraine) over the next decade if the policy status quo is maintained, 
and somewhat increased but still moderate flows if a more liberal migration 
framework is implemented. Based on assessment of EU’s labour market needs, 
migration potential in the EaP countries, and on finding generally positive effects of 
increased mobility to and within the EU, we see stable or moderately increased 
mobility as a positive and desirable outcome. Moreover, we consistently identify that 
the effects of migration are more positive in case of liberalisation which generates 
better matching and so more favourable impact for countries and migrants.  
Before proceeding to present the evidence, we discuss our approach to analysing costs 
and benefits, methodology and data, which – wherever relevant - will be presented 
also in the appropriate Annexes at the end of the report.   
1.1. A conceptual note on costs and benefits  
Migration and mobility engender various effects on receiving and sending societies. 
Relocation of individuals and populations with all their social, economic, political, 
cultural, ethnic and other dimensions certainly affects sending and receiving societies 
in complex ways and in many domains. Some of these effects may be given economic 
interpretation and conceptualised as costs and benefits. For the purpose of this report 
it is necessary to define boundaries of what we understand to be costs and benefits of 
migration and how we measure them. To account for the complexity of the effects of 
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migration but to do this in a tractable way, we adopt a three-level conceptualisation of 
economic costs and benefits of migration.    
More specifically, we look at migration-induced changes in wages, employment, 
labour market performance (e.g. matching the demand and supply of skills), GDP and 
the welfare state. We can distinguish between the following levels of effects within the 
cost-benefit analysis of migration:  
 Direct economic effects of migration through changes/adjustments in the 
aggregate demand. Economic theory predicts that the receiving country will gain 
from migration by an increase in output through growth of the labour force (hence 
production means) and the pool of potential consumers. This can produce benefits 
in terms of e.g. GDP growth, employment, purchasing power and the size and 
diversity of consumer demand. Particular direct effects depend on the need of a 
certain country or sector for migrant workers, on migrants’ skills, and on the sector 
where aggregate demand changes apply, as well as their particular institutional 
arrangements. 
 Indirect economic effects of migration involve those affecting the economic 
situation of a country not directly through aggregate demand. These effects are 
mainly channelled through the labour market and welfare state arrangements. For 
example, the inflow of migrants may increase output and employment through 
increased labour supply and possible effects on wages. The incumbent labour force 
may be affected positively or negatively, depending on the degree to which 
immigrant labour is substitute or complement to incumbent labour. Labour 
market institutions channel, constrain or redirect some of these effects. 
Specifically, immigrant integration into the host countries’ welfare systems may 
entail various costs and benefits, such as those related to migrants’ net 
contribution to public finances, which are also influenced by particular integration 
policies, migrants’ legal status, as well as industrial relations arrangements. For 
example, if a labour market remains closed for migrants, migrants may be driven 
into using irregular channels of entry. In that case, secondary costs of migration 
would go up, as social security premiums are not paid at all by irregular migrants, 
although some social benefits and services may be used. 
 Externalities of migration in general refer to social networks that migrants 
develop, secondary migration flows of families and children and their demand for 
housing, healthcare and education in the receiving countries. Other effects may 
arise through effects of immigration on natives’ preferences, which may for 
example bring repercussions on the receiving countries’ migration policies through 
institutionalised industrial relations institutions.   
The effects of immigration depend on the degree to which immigrant labour is 
substitute or complement to labour of non-migrant (native or resident) labour 
(Chiswick, Chiswick, and Karras, 1992; Chiswick, 1980, 1998). The analysis outlined 
in Kahanec (2013) sheds light on the redistributive consequences of immigration and 
out-migration. These effects thus depend on the skill distribution in populations of 
migrants and non-migrants. For example, incumbent low-skilled workers benefit 
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from an inflow of skilled workers, who complement them in production and thus 
increase the demand for low-skilled labour, resulting in higher employment and/or 
higher wages of low-skilled workers. Correspondingly, such immigration may 
dampen the wages of high-skilled workers, although this needs not happen if the 
increased demand for low-skilled labour resulted in their higher employment and 
thus (through complementarity of low- and high-skilled labour) an increased 
productivity of high-skilled workers in spite of their increased relative abundance. 
One can in the same vein track the redistributive effects of low-skilled immigration 
and low- and high-skilled out-migration.  
While this supply-demand framework is useful to elucidate the potential 
redistributive effects of migration, we need to note that other important factors may 
condition costs and benefits of migration. For example, migration may result in a 
better allocation of human capital, thus increasing productivity in the economy. It 
may also provide for cross-border social ties, thus facilitating international 
circulation of goods and services, capital, as well as ideas and knowledge (Bonin et al., 
2008). All types of labour may benefit from the resulting increased efficiency and 
productivity. The increased diversity of the labour force may provide for additional 
benefits (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006). On the other hand, barriers to integration may 
hinder immigrants’ adjustment to the conditions of the host society, which would 
adversely affect the effects migration may entail (Constant, Kahanec and 
Zimmermann, 2009; Kahanec, Kim and Zimmermann, 2011). Integration failures 
may lead to substandard labour market outcomes and possibly welfare dependency 
(Borjas, 1999; Brücker et al., 2002; Kahanec, Kim and Zimmermann, 2011; 
Zimmermann et al., 2012).  
Circular migration has been commonly considered as a win-win scenario, which is 
considered to deliver benefits to sending and receiving countries as well as individual 
migrants (and their families) (Constant, Nottmeyer and Zimmermann, 2012). 
Circular migration can release the pressure of unemployment from the welfare 
system of the sending states and generate remittances that can be spent in the local 
economy (Caipijus 2010, Favel 2008, de Haas 2005). It can be an alternative to the 
brain drain characterising other forms of permanent and even temporary migration, 
turning “brain-drain” into “brain-gain” and “brain-return” (Mayr and Peri 2009).  As 
it aims to encourage migrants’ return, it can also serve as a tool for EU to manage the 
influx of immigrants and might facilitate more effective matching of supply and 
demand for migrant labour force without necessarily creating higher rates of 
permanent migration” (Iglicka et al. 2011: 24).  
The receiving country gains flexible and temporary labour that does not pose the 
problems of integration and that is sensitive to “swings of markets and the shifting 
needs of employers as well as to the desires and plans of migrants who are not aiming 
at settling down in the destination country” (Triandafyllidou 2010: 11). Under such a 
scenario migrants are seen as benefiting from transnational labour market 
opportunities and the higher salaries in the receiving states. However, temporary 
migration is often based on the principle of unequal benefits as migrants’ rights in the 
country of migration are linked first and foremost to one’s employment contract. The 
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right for entering the country, further geographic mobility and circulation, the length 
of stay, ability to re-unite with the family, get access to various social provisions and 
health insurance in temporary migrating programs are often linked to one contract 
and the migrant’s ability to renew it. This generates complex vulnerabilities for 
migrants. We therefore evaluate costs and benefits of migration in this report also 
from this perspective and propose conditions under which temporary migration is 
more likely.  
 
1.2. Approach, methods and data  
Given the breadth and depth of this study, we adopt a battery of methodological 
approaches to triangulate the costs and benefits of mobility and any relevant policy 
options. As a primary source of country-specific evidence, we conducted five country 
studies carefully selected for this study. The five EU country studies (Italy, Germany, 
Spain, Poland and United Kingdom) provide an in-depth scrutinisation of the costs 
and benefits as well as feasibility of increased labour mobility between the EaP 
countries and the studied EU countries. National experts gathered and examined the 
available data about EaP migrants and provided detailed analysis of their profiles and 
current performance in the host country labour market in view of assessing the 
potential of EaP migration to fill the anticipated labour market gaps in the EU.  The 
country studies also bring important insights about past trends of EaP migration to 
the EU, their composition, performance, and sectoral and occupational allocation.  
The country case studies are complemented by a number of original analytical 
inquiries into the costs and benefits as well as feasibility and projected effects of 
increased labour mobility between the EaP countries and the studied EU countries. 
First, using a unique purpose-made dataset compiled from a number of sources we 
calibrate a prediction model enabling us to project dyadic migration flows between 
the EaP countries and the EU conditional on a number of archetypal migration 
scenarios conditioned by migration policies as well as macroeconomic and 
demographic variables. Given the recent experience of Europe with the Great 
Recession, that is the global economic decline during 2007-2009 and the ongoing 
Eurozone sovereign-debt crisis, migration scenarios take into account varied 
alternatives of economic growth in Europe in mid-term future.  
Second, we utilise a well-established simulation model to evaluate the potential 
effects of projected migration flows on GDP, employment rate, wages and inflation in 
the receiving countries.  
Third, using a unique dataset on international migration we investigate the effects of 
immigration from the Eastern Partnership Countries and the new EU member states 
on the EU economies. Using an empirical model accounting for the endogeneity of 
migration flows we evaluate the effects of immigration from these source countries on 
GDP, GDP per capita, capital stock, total factor productivity, employment rate, 
capital-labour ratio and output per worker.  
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Fourth, using the EU LFS and EU SILC data we evaluate the degree to which 
migrants and natives in Europe respond to increased job shortages across countries, 
sectors and occupations. This serves to evaluate the potential benefits of migration 
for the allocative efficiency of European labour markets.   
Fifth, we complement these perspectives by a comparative qualitative small scale 
research providing knowledge and evidence about costs and benefits at the household 
and individual level from the point of view of migrants, rather than countries. This in 
particular helps us to generate insights about factors contributing to temporary 
migration and barriers that complicate it.  
Sixth, based on a review of theoretical literature, we conceptually build a link between 
industrial relations and bargaining systems in particular and migration flows and 
costs and benefits of migration. We then use secondary resources to provide 
examples of evidence about selected country cases to identify some relationships 
through which the nature of industrial relations conditions the effects of migration on 
receiving countries in the EU.  
We position our findings against a review of the current legal framework and the 
strengths and weaknesses ensuing from it. We complement our analytical findings 
with results from an own online IZA Expert Opinion Survey eliciting views of expert 
stakeholders The survey conducted in Autumn 2012 identifies expert stakeholders’ 
views on the situation of immigrants in the EU, barriers to migrant integration and 
attitudes towards EaP migration. We also gather experts’ views on policy framework 
best suited to address labour market needs and about likely migration dynamics 
following potential introduction of more liberal migration framework vis-à-vis EaP 
countries (See Box 1.1).   
In our endeavour we rely on varied sources of data. First, across different studies we 
utilise representative cross-European survey data – EU LFS and EU SILC – as well as 
national representative sources to study profiles of migrants. In order to estimate 
current and past migration trends, we rely on a unique dataset of migrant flows 
(Adsera and Pytliková 2012, Pytliková 2012).1 In country-level estimations, the EU 
country studies gather and compare different sources of data to measure EaP 
migration profiles and to estimate country-level effects. We also conduct own data 
collection efforts: first, we collect household level data by conducting interviews with 
Ukrainian migrants in Italy and Czech Republic to enrich findings from other studies 
and to better understand decision-making of migrants and different redistributive 
impact of migration at the household level. Second, we approach migration experts 
and practitioners across EU27 countries with an online survey to investigate the 
                                                 
1 The dataset on international migration used for the analyses has been collected by Mariola Pytlikova and 
encompasses information on bilateral flows and stocks of immigrants from all world source countries in 42 
destination countries over the period 1980–2010. The dataset has been collected by requesting detailed 
information on migration inflows and foreign population stocks by source country from selected national 
statistical offices in 27 OECD countries. For six OECD countries – Chile, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Russian 
Federation and Turkey - the data comes from the OECD International Migration Database. For nine other 
destinations – Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovenia – the data is 
collected from the Eurostat. 
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status quo of EaP migration and their views of key stakeholders’ positions to 
migration and economically beneficial migration framework. Table 1 summarises the 
range of analytical inputs, applied methodologies and sources of data. Such 
triangulations of methods and data sources help us tackle some of the well-known 
limitations of migration data and provide more robust evidence to support our 
findings and ensuing policy recommendations.  
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Table 1: Summary of analytical inputs, methodology 
and data 
 Report/task 
type/title 
Authors 
Methodology and 
focus 
Data  
Country studies       
Italy 
Sabrina Marchetti, 
Daniela Piazzalunga, 
Alessandra Venturini  
Country study 
National representative 
sources 
Germany 
Costanza Biavaschi, 
Klaus F. Zimmermann  
Country study 
National representative 
sources 
Poland 
Maciej Duszczyk,  
Marek Góra, 
Paweł Kaczmarczyk  
Country study 
National representative 
sources 
        
Spain 
Lidia Farre, 
Nuria Rodriguez 
Planas 
Country study 
National representative 
sources 
UK 
Stephen Drinkwater, 
Ken Clark  
Country study 
National representative 
sources 
Background tasks    
Costs and benefits of 
EU10 and EaP 
migration 
Mariola Pytliková,  
Martin Kahanec  
Quantitative statistical 
analysis, 2SLS model  
EU SILC, own migration 
dataset 
Immigrant labour 
market matching in 
Europe 
Martin Guzi,  
Martin Kahanec, 
Lucia Kureková 
Quantitative statistical 
analysis, 2 stage 
estimation strategy:  
Stage 1: measurement of 
skill gaps 
Stage 2: measurement of 
migrants’ (vis-à-vis 
natives’) responsiveness to 
skill shortages 
EU SILC, EU LFS 
Migration projections 
Michael Fertig,  
Martin Kahanec 
Econometric projection 
model based on EU8 pre- 
and post-enlargement 
experience 
Migration data from 
Holland et al. (2011) 
amended with own data 
gathering from Eurostat 
Population Statistics, a 
broad compilation of 
data on economic, social 
and demographic 
variables and projections. 
Costs and benefits of 
projected flows 
Tatiana Fic,  
NIESR London 
NiGEM macroeconomic 
simulation model 
Data generated from 
projections (Fertig and 
Kahanec, 2013) 
Household level costs 
and benefits of 
migration 
Olena Fedyuk  
Small scale sociological 
study of Ukrainian 
migrants in Italy and 
Czech Republic  
Own data collection 
based on interviews with 
a small sample of 
migrants 
Role of labour unions 
for costs and benefits of 
migration 
Marta Kahancová, 
Imre Gergely- Szabó 
Conceptual and empirical 
review of link between 
industrial relations 
frameworks and migration 
costs and benefits 
Literature review, case 
study empirical 
investigation 
Other        
Institutional 
background, Italy & UK 
Claire Gordon (UK) 
Simone Millio (IT) 
Expert review National sources 
Expert Opinion Survey  
Martin Kahanec,  
Lucia Kureková 
Online survey targeting 
migration experts and 
practitioners  
Own data collection from 
EU 27 countries 
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1.3. Note on policy frameworks  
Throughout this report we discuss and evaluate existing policy frameworks and study 
migration under different migration policy scenarios.  In the range of policy options 
that we present in the final parts of the report, we discuss different alternatives and 
levels of liberalisation. We find it important to clarify the terminology and concepts 
that we are engaging with in the report, and we therefore summarise them in Table 2 
below. The categories are not exclusive of each other and often might coexist. They 
are ordered from least to most profound, and we provide examples of current or past 
implementation which will also appear in the text.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1.1: Eliciting stakeholders’ views: IZA Expert Opinion Survey 2012: 
Methodology and background 
The IZA expert online survey aiming to investigate various aspects of the current EaP 
migration to the EU countries was conducted among the expert stakeholders between 
November 2012 and January 2013. The survey was distributed to NGOs, think thanks, 
international organisations, migrant organisations, employers and employees associations 
and other expert and practitioner groups dealing with migration and immigrant integration 
in EU27 countries. The survey provides valuable input for drawing concrete 
recommendations for EU’s migration and mobility policy and enriches our understanding of 
the perceptions and attitudes towards existing migration exchange between the EaP 
countries and the EU countries. The questions were prepared to investigate the issues of 
attitudes, integration, barriers to labour market participation, evaluation of most significant 
benefits and costs, and assessment of economically desirable policy framework and policy 
changes. Some questions were framed with respect to different migration groups (non-EU, 
EaP, EU15 and EU12) to enable comparison across different groups, while others were asked 
about migrants and migration generally. The full questionnaire is available at the end of the 
report, and below we provide summary of key findings. 
We received more than 80 responses from a wide range of EU27 countries. 72% of the 
responses came from organisations in EU15 countries, the remaining were from EU12 
countries. The largest share of respondents - 40% - worked in non-governmental 
organisations. Governments, employers’ associations and trade unions were equally 
represented (about 14% each). Academic institutions represented about 8% of answers, 
thinks tanks 3% and 6% belong to other types of institutions, typically international 
organisations. The survey respondents are closely connected to migrant communities as 55% 
stated that they interact with migrants regularly or often and another 22% sometimes.  
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Table 2: Conceptual review of migration policy alternatives 
    Migration 
policy 
alternatives 
 
Explanation Examples 
Possible implementation /  
operational steps 
Status quo 
 
 
 
Existing  
migration  
framework 
Discussed in 
Chapter 6 
  
Visa 
facilitation 
process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Typically  
bilateral steps  
taken towards  
conditional  
easing of visa  
policy  
Fee waiver, visa 
waiver for specific 
categories, 
simplified 
application 
procedures, 
cancellation of 
short-term visa 
Action plan on visa facilitation 
 
EU directive on procedural aspects 
of visa application process  
Visa 
liberalisation 
 
 
Liberalisation  
of visa regime 
Cancelation of 
short-term visa or 
long-term visa 
Bilateral agreement of visa 
cancellation (e.g. visa free regime 
between Czech Republic and 
Slovakia between 1993-2004) 
 
EU directive on visa cancellation  
Selective 
liberalisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Partial  
liberalisation  
based on  
sector,  
occupation,  
job shortage 
or  
combination  
of factors  
Blue/green cards 
– eased assess of 
specific categories 
of workers 
 
Eased access 
based on shortage 
occupation list 
 
Preferential 
schemes for 
temporary 
workers from 
specific countries 
of origin  
Selective liberalisation established 
through bilateral agreement 
 
Selective liberalisation on EU level – 
directive on a category of selective 
liberalisation (e.g. Researchers’ 
directive, Blue Card directive)  
 
Temporary seasonal migration 
schemes between Poland and 
selected EaP countries 
 
SBS, SAWS – seasonal work 
schemes between UK and EU2 
Restricted 
liberalisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time delayed  
liberalisation 
-  
transitory  
periods on 
free  
movement of  
workforce 
EU2 accession to 
the EU in 2007 
Accession agreement with 
conditions on free labour mobility 
(transitory periods, registration 
requirements, e.g. Worker 
Registration Scheme – UK) 
Full 
liberalisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Free  
movement of  
workers  
allowed – no  
visa, no work  
permit 
needed 
EU8 accession 
after May 2011  
 
Commonwealth 
of Independent 
States (CIS) 
regime between 
Russia and EaP 
countries 
Accession agreement with no 
conditions on free labour mobility 
 
Loose labour market integration 
(e.g. CIS regime) 
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4. Characteristics of EaP migration 
4.1. Magnitude of migration flows in Europe 
The EU exhibits a relatively low rate of inter-state mobility (1 per cent per annum, 
vs. 3 per cent in the US). 
 Although slightly rising, migration from the EaP constitutes only a small fraction of 
total immigration to the EU: 3.46 and 3.68 per cent of total stock of immigrants in 
1995 and 2010, respectively.  
In 2010, the total EaP migrant population in EU27 was about 1.5 million. Most EaP 
immigrants came from Ukraine and went to Italy, Germany and Poland.  
The Great Recession slowed down or diverted migration flows; return migration 
occurred if migration was of an inherently temporary nature and/or re-entry was 
facile.  
The European Union exhibits a relatively low rate of labour mobility. The annual 
inter-state mobility of the working-age population in the EU15 prior to the 2004 
enlargement was about 1 per cent, compared to around 3 per cent in the United 
States, 2 per cent in Australia and Canada, and 1.7 per cent in the Russian Federation 
(Gill and Rasier, 2012). Annual interstate mobility is lower in southern EU Member 
States – only about 0.5 per cent – and higher in France, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, around 2 per cent (Bonin et al., 2008). Most 
migration to EU Member States has been from other European countries. 
Comparatively, flows and stocks of EaP migration in the EU27 have not been among 
the larger ones, but we see a steadily increasing trend in EaP migration to Europe 
during the last decade until the Great Recession. The drop in migration during the 
Great Recession marks a more general migration trend typical for other migrant 
groups in and outside of Europe, and given the temporary nature of the cause it is 
likely to be temporary as well.  
To demonstrate the main trends we use a unique dataset compiled by Mariola 
Pytliková (see Adsera and Pytliková, 2012, Pytliková 2012). Figure 1 describes 
migrant gross flows in EU countries, by source region. The biggest migration flows 
come from Europe, followed by Asia and Africa. Figure 2 allows for a closer look at 
the flows of migrants who originate from Europe. We divide the source countries into 
five groups: EU15, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland as one group 
(EU15+); EaP countries; EU10; EU2; and other European countries. Figure 2 shows 
that the highest inflow of immigrants comes from the “old” EEA group of source 
countries and Switzerland. The inflows are relatively stable over time, whereas the 
lowest immigration into EU27 destinations stems from the EaP source countries. 
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Figure 1: Migration flows to EU27 destination countries by regions of 
origin, 1990-2010 
 
Source: Gross inflows. Own calculations using migration flows and stock database collected by 
Pytliková (2012) 
Figure 2 also depicts how historical events affected migration flows in Europe. The 
1992 peak of migration from “Other European source countries” region corresponds 
to the development of migration around the fall of the Soviet Union. Also, one can 
observe a gradual but considerable increase in migration flows for the new EU 2004 
entrants after the 2004 EU enlargement. Similarly, migration from Bulgaria and 
Romania increases sharply around the 2007 EU enlargement.  
Figure 2: Migration flows to EU27 destination countries from Europe, by 
European regions of origin, 1990-2010. 
 
Source: Gross inflows. Own calculations using collected migration flows and stock database by 
Pytliková (2012) 
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Looking at the evolution of migration stocks, the trends closely follow the 
development in migration flows. European countries provide the highest number of 
migrants, followed by Asia and Africa (Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Foreign population stocks living in EU27 destination countries 
by regions of origin, 1990-2010. 
 
Source: Own calculations using collected migration flows and stock database by Pytliková (2012) 
 
In Figure 4 we disaggregate foreign population stocks stemming from Europe into 
more detailed regions of origin, similarly to Figure 2. We observe that the highest 
number of migrants living in EU27 countries come originally from the EU15+, 
whereas foreigners stemming from the EaP countries have the lowest numbers. Still, 
in the 2000s we observe an upward trend (until the Great Recession) in migration 
from the EaP, suggesting more vibrant migration dynamics which may continue after 
the pause due to the Great Recession.  
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Figure 4: Foreign population stocks living in the EU27 destination 
countries from Europe, by European regions of origin, 1990-2010. 
 
Source: Own calculations using collected migration flows and stock database by Pytliková (2012). 
Table A.1 in Annex A shows stocks of migrants from EU8, EU2 and EaP countries of 
origin in European destinations in 1995 and 2010 to provide perspective on changes 
over time and comparative evaluations of the magnitude of migration from the new 
Member States and EaP countries. Transitional arrangements applied differently 
across the EU toward citizens of new Member States, and other factors such as 
linguistic proximity or labour market performance, resulted in significant variation in 
terms of the intensity of migration flows across destination countries and in resulting 
stocks of foreign population. Whereas as of 2010 the main target countries for EU8 
citizens were the UK and Germany, relatively few of them live in new Member States 
and – among the EU15 countries – in Portugal and Greece. Italy and Spain 
dominated as the most attractive destinations for the EU2 migrants, while the other 
end of the range consisted mainly of the EU8 countries. EaP migrants predominantly 
live in Italy and Germany, followed by Poland and the Czech Republic. Countries such 
as Malta, Finland, Slovenia and the Netherlands are the least popular destinations 
among the EaP migrants.  Compared to other immigrant groups, EaP migrant 
presence in the new Member States (EU8+2) is currently much larger than in the 
EU15, but this was already the case in the mid-1990s, pointing to political, economic, 
cultural or linguistic connections (e.g. within the former Soviet Union) between these 
regions in the past.    
Table A.2 in Annex A shows, that from among the EaP countries, Ukrainian migrants 
typically constitute the most important migrant group both in absolute numbers and 
in percentage. In some cases, Belarusian or Moldovan migrants also have a 
significant share, suggesting that distance from the EU plays a role in migration 
decisions. Only migration from Belarus declined between 1995 and 2010, which 
points at a politically restrictive regime and, at least by official statistics, better 
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economic performance. It could also signal latent migration potential from Belarus 
should the conditions change.  
EaP migrants in the EU form diasporas that facilitate connections with family 
members and other people in the home country, thereby providing for flow of 
information and, in particular, for trade, investment and technological connections 
between sending and receiving countries. The main argument in the literature 
explaining these positive effects is that diasporas help to overcome informational 
asymmetries and other barriers. These are also the main channels through which 
diasporas contribute to development in their home countries, beyond the positive 
effects of remittances. 2      
 
EaP Migrant Stock: EU Country Studies 
EU country studies generally confirm the data presented above, although exact 
numbers might differ due differing statistical sources. Drawing on the EU country 
studies, we are better able to evaluate factors contributing to shifts in EaP migration 
trends and evaluate the propensity for illegal migration. There is considerable 
variation in EaP migratory flows across the selected EU countries. Some of the more 
significant changes to the earlier patterns were induced by the onset of the Great 
Recession, changes in immigration policy, or the recent European enlargements, 
sometimes in conjunction with other developments. While the flow of EaP migrants 
to the five EU countries in some cases mirrors that of other Eastern European 
countries3, it also contrasts them sharply in others. 
First, the Great Recession had the effect of halting formerly increasing inflows of EaP 
migrants. At the same time, little or no return migration has occurred as a result of 
the Great Recession, with the exception of cases where the migration project was 
most likely envisaged to be temporary from the very beginning (Poland, Italy) or 
where the existing framework offers a relatively easy re-entry (Poland). In some cases 
the recession increased competition with the native workforce or other immigrant 
groups, or revealed a weaker labour market position of EaP migrant workers leading 
to high unemployment as well as differential gender effect on employment outcomes.   
Second, the changes in immigration policy have in principle resulted in two effects. 
In Italy and Spain, regularisations resulted in the legalisation of the presence of 
migrants and in creation of more favourable conditions for their work. Both Poland 
and the UK implemented new migration frameworks in the latter half of the 2000s. 
These resulted in favourable and preferential access for EaP migrants to the Polish 
labour market, but significantly restricted access to the British labour market. In 
Germany, the Immigration Act of 2005 facilitated the acquisition of residency for 
highly qualified and self-employed persons, while limiting residence permits for 
gainful employment to the needs of the German business and local labour market 
conditions. Descriptive evidence in Constant and Tien (2011) shows that the 
                                                 
2 See Plaza (2013). 
3 For example. migrants from EU2 or EU8 or specific countries from these groups.  
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Immigration Act of 2005 appears to be associated with a reduction in the overall 
number of immigrants being granted a work permit. Such reduction has particularly 
impacted Ukrainian migrants (6.9 per cent decrease in stock).  
Third, the Eastern EU enlargements had the effect of changing the balance of 
competition between workers from new Member States and EaP countries to the 
detriment of the latter. In the UK and Germany in particular, previous EaP flows 
were, after the Eastern enlargement, replaced with EU8 and EU2 migrants. Some of 
the EaP flows have been redirected to the new Member States (e.g. Poland), which 
have been experiencing labour shortages but which have also made changes to their 
migration policy frameworks that have re-instituted a more favourable position for 
EaP migrants (mainly Ukrainians) that had been lost with the entry of EU8 countries 
to the Schengen agreement.  
Illegal migration is generally very difficult to measure. Countries with frequent 
regularisations are able to estimate irregular migration ex-post. Irregular migration 
into Italy is wide-spread, but originates mostly in sub-Saharan Africa. From the EaP 
countries, Ukrainian irregular migrants are estimated at 28,000 (6.7 per cent of all 
irregular migrants) and Moldovans at 17,000 (4.1 per cent of all irregular migrants) ( 
Marchetti, Piazzalunga and Venturini, 2013). Illegal immigration into Spain is 
considered frequent due to government’s low capacity to manage the flows. Precise 
numbers, however, are unavailable (Farré and Rodríguez-Planas, 2013). In Poland 
illegal migration is very small in absolute numbers, but on average more present in 
sectors such as household services, trade and transport. Being employed in 
construction, agriculture and other services increases the probability of legal 
employment. This has been linked to the recently introduced measures targeting 
workers in such sectors as agriculture and construction which have been successful in 
redirecting EaP migrants into legal employment and payment of tax contributions 
(Duszczyk, Góra and Kaczmarczyk, 2013). In the UK, most migrants are expected to 
be failed asylum seekers rather than overstayers or illegal entrants; for this reason, 
the total number of illegal EaP migrants is likely to be very low, but estimates based 
on the country of origin are not available (Clark and Drinkwater, 2013). Estimates of 
irregular migration into Germany could not be generated on the basis of available 
data sources (Biavaschi and Zimmermann, 2013). 
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4.2. Migrant profiles 
EaP migrants are rather well educated, often exceeding the education attainment 
levels of natives and other immigrants. 
 
Most EaP migration appears temporary and it is gendered along sectors of 
employment. 
 
In spite of their relatively high level of educational attainment, EaP migrants 
predominantly find employment in low-skilled and unskilled sectors.  
 
Downskilling of EaP migrants is a function of various factors, ranging from 
institutional barriers (recognition of qualifications) to migrants’ preferences.  
 
There are distinct patterns describing EaP migrants in the EU emanating from the 
country studies, which we summarise in Table 3. Some particularly important general 
characteristics of EaP migration are the distinctly gendered composition and the very 
poor skill-job match. Male and female EaP migrants find employment in different 
sectors in which they are then rather concentrated. Male EaP migrants find 
employment predominantly in construction or agriculture, while female EaP 
migrants find employment mainly in the domestic care and service sector. 
Positioning in low-skilled sectors implies low average earnings and higher labour 
market vulnerability. Migrants from EaP countries typically belong to the younger 
and better educated of all groups relative to both natives and other immigrant 
groups, yet encounter difficulties in labour market integration and skill recognition, 
as well as low prospects to catch up with other immigrant groups or natives. The 
situation is different for female EaP migrants who work in the domestic care sector – 
they are typically older than their colleagues in the other sectors. EaP migrants also 
often constitute the group of immigrants that has arrived more recently, and their 
migration patterns with respect to destinations within the receiving countries reveal 
the influence of migrant networks.  
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Table 3: Overview of EaP migrant profiles based on country studies 
  UK Spain Poland Germany Italy 
Education Primary-Low 18.7* 8/9** n.a. 20* 7.2* 
 
Secondary-Medium 14.7 34/44** n.a. 31 69.1 
  Tertiary-High 53.5 45/37** 25.9* 44 23.7 
 
In Education 12.1 n.a. 18 20 n.a. 
Age Average Age n.a. 37 n.a. 44* n.a. 
 
Age Groups 36.4* n.a. 
 
n.a. 13 
  
(see notes Table 
A.3 Annex A.3) 
44.5   53.3*   14 
  
12.9 
   
21.5 
    5.1       29.5 
    1   1.4   21.5 
Gender Female 59.0 56 57.7* 61* 67 
  Male 41 44 42.3 39 23 
Occupation 
Low Skilled- 
Unskilled 
47.1* 90/94** 24.2* 25* 96.5* 
 
Medium Skilled 31.2 6.3 35.8 41 2.5 
  High Skilled 21.7 4.3 1.4 34 0.9 
Economic 
Activity 
Employed 67.8* 63/78** 87.5* 31* 76/72* ** 
  Unemployed 7.8 n.a n.a. 16 7.8 
  Inactive 24.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. 19/22** 
Sectoral 
Allocation 
Manufacturing-  
Production 
13.7* 0/10.24** 9.1* 16* 
3.9/23.3* 
** 
(see notes 
Table A.3 
Annex A.3) 
Construction 6.5 0/42.19** 29.6 3 0/28.3** 
  Retail-Hospitality 28.8 23.73/2.88** 2.3 17 8.7/10** 
 
Transport- 2.9 n.a. 6.9 7 0.4/8.3** 
  Communications           
 
Business Services- 
Finances 
24.5 n.a. 6.8 18jj 0/0** 
  Public Services 15.8 n.a. n.a. 33 0/0** 
 
Domestic Services n.a. 56.23/2.56** 20.5  72.1/8.3** 
  Agriculture n.a. 3.71/4.15** 6.3 1 2.4/6.7** 
  Other Services 7.9 4.71/1.58** n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
Notes: In per cent of the respective population. * Refers to Ukrainian migrants only.  ** Female/male. 
See Table A.3 in Annex A for extensive details. 
Sources: Country studies: Biavaschi and Zimmermann, 2013; Clark and Drinkwater, 2013; Duszczyk, 
Góra and Kaczmarczyk, 2013; Farré and Rodríguez-Planas, 2013; and Marchetti, Piazzalunga and 
Venturini, 2013 
 
Within the IZA Expert Opinion Survey 2012 expert stakeholders were asked to 
evaluate the nature of migration from EaP countries (Table 4). In comparison to 
other third-country immigrants, EaP migration is viewed as less permanent. While 
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more than a third of experts evaluated EaP migration as irregular, about two thirds 
considered the flows as prevalently legal. The most important reason for EaP 
migration is labour motive. Compared to other non-EU migrants and intra-EU 
mobility, student migration is less prevalent. Generally, non-EU migrants are seen as 
having irregular status more frequently than EU migrants.  
 
Table 3: Prevalent nature of migration 
   Temporal nature Legal aspect Reasons for 
migrating 
  
 
Permanen
t 
Temporar
y or 
circular 
Seasona
l 
Irregula
r 
Regula
r 
Work Family Study 
Non-
EU  
 63% 61% 17% 35% 81% 81% 55% 47% 
EaP   47% 49% 18% 36% 66% 71% 30% 19% 
EU15  57% 65% 11% 2% 82% 77% 30% 49% 
EU12  61% 64% 30% 11% 84% 87% 37% 36% 
 
Source: Own calculations based on IZA Expert Opinion Survey 2012. Respondents were asked “What 
is the prevalent nature of migration to your country?” Multiple responses were possible; percentages 
do not need to sum up to 100. N= 83. 
 
The country case studies also provide specific lessons about particular countries. 
According to the UK country study (Clark and Drinkwater, 2013), EaP migrants in the 
UK are relatively young and well-educated compared to natives and other immigrant 
groups. Data sources suggest a feminisation of migration flows to the UK. EaP 
migrants find employment mainly in the retail and hospitality sector (but also in the 
business and finance sector) implying a mismatch between employment and their 
actual relatively high skill level as measured by educational attainment. Additionally, 
their employment rates are lower than those of other European migrants for both 
genders. EaP migrants concentrate in London, for its economic status and social 
networks. 
EaP migrants in Spain are younger on average than the native population and also 
considerably better educated (Spanish country study, Farré and Rodríguez-Planas, 
2013). They work mainly in the domestic and construction sector.  Female EaP 
migrants are much more likely to be employed than their native counterparts. Their 
high level of education does not match their employment in low-skilled occupations. 
Labour market integration is partial, yet they have the potential of catching-up to 
other immigrant groups and natives and eventually surpassing them. Migrant 
networks are influential when it comes to the location of EaP migrants in Spain. EaP 
migrants represent the most recent immigration wave in Spain, which due to the 
need of adjustment may partly explain their worse employment outcomes. Another 
factor is their higher concentration in sectors more significantly affected by the crisis.  
According to the Polish country study (Duszczyk, Góra and Kaczmarczyk, 2013), EaP 
migrants in Poland are mainly employed in low-skilled occupations (construction, 
agriculture and domestic sectors). A considerable share also immigrates via the study 
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route rather than through employment. As a result of temporary employment 
frameworks, EaP labour migrants stay mostly between 3 and 12 months. Yet a clear 
distinction can be made between predominantly female EaP migrant workers staying 
longer than 6 months (domestic sector), and mainly male EaP migrant workers 
staying up to 6 months (construction, primary sector employment). Their level of 
education is higher than that of natives and they are younger on average than the 
native population. EaP migration to Poland (especially from Ukraine) has 
consistently been high, and is driven by long-standing migrant networks and 
relations.  
EaP migrants enter Germany for study, work or family reasons (German country 
study, Biavaschi and Zimmermann, 2013). EaP immigration has become a female 
phenomenon since the 1990s. While Ukrainian immigrants are largely the same age 
as the native population, other EaP migrants are younger. EaP migrants are better 
educated than natives or other migrant groups, yet experience difficulties in labour 
market integration. Their employment rates are below those of natives and they do 
not catch up with time. Their length of stay in Germany is shorter (though increasing) 
than that of other immigrant groups and their numbers levelled off around the mid-
2000s. They are mostly employed in low-skilled sectors (hotel & food services, 
domestic sector), exhibiting the widest skill-job mismatch in comparison to all other 
migrant groups.  
EaP migration to Italy is structured around two different patterns: an older, female 
immigration flow from Ukraine, and a male-dominated and younger immigration 
flow from Moldova (Italy country study, Venturini, Piazzalunga, and Marchetti, 
2013). They signify a temporary and a more permanent migration plan, respectively. 
Overall, females are more frequent among EaP migrants in Italy. EaP migrants show 
very high and gendered employment rates, mainly in construction and the domestic 
sector. They are also among the best educated of all immigrant groups, yet their skill-
job match is very poor with little prospect for improvement.  
In sum, in all studied countries the EaP migrants were found to be rather well 
educated, often exceeding the education attainment levels of natives and other 
immigrants. Moreover, a larger share of migrants have technical and engineering 
degrees (Duszczyk, Góra and Kaczmarczyk, 2013, Biavaschi and Zimmermann, 2013). 
In spite of high level of educational attainment, a large majority of EaP migrants find 
employment in low-skilled and unskilled sectors, such as agriculture, construction 
and domestic and care services. There is a small proportion of EaP migrants who 
work in highly skilled sectors (e.g. financial services in the UK, IT industry in 
Poland). The allocation of EaP migrants is gendered across sectors of employment. 
Especially in Italy, Spain and Germany, Ukrainian migration is female-dominated 
(domestic care sector). Male migrants from the EaP countries typically find jobs in 
the construction sector or in agriculture, which have a more seasonal character. Many 
migrants also work in trade and services. The importance of migrant networks should 
not be neglected; a possible pitfall of migrant networks is the resulting concentration 
of EaP migrants in certain regions possibly resulting in skill mismatches (Duszczyk, 
Góra and Kaczmarczyk, 2013). 
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Downskilling  
The studies jointly revealed that EaP migrants are typically not well-matched with 
respect to the level of formal education they attained at home.  Key factors that have 
been proposed in country case studies to explain down-skilling in the country studies 
related to different dimensions. 
First, labour market positioning of EaP migrants is structured by the type of demand 
in these countries and existing labour market segmentation, which might be further 
reinforced by sufficient supply of immigrant labour. The second factor relates to 
migrant strategies. If the migration project is temporary, migrants accept less skilled 
positions more readily  and might not strive for improved conditions, as the 
investment in country-specific skills (e.g. language) required for climbing up the 
occupational or social ladder may have low returns on investment (e.g. in terms of 
increased wages or employment chances over a time horizon of limited duration). 
Third, measured down-skilling might rather be a measure of the short stay in the 
receiving countries. The country studies have demonstrated that EaP migrant groups 
belong to the most recent arrivals, while labour market integration and skill 
upgrading typically requires time. As “late arrivals” they have had little time to adjust 
in the domestic labour market and move into higher positions more appropriate to 
their skills.  
The fourth aspect relates to institutional barriers embodied in difficulties in the 
process of recognition of qualifications or restrictions on transition to other jobs. 
Recognition of qualifications plays a particularly important place in German 
migration policy, making the immigration procedure lengthy and costly. In Germany, 
several initiatives to improve the situation have been implemented in the past few 
years, including the new Federal Law on Recognition of Foreign Qualifications. 
However, the process remains cumbersome, expensive and complicated, as the fees 
vary by Federal States (IOM, 2013b). This might be creating barriers for better skilled 
migrants in particular, possibly redirecting them to countries with more favourable 
frameworks. Recognition of foreign qualification is important not only from the 
perspective of matching, but also with respect to migrant employability (IOM, 
2013b). Self-employment is, in some countries, a way of entering the domestic labour 
market, while this does not seem to be the case in others. In addition, if migration 
policy is temporary by design, a possibility of transition into higher positions from 
low-skilled jobs is often not legally possible. 
While the temporality of stay might have detrimental effects on wage and 
employment development of EaP migrants, temporary arrangements appear to be 
preferred by most EaP migrants. The appeal of such migration plans may be due to 
their less restrictive regulation and better predictability, compared to uncertain and 
administratively burdensome long-term prospects regarding acquisition of 
permanent residence and work permits or ascension to citizenship.  
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The 2012 IZA Expert Opinion Survey provides additional insights into the key factors 
contributing to mismatch between relatively high formal qualifications of migrants 
and their low-skilled jobs. Expert stakeholders identified difficulties in recognition of 
qualifications (52%), discriminatory attitudes (42%) and institutional barriers in legal 
framework (35%) as the key factors explaining downskilling of migrants in their 
respective countries (Figure 5). A third of experts considered also poor access to 
information about the employment opportunities and insufficient knowledge of the 
official language as factors leading to downskilling.  
 
Figure 5: Factors of immigrant downskilling 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on IZA Expert Opinion Survey 2012. Respondents were asked 
“Immigrants in the EU are known to often work in occupations that are below their level of formal 
qualification. Which of the following barriers do you think best explain this phenomenon in your 
country?” Multiple responses were possible; percentages do not sum up to 100. N= 83. 
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5. EU labour market needs  
The European Union need immigrants – high-skilled but also low-skilled.  
 
Labour shortages were high among skilled-manual occupations in the agricultural, 
health and education sectors over the late 2010s. At the same time skilled non-
manual occupations in the agriculture and construction sectors experienced the 
largest decline in labour shortage 
 
In the medium term (until 2020), shortages are expected for health professionals, IT 
staff, engineers, sales representatives, and accounting and finance staff, as well as 
in sales, services and elementary occupations. 
 
Due to its aging populations and in view of structural changes and shifts, Europe is 
likely to need immigrant labour to fill in replacement jobs and newly emerging jobs. 
The structure of future demand is expected to be varied and include highly-skilled as 
well as low-skilled jobs. According to a survey conducted in 2009 by Kahanec and 
Zimmermann (2011), 87.3 per cent of labour market experts indicate that the EU 
needs at least as many immigrants as it has now, and 56.6 per cent believe that 
compared to the current situation the EU needs more or many more immigrants. This 
conviction is even stronger for high-skilled immigrants (the corresponding figures are 
96.1 and 81.2 per cent) and somewhat weaker for low-skilled immigrants (the 
corresponding figures are 58.1 and 25.8 per cent). The surveyed experts foresee 
inflows dominated by low-skilled immigrants, although the survey indicates that the 
supply of and demand for high-skilled workers is going to be less negatively affected 
by the Great Recession than in the case of their less-skilled colleagues.   
An analysis of current labour market situations,  the European Vacancy Monitor, 
conducted in 2012 identified top bottleneck occupations in the following medium- to 
high-skilled occupations: health professionals, IT staff, engineers, sales 
representatives, and accounting and finance staff (EC and ECORYS, 2012).  
We have conducted our own analysis to estimate labour shortages in the EU in the 
recent past. In Guzi, Kahanec and Kureková (2013), movements of residual wages 
calculated using EU LFS and EU SILC data have been used as a measure of labour 
shortages under the assumption that an upward movement of wages signifies, ceteris 
paribus, a tightening of the labour market and therefore increasing skill shortages. In 
particular, the methodology of measuring labour shortage is inspired by Borjas 
(2001), whereby labour shortage is measured by average residual wage in the given 
country, industry, and occupation after controlling for the composition of the labour 
force in so defined group. Comparison of this wage residual across countries, 
industries and occupations permits evaluation of the extent of wage dispersion net of 
labour force composition.4 Labour shortage is evaluated in relative terms by 
                                                 
4 Differences in the cost of living are not accounted for. 
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contrasting the situation in each country, industry and occupation to the European 
Union mean in the particular year.  
Figure 6 depicts the average wage premiums in European countries during the 
2000s. It can be observed that workers in Austria are paid wages that are, net of the 
differences in the characteristics and distribution of labour force, close to the 
European average. Among the countries with relatively low wage premium are 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain; on the other hand in Denmark and Sweden, and 
initially also in Ireland and the United Kingdom, wage premiums were well above the 
EU average.  In some countries the wage premium decreased over time (e.g. France, 
Ireland, United Kingdom) while it has increased in others (e.g. Finland). Non-
monotonic development is observed in yet other countries (e.g. Denmark, Greece, 
Italy, and Sweden). It is exactly this variation that is indicative about the existence of 
labour shortages. The analysis in Guzi, Kahanec and Kureková (2013) identifies that 
the labour shortage in the European countries remained high among skilled-manual 
occupations in agriculture and the health and education sectors over the studied 
period. At the same time skilled non-manual occupations in the agriculture and 
construction sectors experienced the largest decline in labour shortage.  
Figure 6: Wage premiums in the EU countries, 2004-2010 
 
Source: Adapted from Guzi, Kahanec and Kureková (2013) 
Note: The figures represent average residual wages in the given country, industry, and occupation after 
controlling for the composition of the labour force.  It is estimated from log-wage regressions based on 
yearly samples.  
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CEDEFOP (2012) in its analysis aimed at predicting skill needs in Europe in the 
upcoming decade estimated that more than 8 million additional jobs are to be created 
by 2020. Another 75 million jobs will emerge in this period as “replacement jobs” to 
fill in vacancies emerging after workers take up retirement or leave the labour market 
for other reasons. The high share of replacement job opportunities reflects the aging 
work force in Europe. In 2010, the share of the labour force aged over 45 already 
stood at an average of almost 40% (Figure 7). The CEDEFOP forecast estimated a 
further growth over the next decade in the share of national workforce aged over 45 
years in the great majority of EU countries with more pronounced labour force aging 
problems in some of the largest EU countries and economies: Germany, France, Italy, 
or Romania (Figure 7).  
In fact, despite the variation in the level of the labour force share and projected old-
age dependency ratios across the Member States, the potentials for intra-EU mobility 
are dramatically hampered by the concurrent decline in the share of young, mobile 
European workers (Bonin et al, 2008). In fact, the share of the 20-29 population 
within the total population is expected to decrease by almost 20% by 2020  and 
converge across Member States  (Bonin et al., 2008), with the sharpest reduction in 
Eastern Europe. The authors claim that trends cannot be tackled without 
immigration from outside the EU and they therefore call for pro-active measures to 
strengthen migration and mobility frameworks.  
Figure 7: Share of labour force aged over 45 by country, 2010 and 2020 
 
Note: Per cent. Countries are sorted by the highest share of aged labour force in 2020. The figures for 
2020 represent projections.  
Source: CEDEFOP, 2012 
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openings will be in services. Traditional manual and routine jobs are on decline, and 
due to weak expected employment growth in the next decade, the supply of people 
with high-level qualifications will exceed demand, leading to short-term over-
qualification. Services including tourism, health care and IT are expected to generate 
most job growth in the years up to 2020, but at a slower rate than anticipated earlier 
due to crisis-related austerity measures.  
In spite of relatively high unemployment levels, shortages will also appear. Shortages 
are likely to exist under the forecast assumption of 75% level employment rate, which 
is the EU 2020 employment target. Shortages are in part a result of inefficiencies in 
job matching at the micro-level but also reflect insufficient skill mix or skill 
deficiencies not reflected in formal education levels. Notably, CEDEFOP (2012, p. 13) 
expects the greatest recruitment difficulties in sales, services and elementary 
occupations (ISCO 91). 5 Sales, services and elementary occupations belong to the ‘top 
five occupations’ most in demand up to 2020, where over 7 million (new and 
replacement) jobs likely are to be created. Importantly for this report, a factor likely 
to contribute to a shortage in these occupations is the quality of working conditions 
and pay levels, which might not be sufficiently attractive to national workers 
(CEDEFOP 2012). These positions have traditionally been filled by migrant workers.  
Other occupations projected to be most in demand in the medium term (until 2020) 
are high-skilled corporate managers (ISCO 12), professionals (ISCO 24 and 34), and 
personal and protective service workers (ISCO 51) (CEDEFOP 2012, p.10).  These 
require a more educated workforce and are expected to create about 26 million jobs 
(most of which will be replacement demand).  
  
                                                 
5 The projections are based on the assumption that the mix of qualifications (share of high, medium and low 
qualified workers) in the occupation will remain stable. Based on forecasting results this mix is more likely to 
remain stable in higher-level occupations (such as associate professionals) than in lower ones (such as plant and 
machine operators). (CEDEFOP 2012, p.13) 
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6. Relevance of EaP migrant profiles for the EU labour 
needs 
 
EaP migrants have been filling existing gaps in host countries’ labour markets. 
 
Due to a relatively small number of EaP migrants in the EU such positive effects 
have been in aggregate limited. 
 
Immigrants generally provide for a more efficient allocation of workers. For 
instance, they enable native households to engage in market employment by 
providing substitute domestic care. 
 
While the EaP Synthesis Report (Barbone, Bonch-Osmolovskiy and Luecke, 2013) 
highlights demographic limitations that EaP countries themselves might be facing in 
the future, the EU country studies document that the profiles of EaP migrants are 
well suited and relevant for current and future EU labour market needs. Our in-depth 
analysis points out that particular needs across the EU are diverse.  The findings from 
the country studies suggest that skill demand structure and shortages vary widely 
across the EU countries, as a result of different economic structures, demographic 
curves or the impact of the EU enlargement and economic crisis.6 The consensus 
arising in the country studies is that EaP migrants have been filling the existing gaps 
in host countries’ labour markets, and thus their economic impact is generally 
positive. Due to a relatively small number of EaP migrants in the EU to date, 
however, the aggregate impact on host countries’ labour markets is limited. In Table 
5. below we synthesise the current and future labour market demand as evidenced in 
the five country studies and expert evaluations of the degree to which EaP migrants 
can match the future needs.  
 
The country studies identified that the EaP migrants have been filling the current 
gaps in the host countries’ labour markets in sectors such as agriculture (Poland), 
household services and personal care (Spain, Italy, Germany), construction (Poland, 
Italy) or retail and hospitality (UK, Germany) (see again Table 3). Especially in Italy 
and Spain, EaP migrants have played an important positive role in filling demand in 
the ‘shortage’ sectors in social and care services. Moreover, the EaP migrants 
complement natives in employment and have contributed to female labour market 
participation in Italy and Spain.  
The role that female labour migrants have played in low and medium-skilled 
domestic care services should be particularly highlighted. While the over-
qualification of these migrant women remains a concern, their contribution to the 
host country labour market has been significant both through direct micro-level 
impacts as well as by enabling the national female labour force to participate in 
                                                 
6 Biavaschi and Zimmermann, 2013; Clark and Drinkwater, 2013; Kaczmarczyk, Gora and Duszczyk, 2013; 
Farré and Rodríguez-Planas, 2013; and Marchetti, Piazzalunga and Venturini, 2013; see also CEDEFOP 2012. 
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market employment. The demand in this sector appears to be robust even during the 
crisis, which has been evidenced by the fact that female EaP migration has remained 
stable over the past few years. A further shift towards the service sector in some EU 
labour markets might further increase the need for female (EaP) immigration to fill 
these types of labour market shortages and gaps, which are likely to grow further in 
view of EU’s aging populations. On the other hand, EaP migrants are generally well-
educated and thus well suited to fill in shortages in the high-skilled sectors identified 
by forecasting studies (CEDEFOP 2008, 2012). Efforts need to be increased to ensure 
their matching to high-skilled job openings in specific sectors, where they may be 
most needed. 
 
 
Table 4: Labour needs in five case countries and potential for EaP 
matching 
 
Country Labour Market Needs 
Potential EaP Migration 
Matching 
UK Current   
- 34 occupations figure on the “shortage 
occupation list” of which 16 require an 
education in the STEM subjects - EaP migrants are not regarded as 
matching shortage occupations 
identified by MAC, but mostly due to 
downskilling  
- there is a focus on attracting high-skilled 
non-EEA migrants to the UK 
- migrants might also offer particular soft 
skills (linguistic and cultural skills) 
Future    
- the UK does not produce enough graduates 
in the STEM subjects 
- future opportunities for EaP 
migration to the UK lie where a 
strategic or sectoral shortage of skill 
has been identified by MAC 
Spain Current   
 
- a “difficult to cover occupations”-list is 
published quarterly 
- candidates with technical degrees 
and for the care sector are in the focus 
- vacancies are in the fishing and the naval 
sector 
- prior to 2008 – vacancies in construction 
and restoration sector 
Future 
 
- many skilled natives (e.g. engineers, 
business men, architects) have left or are 
leaving the country and are not likely to 
return - EaP migrants are regarded as “good 
candidates” to cover future labour 
market demands 
- skilled immigrants are regarded as “good 
candidates” to cover the resulting vacancies 
- additionally, there will be an increase in 
demand for elderly care service 
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Poland Current   
- employment of immigrant workers mainly 
in managerial and professional positions 
(employment based on specific skills) 
- Ukrainian immigrants play an 
important role in industry and 
services 
- deficit profession are industry manual 
workers and craftsmen (2007-2011) 
- EaP immigrants are relevant in the 
‘secondary labour market’ 
Future    
- medium & large firms display a potentially 
higher demand for foreign labour (in sectors 
such as industry & mining, or construction) 
- most intense inflows are expected 
from Ukraine and Belarus 
- demand is also predicted for the agricultural 
sector (seasonal) and services sector 
- language similarities facilitate EaP 
migrant employment, e.g. in the 
household/service sector 
Germany Current   
 
- high skilled and skilled workers  
- current matching has not been good 
due to poor recognition of 
qualifications and poor selection 
Future 
 
- shortage of graduates and individuals with 
vocational training by 2020 
- EaP migration is desirable for two 
reasons: 1.) it is seen to help to 
alleviate future demographic 
problems, and  
2.) EaP migrants, especially females, 
have favourable degrees  in STEM and 
engineering, more-so than other 
migrant groups  
- engineering, health care, legal, management 
and business administration, and science 
occupations are expected to experience 
shortages 
Italy Current   
- demand for unskilled workers 
- current employment in family sector 
(female) and construction (male)  
- demand across all sectors (construction, or 
services, e.g. tourism, restaurants & hotel 
sector, health, social services, private health 
sector) 
Future    
- demand for unskilled workers will continue 
– construction, health and social services  
- there is a lack of estimates for the 
household sector, the most important 
sector currently for female EaP 
migrants 
 
Source; Authors’ elaboration based on EU country studies: Biavaschi and Zimmermann, 2013; Clark 
and Drinkwater, 2013; Duszczyk, Góra and Kaczmarczyk, 2013; Farré and Rodríguez-Planas, 2013; 
and Marchetti, Piazzalunga and Venturini, 2013.  
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7. Costs and benefits of migration  
 
In this section we turn to costs and benefits of labour mobility between the EaP 
countries and the European Union. To measure and evaluate these costs and benefits, 
we adopt a cross-cutting triangulation approach applying a range of methodologies 
and using a number of primary and secondary data. To this end we first extrapolate a 
number of lessons from recent migration flows including those related to EU’s 
Eastern enlargements. We then turn to a quantitative statistical evaluation based on a 
unique dataset of costs and benefits of recent migration from the EaP, EU8 and EU2 
on key economic variables in the EU:  GDP per capita, total GDP, employment rate, 
capital stock, total factor productivity, capital to labour ratio, and output per worker.  
Third, we use a dataset compiled for this purpose and advanced econometric methods 
to evaluate the degree to which migrants grease the wheels of EU’s economy by 
allocating to sectors where labour shortages arise. Fourth, we review two micro-level 
qualitative case studies of migrants from EaP to the EU in order to inform us about 
how costs and benefits of (temporary) mobility are shared and dealt with within 
migrants’ households. In this section we also review the observed shortages. Fifth, we 
look at the role of labour market institutions and industrial relations for the costs and 
benefits of labour mobility.   
 
7.1. EU Eastern enlargement: experience and lessons  
The main lessons from European Union’s eastern enlargements are: 
- Liberalisation of entry and access to the labour market leads to increase in 
migration flows.  
- Transitional arrangements divert migration flows quantitatively and qualitatively; 
even countries applying such arrangements witnessed increased flows, however. 
- Post-enlargement migrants are relatively well educated, and actively participate in 
the labour market. 
- There is a degree of downgrading into lower-skilled occupations. This may signify 
brain waste, but it may also be part of an optimal migration strategy, lead to a 
more efficient utilisation of labour force, and be just a temporary phenomenon. 
- Except for micro-level substitution effects in some local labour markets, the 
aggregate effects of post-enlargement migration are relatively small, and positive if 
present. 
- Intra-EU migrants do not abuse or shop for welfare, they rather lack adequate 
access to welfare.  
- Outflows of skilled workers pose a challenge for sending countries, but brain 
circulation provides for convergence and prosperity. Remittances compensate some 
of the short-term costs.  
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European Union’s eastern enlargement of 2004 and 2007 offers insightful lessons 
about the consequences of liberalisation of mobility for migration flows and their 
effects in receiving and sending countries.7 From a number of perspectives, EU 
Eastern enlargement represents a good benchmark for evaluating expected flows, 
migrant composition and possible effects in light of more liberal migration 
framework between the EU and EaP countries. While the development in Eastern 
European new member states and the EaP region has diverged since the regime 
change in 1989, the regions share some general similarities with respect to education 
structure of national populations and demographic trends as populations across the 
former Eastern bloc countries have been stagnating or falling in numbers and are 
projected to age.  
 
Flows  
EU Eastern enlargement in 2004 and 2007 increased intra-EU labour mobility.  
Transitional arrangement applied by most EU15 states had important implications on 
directionality of post-accession flows, which were not massive, but sizeable. Based on 
data collected by Holland et al. (2011),8 we can estimate that between 2004 and 
2009, the total number of EU8 and EU2 citizens in EU15 countries rose by about 
150%: whereas in 2004 there were about a million citizens from the EU8, and almost 
another million EU2 nationals, by 2009 the total number of EU8 and EU2 citizens 
reached almost five million. When measured as a share of respective populations, 
EU8 and EU2 migrants in EU15 combined equalled about 1.22% of the total EU15 
population and 4.75% of combined populations of EU8 and EU2 countries in 2009.9  
EU8 citizens reacted to enlargement with some delay, with peak migration level only 
in 2006 and 2007, two years after their accession and at a point when their 
economies were performing well and grew at high rates. This maps the experience 
from the migration literature that migrants move after they have gathered relevant 
                                                 
7 For a comprehensive account of EU’s Eastern enlargements see Kahanec and Zimmermann (2010) and 
Kahanec (2013). 
8 While this dataset provides probably the most comprehensive account of migration flows between the new and 
old member states known to us, it has to be acknowledged that a number of issues arise with it. These mainly 
arise because of the lack of adequate infrastructure to collect data enabling us to measure migration flows in the 
EU. For example, data is often based on population statistics by citizenship, and changes in respective stocks are 
interpreted as migration flows. Deaths and births, legalizations, as well as citizenship acquisition, are included in 
these flows, although they should not be interpreted as migration. Latvia and Estonia are especially problematic 
in this respect, as these countries host large populations of non-citizens, who are treated in various destination 
countries in different ways. Data from Ireland and the UK are similarly problematic, as they are based on 
interpolations from the respective labor force surveys rather than large-scale administrative or census data, which 
may have large error especially for evaluating the sizes of populations originating from smaller source countries. 
Looking at foreign-born populations does not help to solve all these issues; for example, many migrants from the 
Baltic states were born in other republics of the Soviet Union. Various registers have their own problems, as 
migrants often fail to deregister. The statistics that we discuss below may therefore over- or under-represent true 
migration flows and need to be interpreted with these caveats in mind. 
9 For 2007 these figures are slightly higher than those reported by Brücker and Damelang (2009) or Brücker et 
al. (2009), and in the range of those provided by European Commission (2008a, b).  
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information and accumulated the economic means to do it. The response of EU2 
citizens was considerably swifter and more pronounced, reaching peak migration 
flows already in the year of enlargement.10 The Great Recession affected also intra-EU 
labour mobility by incentivising return migration and by discouraging migration 
propensity of new migrants.  In spite of relatively similar income differentials with 
EU15, emigration rates from the EU8 and EU2 sending countries have been quite 
diverse. While the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia sent below 2% of their 
populations, close to 6% of Lithuanian and Bulgarian citizens had worked in EU15 at 
peak times, and so did as much as 10% of Romanian citizens (Holland et al. 2011).  
This diversity has been attributed to different labour market conditions and welfare 
system structures in home countries which have interacted to shape the propensity to 
migrate or to stay (Kureková, 2011).  
Post-enlargement migration was characterised by geographic diversion of migration 
flows. For EU8 citizens the relative importance of the UK, Ireland and also Spain as 
host countries increased substantially, while the traditional host countries, Germany 
and Austria, lost their share quite dramatically. For EU2 citizens the shares of Spain 
and Italy increased steeply, at the expense of mainly Germany, but also Austria and 
France. This diversion is partly a result of transitional arrangements. While delayed 
liberalisation of labour market access in some EU15 countries diverted some migrants 
elsewhere, it did not prevent their EU8 populations from growing.   
 
Skill composition, occupational and sectoral profiles 
In addition to increased flows, EU accession led to a generally positive shift in 
migrant profiles. Using the 2009 EU Labour Force Survey11 we found that with 
enlargement the share of EU10 migrants with high educational attainment residing in 
the EU15 increased substantially (Figure 8).12,13  The fact that the share of highly 
educated EU10 migrants increased already in 2003 might indicate that even the 
prospect of EU accession already attracted many educated EU10 citizens. In 2007 
and 2009 we however observe somewhat higher shares of low educated EU10 
migrants. This is consistent with the findings in the literature that the proportion of 
                                                 
10 That the 2004 accession took place on May 1, whereas in 2007 it was January 1, can at best only partly explain 
this difference in response. 
11 We reconstruct immigrant cohorts using the year of arrival for residents born in the EU10 and EU2. We 
consider the population above and including 16 years of age, excluding conscripts on compulsory military or 
community service as well as anyone whose highest level of education or training successfully completed was 
attained after his or her immigration to the current country of residence in the EU15. 
12 High level of education includes ISCED 5 and 6 levels; medium level of education comprises ISCED 3 and 4 
levels; and low level of education takes in ISCED 0, 1 and 2 levels. For further details about this classification 
see UNESCO (1997). 
13 Given the construction of the sample, were the propensity to stay in the host country positively correlated with 
a migrant’s educational attainment (Hazans (2012) shows this to be the case for the Baltic states before 
enlargement as well as since 2006), our results would underreport the true improvement in the skill composition 
of immigrants from the new member states.   
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high- but also low-educated migrants from the EU10 in several EU15 countries 
increased after the 2004 enlargement (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2010).  
Figure 8: Educational attainment of EU10 and EU2 citizens in the EU15. 
a. EU10 
 
b. EU2 
 
Source: Own calculation based on the EU Labour Force Survey, 2009.  
Notes: In per cent of total EU8 and EU2 populations resident in the EU15 above and including 16 years 
of age, excluding conscripts on compulsory military or community service as well as anyone whose 
highest level of education or training successfully completed was attained after his or her immigration 
to the current country of residence in the EU15. No data available for Malta. Germany excluded due to 
no information on migrants’ country of birth.  
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More concretely, in 2009 among EU10 nationals in the EU15 the share of high 
educated was 26.1% and low educated 22.5%; i.e. they were considerably more 
educated than EU2 nationals in the EU15 of whom 12.2% were high and 37.5% low 
educated. While EU migrants have been on average less educated than EU10 
migrants, EU2 nationals were nevertheless more educated than the total population 
in the EU15 with 18.9% high and 45.7% low educated residents. EU10 as well as EU2 
nationals in the EU15 were each positively selected also relative to their source 
populations (see also Holland et al. 2011).14  
Patterns of selection appear to have been uneven across an enlarged European Union, 
with transitional arrangements affecting the scale and composition of post-
enlargement migration flows.15 Holland et al. (2011) find that Luxembourg, Demark, 
Sweden, and Ireland are most popular among high-skilled workers while low-skilled 
workers are more likely to go to Greece, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, Netherlands, and 
Finland. This needs to be understood in the context of supply and demand in the 
sending and receiving labour markets. The migration decision is also conditioned by 
the expectations of the potential migrant about his or her probability of success in 
securing desired employment. Potential migrants better equipped to succeed are thus 
also those who are more likely to migrate, which may also explain positive selection of 
labour migrants with respect to source populations. Finally, several EU15 member 
states have applied transitional arrangements towards EU8 and EU2 migrants 
differently. As more skilled migrants appear to have been more distracted by 
transitional arrangements than their less-skilled colleagues, this policy variation may 
explain part of the observed differences in selectivity between EU8 and EU2 migrants 
(Kahanec and Zimmermann 2010).  
With respect to employment outcomes, EU8+2 migrants generally have high (waged) 
employment rates, but typically work in less-skilled occupations than natives. They 
are overrepresented in low- and medium-skilled occupations and sectors, such as 
construction, manufacturing, hotels and restaurants, and agriculture (Kahanec, 
Zaiceva and Zimmermann, 2010; Blanchflower and Lawton, 2010). This may signify 
imperfect adjustment and downskilling of relatively well-educated migrants into less-
skilled occupations. While this implies brain waste, it may also be part of an optimal 
migration strategy, lead to a more efficient utilisation of the labour force, and be just 
a temporary phenomenon, as labour market outcomes of migrants typically improve 
with time.   
Indeed, early studies suggest that there were no signs of significant brain drain, 
although some skilled sectors, such as medical doctors, lost non-negligible 
proportions of their workforce (Frelak and Kazmierkiewicz, 2007; Brücker et al. 
2009; European Commission, 2008; Hazans, 2012).  There is also ample evidence 
suggesting that for EU8 and EU2 migrants the possibility to work abroad offered the 
                                                 
14 Most of these results stay valid if we look at prime working age population (25-54), except that EU2 migrants 
then appear to be negatively selected form their source population. 
15 Kahanec, Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2010), Kahanec and Zimmermann (2010b). 
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opportunities that were missing in domestic labour markets. From such perspective, 
alternative to migration would have been unemployment or inactivity. Moreover, 
some evidence exists suggesting that for young workers in particular, experience of 
working abroad is valued positively in domestic labour market after return, as it 
demonstrates a set of desirable skills, such as independence, initiative or language 
proficiency (Kureková, 2011).   
 
Effects on the receiving countries 
Based on a broad account of labour market impacts of post-accession migration flow 
in receiving countries, Kahanec et al. (2010) conclude that there is little evidence that 
they would crowd out native workers from employment or lower their wages, even in 
the countries with most marked increase in migrant inflows (UK, Ireland, Spain). A 
downward pressure on wages in low-skilled sectors and strain on the provision of 
public services and housing in the areas where the immigration concentrated was 
suggested by some reports (House of Lords 2008; Trade Union Congress 2007). 
Generally, however, EU8 immigrants were filling shortage sectors (e.g. 
manufacturing and construction) and complemented rather than replaced domestic 
and other immigrant labour force (Kureková, 2011).  
Similarly, relatively low welfare dependency was documented among post-accession 
immigrants, although there is some evidence that it grew as the migrants fulfilled the 
legal requirement of employment duration to qualify for such benefits (Kureková 
2011). This is related to contributory nature of benefit schemes and other restrictions 
and conditions on access to welfare rights and responsibilities (Kureková 2013, also 
see Zimmermann et al. 2012). Welfare system structures in host and home countries 
might have affected patterns of return migration affected by the economic crisis. 
Kahanec and Kureková (2013) found that the degree to which return migrants to 
Slovakia enter unemployment registers differs quite significantly based on the 
country of previous employment. Anacka and Fihel (2012) have argued that return of 
mainly rural origin migrants back to Poland during the recent crisis is related to the 
preferential status and access to social security system of farmers and their families in 
Poland. Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2012) have studied the mobility of workers from 
EU8 and EU2 Member States in the receiving EU15 countries. A significant 
proportion of these migrants stayed abroad only temporarily, and the Great 
Recession has triggered return intentions. Their findings suggest that brain 
circulation rather than brain drain is relevant and that returnees are most likely to 
migrate again. Repeat and circular migration is expected to alleviate the potential 
negative impacts of the crisis, leading to a more efficient allocation of resources 
within the enlarged EU. 
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Effects on the sending countries 
EU accession and the ensuing labour mobility impacted EU8+2 sending countries in 
varied ways, and had most significant effect on their labour markets. Two related 
phenomena occurred between accession and the outbreak of the crisis in the 
countries with greater outflows. High labour mobility from these countries combined 
with strong economic growth resulted in a marked decline in unemployment rates, 
including youth unemployment. Relatedly, labour shortages in some sectors and 
occupations occurred (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski, 2008, Kadziauskas, 2007, Galgóczi, 
Leschke, and Watt, 2012). This encouraged governments to revise migration policy 
framework and in some countries led to designing of preferential schemes towards 
EaP migrants, but also some Balkan countries (Frelak and Kazmierkiewicz, 2007; 
Iglicka, 2005; Kureková, 2011).    
For gains and losses of mobility, it is also important to what extent these transmitted 
to the left-behinds in the form of remittances. Kahanec, Zaiceva, and Zimmermann 
(2010) report an increasing importance of remittances in a number of sending 
countries, most significantly in Bulgaria and Romania, but also the Baltic states. 
Unsurprisingly, the overall volume of remittances to the EU8 and EU2 declined in 
2009 after years of growth due to the worsened economic situation in the host 
economies affected by the 2008-2009 economic crisis (Comini and Faes-Cannito, 
2010). Kaczmarczyk and Okólski (2008) document that remittances were primarily 
used for consumption and durable goods during the early post-enlargement period, 
but also report that more recently they have been invested in human capital as well. 
Kahanec and Pytliková (2013) find rather positive effects of east-west migration in 
receiving countries’ economies and, using the same migration database, compare 
these to the impact of recent EaP migration in Europe. These are summarised in the 
next section. 
In sum, EU8 and EU2 migrants have responded flexibly to economic conditions 
across Europe, not least due to the fact that free mobility has allowed them to freely 
relocate within the EU. Moreover, institutional arrangements in the area of social 
security transposition might have also facilitated return and integration of returned 
migrants (but more research is needed in this generally under-researched area).   
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7.2. Costs and Benefits of EaP Migration for Europe 
 
Experience with past flows from the EaP, EU8, and EU2 indicates a generally 
positive effect of migration on receiving countries’ economies (GDP per capita, GDP 
and employment), which is conditioned by economic integration and free labour 
mobility (and the prospect thereof). 
 
Immigrants from the EaP in the EU typically:  
- Provide much needed productive capacity and human capital 
- Help to mobilise internal capacities 
- Do not negatively affect wages 
- Do not abuse welfare  
but due to inefficient matching to jobs (downgrading) and negative selection some 
of the potential benefits are not realised. This calls for improved management of 
EaP migration flows. 
 
Out-migration from the EaP generally provides for gains from brain circulation 
and remittances, but the there are risks of Dutch diseases and socio-psychological 
costs for the left behinds, as well as risks for long run innovation potential and 
demographic challenges. Again, improved management is an imperative.    
 
 
This section presents comprehensive evidence to assess the benefits and costs of EaP 
migration on both the receiving and sending regions. We combine information drawn 
from the EU and EaP Country Studies as well as other works delivered in the process. 
We broadly distinguish between effects at macro-level (on the countries) and at a 
micro-level (on the migrants, migrant households, natives). Conclusions from the EU 
country studies are rather homogenous, and therefore costs and benefits are fairly 
comparable. On the other hand, inference on the EaP experience is more 
heterogeneous, making overall analyses of costs and benefits more challenging.  
Prior to proceeding with a careful overview of costs and benefits of EaP migration, it 
is worth making a few overall observations, already presented in the EaP Synthesis 
Report (Barbone, Bonch-Osmolovskiy and Luecke, 2013). First, EaP migrants are 
primarily labour migrants, and often temporary. Given the labour motives behind the 
migration choice, EaP migration consequently responds to push and pull factors that 
are primarily of an economic nature. The host countries receive labour migrants of 
working-age who are likely to respond to changes in labour market opportunities in 
Europe. Second, while the EaP flows differ in size as a proportion of the sending 
economy, they still represent a rather small percentage of the stock (and flows) of 
foreign-migrants in the EU, as shown in Chapter 2. Costs and benefits for the EU are 
hence rather mild, while consequences for the EaP countries can vary considerably. 
Third, there is substantial variation determined mainly by data availability in whether 
the evidence provided is based on systematic analyses or suggestive arguments. Of 
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the numerous consequences discussed throughout the country studies, we focus on 
those costs and benefits for which some evidence was available. 
 
Measured costs and benefits: comparing EaP and EU10 migration 
macroeconomic effects  
Given the generally positive effects of EU8+EU2 intra-EU mobility, we now set out to 
measure and compare these effects to the previous EaP migration into EU15 
countries. Here we quantitatively measure the effects of immigration from the EaP 
countries and the new EU member states on the EU economies over the years 1995-
2010. This enables us to assess the nature of the potential effects of future migration 
flows from the EaP to the European Union.16 The results of our analysis of the effect 
of immigration on the EU15 and EU27 destination countries are presented in Table 6. 
We present OLS as well as 2SLS results, the latter accounting for the possible 
endogeneity of migration flows. We discuss 2SLS results which we consider 
statistically more reliable and robust.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Yearly changes, FE and IV estimates. Period of analyses: 1995-2010. The dataset on international migration 
used for the analyses has been collected by Mariola Pytliková and encompasses information on bilateral flows 
and stocks of immigrants from all world source countries in 42 destination countries over the period 1980–2010. 
The dataset has been collected by requesting detailed information on migration inflows and foreign population 
stocks by source country from selected national statistical offices in 27 OECD countries. For six OECD 
countries – Chile, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Russian Federation and Turkey - the data comes from the OECD 
International Migration Database. For nine other destinations – Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovenia – the data is collected from the Eurostat. 
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Table 5: Consequences of foreign population on production factors, 
productivity and factors per worker in the EU15 economies 
To EU15 Effects of immigration 
from 2004 EU entrants 
Effects of immigration 
from 2007 EU entrants 
Effects of immigration 
from  EaP group 
Dependent 
variable 
OLS – FE 2SLS – FE OLS – FE 2SLS – FE OLS – FE 2SLS – FE 
Log (GDP per 
Capita) 
-0.001 0.03** -0.0021 0.055* -0.00486*** -0.0130*** 
(0.002) (0.01) (0.001) (0.03) (0.00135) (0.00501) 
Log (Total GDP) -0.00073 0.0529*** -0.00108 0.092** -0.00589*** -0.0144** 
(0.00343) (0.01657) (0.00181) (0.04367) (0.00173) (0.0062) 
Log (Labour 
force 
participation) 
0.0005* 0.0005 0.0005* 0.0009 0.00049* -0.00134 
(0.0003) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.003) (0.00027) (0.00154) 
Log 
(Employment 
rate) 
-0.0004 0.02*** -0.0002 0.03*** -0.00061 -0.00993*** 
(0.00105) (0.003) (0.0006) (0.01) (0.00056) (0.00348) 
Log (Capital 
stock) 
-0.00006 -0.0001 -0.00007 -0.0003 -0.00002 -0.00196*** 
(0.0002) (0.0006) (0.00009) (0.001) (0.00009) (0.00063) 
Log (Total 
factor 
productivity) 
0.00004 -0.004 0.00007 -0.007 -0.00015 -0.00247* 
(0.0004) (0.002) (0.0005) (0.006) (0.00031) (0.00143) 
Log (Capital to 
labour ratio) 
0.001 -0.017 0.001 -0.018 -0.00389** 0.033*** 
(0.003) (0.01) (0.0016) (0.02) (0.00153) (0.01038) 
Log (Output per 
worker) 
-0.001 -0.03** -0.0022* -0.06*** -0.00452*** 0.00544 
(0.002) (0.01) (0.0012) (0.02) (0.00113) (0.00574) 
No of 
Observations 
225 183 225 183 225 161 
F-test  7.88  11.08  11.39 
Notes: Each cell shows the coefficient from a different regression with the dependent variable described in the 
first cell of the row and the explanatory variable equal to the total flow of immigrants as a share of the initial 
population of the receiving country. All regressions includes year, country fixed effects and interaction of region 
dummy and time. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. The 2SLS estimation method 
uses the predicted flow of immigrants from the gravity push factors as instruments; the predicted share of foreign 
population per destination population are then summed on the destination country level and used as an IV.  
***,**,* imply significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level. 
 
We find positive and significant effects of post-enlargement migration flows from the 
new EU member states on GDP, GDP per capita, and employment rate and negative 
effect on output per worker in the EU15. We find economically small but statistically 
significant negative effects of migration from the Eastern Partnership countries on 
GDP, GDP per capita, employment rate, and capital stock in the EU15, but a positive 
significant effect on capital to labour ratio. More specifically, the estimated effect on 
income per capita is quite large as the coefficients imply that 10 per cent increase in 
the number of immigrants coming from the 2004 and 2007 EU member countries 
per destinations population increases the destinations income per capita by 0.3 and 
0.55 per cent, respectively. In contrast, 10 per cent increase in share of immigrants 
coming from the EaP lowers income per capita in the EU15 countries by 0.13 per cent.  
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With respect to a positive significant effect of EaP migration on the capital to labour 
ratio, we interpret this result as an increase in the use of capital-complementary 
techniques enabled by EaP migration to less capital intensive sectors and in final 
goods production. This appears consistent with country study findings that EaP 
migration might favour the employment of certain sub-populations (such as 
productive women), which might in turn ignite a positive process of capital 
accumulation.  
With due respect to data limitations, we interpret the results of this comparative 
analysis based on the past immigration to EU15 between 1995 and 2010 as indicating 
a generally positive effect of migration on receiving countries’ economies, which is 
conditioned by economic integration and free labour mobility (and the prospect 
thereof).  
 
Evidence from EU country studies 
EaP Migrants as providers of benefits 
A review of findings in EU country studies allows us to summarise benefits and costs 
of EaP migration at the national and local level. Benefits are multiple and are related 
to profiles of EaP migrants described in earlier sections.  
As already shown, due to work-related nature of EaP flows, the country studies show 
fairly high average employment rates in the EaP population. Hence, a key benefit 
results from high degree of labour market activity. Considering that Europe as a 
whole is experiencing a period of important structural changes, driven not only by the 
recent economic crisis, but also by the demographic transformation triggered by 
decreasing fertility and increasing life expectancy, the arrival of productive workers 
constitutes a considerable benefit for destination countries. Accordingly, several 
additional benefits have arisen from the analyses.  
All country studies have shown that EaP female migrants concentrate in the domestic 
service and act as “household welfare providers”, wherever there is a lack of access to 
public care. Evidence from Spain and Italy suggests that foreign migrants working in 
the family sector as care givers have favoured the labour force participation of native 
women. Consequently, EaP migrants might be instrumental in the mobilisation of 
internal capacities against the backdrop of native participation ratios that worry 
European policymakers.  
All the country studies have shown very little effect on native wages, presenting an 
occupational distribution between the two groups that suggests the presence of 
complementarities rather than substitutability between migrants and natives. For 
example, the Italian country study mentions that migrants positively affected wages 
of Italian workers, with a zero effect on the most vulnerable groups of the native 
population. Such effects are explained by poor local flexibility and strong role of 
unions in the Italian labour market. Furthermore, the German country study argues 
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for no downward pressure on native wages. These results are unsurprising, bearing in 
mind the relatively small size of these migrants in the total population (and the 
immigrant population), but also the indicated complementarities.   
As discussed in detail in the section about migrant profiles, EaP migrants were found 
to be well educated in all countries, typically exceeding the educational attainment of 
other immigrants and natives themselves. In Poland and Germany, an important 
share of migrants was found to hold technical and engineering degrees. EaP migrants 
might therefore serve as a channel for further human capital development in the EU. 
The presence of highly skilled EaP migrants might alleviate the increased demand not 
only in engineering occupations, but also in all other occupations where shortages are 
expected, such as health care, legal, management and business administration.  
Lastly, evidence at the micro-level suggested that access to the pension system has 
been very limited, and EaP migrants do not have disproportionately higher welfare 
take-up rates than other migrants in terms of access to social assistance or family 
benefits. In Spain and Germany, migrants have relied on unemployment benefits to a 
larger extent than natives which, however, reflects their likelihood to work in the 
sectors affected negatively by the crisis.  
Limited Costs of EaP Migration in Europe 
While EaP migration might bring benefits to the host regions, all country studies have 
detected an important cost, or at least a factor, hampering the advantages that would 
otherwise arise from this source of mobility. Despite a high level of educational 
attainment, EaP migrants predominantly find employment in low-skilled and 
unskilled jobs, with only a small share of EaP migrants finding employment in highly 
skilled occupations, primarily in the UK (financial sector) and Poland (IT sector). 
While highly qualified EaP migrants have filled up the shortages in the domestic and 
private sector services in countries such as Italy and Spain, skill mismatches in 
countries such as Germany have implied higher unemployment rates. The German 
country study reports half of the employment gap between EaP migrants and natives 
closing once over-qualification is taken into account.  
There are several consequences of poor labour market matching for the host 
countries. At the individual level, the market is unable to absorb the productivity 
potential of the migrants, who become a vulnerable part of the population. Indeed, 
upon arrival in Spain, male (female) migrants are 60 (34) percentage points less 
likely to work under a permanent contract than their native counterparts, although 
this gap closes over time. Furthermore, the lower employment probability seems to 
translate into a higher likelihood of receiving unemployment benefits than natives. In 
some cases, access to unemployment benefits appears to be a consequence of the 
inability to find appropriate occupations (Germany), whereas in other cases it seems 
a consequence of their substantial presence in sectors affected negatively by the crisis 
(Spain). More worryingly, the Spanish study reports the absence of convergence in 
terms of the over-education differential between EaP migrants and natives. 
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Juxtaposing these findings to results of the Kahanec and Pytliková (2013) study, it 
seems plausible to claim that improved management of EaP immigration and 
integration into EU labour markets would provide for similarly positive effects as in 
case of EU10 and EU2 migrants. 
 
Benefits of EaP Migration for EaP countries 
The costs and benefits of EaP migration on the sending countries need to be assessed 
by understanding the heterogeneity of experiences in terms of the size of the migrant 
outflow relative to the population, the characteristics of migration and the preferred 
destination regions (Barbone, Bonch-Osmolovskiy and Luecke, 2013).  
At the household level, information throughout the EaP studies suggests that 
migration is a consequence of high poverty rates at home. Hence, the flow of 
remittances generated by the migrants are not saved or invested in productive 
activities – possibly also as a response of the high business start-up costs -  but rather 
are devoted to purchases of consumption goods and housing, and investment in 
health and human capital formation. However, compared to a no-migration 
benchmark the country studies showed that remittances have alleviated poverty in 
households with migrants, particularly in countries such as Armenia, Georgia and 
Moldova. In fact, the loss of tax revenue due to migration is likely to be compensated 
by increased domestic spending fuelled by remittances. Lastly, remittances might 
also help the development of the financial sector, increasing the likelihood of access 
to financial services by remittance-recipient households. Indeed, such positive effects 
have been found to be particularly high in Moldova, with the benefits derived from 
this channel only starting to be fully exploited through the expansion of formal 
financial institutions in the EaP countries. 
Costs of EaP Migration on EaP countries 
As a predominantly temporary phenomenon, EaP migration might impose costs on 
the household members that remain in the home country. Indeed, the absence of a 
parent might place their children’s development at risk or reduce support to the 
elderly. However, evidence concerning these costs is rather scant. Evidence from 
Moldova in Luecke and Stoehr (2012) suggests that costs on children left behind are 
non-existent, probably because migrants ensure the presence of well-functioning 
caregiving arrangement prior to migration. Even less is known on the potential costs 
on the elderly population, with Luecke and Stoehr (2012) suggesting that the 
presence of an adult child increases the well-being of elderly individuals. However, 
these conclusions might not be generalisable to other contexts, and it is difficult to 
gauge the magnitude of such costs.  
As explained in detail in the EaP Synthesis Report (Barbone, Bonch-Osmolovskiy and 
Luecke, 2013), remittances may lead to a real appreciation of the domestic currency, 
reduced competitiveness and an increased size of the non-tradables sector. Given the 
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high volatility of foreign-exchange flows, expansions of the non-tradables sector 
renders the economy vulnerable to external shocks; furthermore, growth might be 
dampened by the reduction in tradables if not followed by substantial human capital 
investment. The evidence presented in our analyses suggests that the real 
appreciation of EaP countries’ currencies have been higher overall in the smaller, 
high-emigration countries such as Armenia, Georgia and Moldova. Moreover, the 
share of services in the economy has been growing substantially in Georgia and 
Moldova. All of these factors indicate a future risk of Dutch disease.  
While those left behind might benefit from remittances, there is a question of 
whether migrants abroad incur skill gains or losses, which might have consequences 
on the home state economy in the form of brain drain and brain waste. Permanent 
outflows may generate risks for countries’ innovation potential, and may aggravate 
the problem of aging and low fertility existing in the EaP states. The EaP country 
studies have shown that although EaP migrants to the EU are on average more 
educated than those going to other destination countries, compared to the population 
at home there are still a larger number of less skilled workers among them. Therefore, 
although skill downgrading exists, the negative effects of brain drain on the source 
regions seem limited from this perspective. It is also important to consider 
alternatives to migration whereby in the absence of migration, EaP workers might 
face joblessness, inactivity, low-paid and unstable work, as well as lack of job 
opportunities matching their qualifications. This is not to deny that better matching 
of EaP migrants in the EU receiving countries will generate more benefits to receiving 
countries, sending countries as well as migrants themselves and should become a 
policy objective. So that the outflow of productive workforce brings benefits to the 
EaP countries, it will be crucial whether EaP migrants return, with what human 
capital and how well they will be able to utilise it in domestic economies. In this area, 
scope exists for policies in the origin countries which would facilitate integration of 
return migrants, and, for example, direct their potential to entrepreneurial activities.  
To sum up, while cost-benefit analyses are complex exercises, with not only the 
economic impact but also all the social and political effects requiring consideration, 
some patterns seem to emerge from the discussion. The costs for Europe appear to 
come primarily from its inability to effectively manage flows of migrants from the 
EaP and their integration in the labour market. Whereas in general the flows of 
migrants from the new member states affect the receiving labour markets positively, 
the EU is missing the opportunity for a win-win situation in case of EaP migrants. 
The forgone opportunity for positive effects is mainly due to poor matching of EaP 
migrants to jobs where their potential would be fully utilised.  In fact, the potential 
costs associated with EaP migration might be related to the lack of recognition of 
qualifications, poor quality of education in the sending countries, poor knowledge of 
the host country language or migrants’ individual strategies and preferences. In spite 
of these difficulties, no particular negative effects on the natives are present, nor on 
the welfare system. Positive impact of East-West post-accession migration, which is 
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similar with EaP migrant profiles in some characteristics, suggests that more liberal 
migration policies tend to lead to more favourable macro and micro-level outcomes 
and allocative efficiency, as well as more positive (self-)selection into migration. 
Potential costs stemming from the sending countries’ side primarily derive from the 
forthcoming possibility of a Dutch-disease. Although other negative externalities 
might haunt the left-behind, there is presently little evidence for them. On the other 
hand, benefits for the EaP countries are apparent, with increased GDP growth, 
smoothed excess of labour supply and increased real wages. Remittances have lifted 
tight household budget constraints, allowing individuals to spend more on 
consumption goods, health and education. While macro-level benefits for Europe 
might be less pronounced, we should bear in mind that the identified costs are rather 
limited, also due to so far small number of EaP migrants in the EU countries.  
Part of the costs for Europe and potential costs for the EaP countries might be 
reduced through proper management of migration flows, and similarly benefits might 
be enhanced. In the next subsection we elaborate on the aspect of labour market 
matching which has been identified as one of the key deficiencies of EaP migration 
into the EU to date.  
 
7.3. Immigration and skill gaps in the EU 
Migrants fill up labour market gaps in European labour markets more flexibly than 
natives. 
 
The European labour markets have been suffering from structural inefficiencies in 
labour markets characterised by labour and skill shortages and mismatches. 
Economic costs of skill gaps in Europe can be large. Lucifora & Origo (2002) who 
estimate short-run and long-run costs as well as direct and indirect costs of skill 
shortages in Europe estimate that costs generated by skill gaps are quite remarkable 
and range around 7 per cent of GDP. Perhaps the key consequence of the skill 
shortages is the impact on wages, as firms are forced to raise wages in order to attract 
relatively scarce skilled labour. Increased wages may affect trade and competitive 
capacity of export oriented sectors (indirect effect), and have inflationary pressures 
(direct effect). Additional consequences lie in lowered productivity, when firms fill 
high-skilled jobs by low-skilled workers, or decreased innovation potential, if the 
shortage exists among the high skilled workers. If shortages lead to wage increases in 
selected sectors, this can result in widened wage differentials across skills levels and 
larger inequalities (Lucifora & Origo, 2002; Neugart & Schömann, 2002). Improved 
flexibility in the labour market is a general tool for improving labour market 
adjustment. This can be achieved in a number of ways. Especially in the cases of rigid 
or segmented labour markets with low mobility of resident labour to eliminate labour 
shortages, bringing workers from abroad might be an alternative. However, analyses 
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investigating to what extent migrants have been filling shortage sectors are scare. In 
view of providing recommendations on better matching, in this section we set out to 
test this question.  
 
Approach 
The methodology used is motivated by Borjas (2001) who studied whether 
immigration into the US greases the wheels of the labour market and found that 
newly arrived immigrants are much more likely to be clustered to those states which 
offer higher waged for the types of skills they offer and so help to equalize economic 
opportunities across areas. Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2010) applied similar 
estimation strategy to assess whether immigration reduces regional disparities 
between wages in the United Kingdom.  
Using a similar approach, we test whether immigration helps to reduce labour 
shortages in the European labour market. In particular we look at the relationship 
between residual wage differentials of jobs in different industry-skill groups and the 
decision of migrants and natives to work in these jobs. Wage differentials across jobs 
that go beyond what can be explained by differing characteristics of workers in these 
jobs – residual wage differentials or wage premiums – are then taken as a measure of 
labour shortage in a given industry-skill cell. The analysis then evaluates the reaction 
of migrants towards jobs with higher wage premiums. Aggregation of standard ISCO 
and NACE categories into larger groups in order to gain sufficient number of 
observations in a cell is presented in Annex B. Table B.1 describes how nine major 
occupational groups are grouped into four categories. Similarly Table B.2 defines 
nine industry groups based on the NACE classification. Such a categorisation 
generates 36 groups for which we calculate respective labour shortages and index of 
relative supply of migrants. The final sample includes information for 13 European 
countries over period 2004-2010.17 
 
Data  
The analysis in this section combines the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-
LFS) and European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). 
Both data sets are household surveys conducted annually in all Member States of the 
European Union. The information on earnings of workers in the EU is taken from 
EU-SILC to determine the labour shortages (wage premium). The classification of 
industry and occupation categories in EU-SILC is consistent with EU-LFS. Owing to 
                                                 
17 Sample includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. Germany was excluded as foreign-born workers could not be identified in 
the data and Luxembourg was excluded for its small size.  
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its large sample size, the EU-LFS provides reliable information on the share of 
foreign-born population and it is commonly used in the research analysis on 
immigration in the European context (D'Amuri and Peri, 2012). In this section EU-
LFS is used to calculate the shares of native/foreign-born workforce within industry 
and skill groups. The definition of migrant worker is based on the country of birth 
however data does not allow to unambiguously distinguish the origin of migrants. 
Foreign-born persons are therefore treated as one group. Finally, GDP and 
unemployment rate were obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
online database (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/). Per-capita GDP is PPP 
adjusted and expressed in 2005 US dollars. 
 
The Model 
The analysis proceeds in the following two steps: in the first step wage premiums 
measuring labour shortages, are estimated for each cell, in the second relative 
mobility of migrants vis-à-vis natives as a function of labour shortages across cells is 
measured (See Box 1 for more detail). The unit of observation in the regression is 
industry-skill-country group. The dependent variable is the measure of the relative 
supply of immigrants. The model tests whether the relative supply of migrants 
responds to the changes in the labour market, measured as labour shortage by wage 
index within the given group. The variable of labour shortage is lagged by one year so 
the response of immigrants is delayed. Labour shortage is computed at the 
international level (i.e. all 13 studied EU countries) as if countries were competing for 
migrant workforce. Two specifications were developed, without and with controls for 
unemployment rate and GDP levels. Models are estimated in the first difference form 
and additionally include time and country fixed effects. This controls for variation in 
factors that remain constant within cells, such as industrial structure, unionisation 
levels and the like. It also permits a very strong interpretation of results, namely, that 
a positive effect of shortages on relative inflow of migrants can be interpreted as a 
link between changes in shortages and changes in migration patterns.   
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Box 5.1: Methodology of the evaluation of matching 
First a log wage index is constructed to measure the relative wage of industry-and-skill 
specific group in a particular country and a particular year. The index is computed for each 
year from a separate log-wage regression of the form 
W =ikc ikc kc ikcX    
 (1)
 
where W is the log income of worker who belongs to industry and skill group k in country c, X 
is a vector of worker’s characteristics like gender, education, and work experience and  is the 
error term assumed uncorrelated with all the independent variables in the model. We 
normalise income and all variables in vector X to have mean zero in each year t. The   gives a 
vector of fixed effects for industry-skill-country group. Log wage index  denotes the per cent 
wage differential between the average wage (adjusted for individual characteristics) for 
individuals in the particular industry-skill-country group and the mean wage for a given year. 
The wage index thus represents the wage premium in the given industry-skill-country group 
with respect to the average value at the European level. In the analysis we test whether 
migrants are responsive to these differences to higher degree relative to native population.  
In the second step, we compute the measure of relative supply of migrants and natives within 
industry-skill-country groups. Following the Borjas (2001) we define the index of relative 
supply for industry-skill group k as 
/
/
kc k
kc
kc k
M M
Z
N N
   (2). 
The variable Z is the measure of relative supply, kcM is the number of migrants belonging to 
group k and country c while kM  is the total number of migrants corresponding to group k. 
The denominator similarly indicates the relative supply of natives in the particular group. 
The relative supply index equals one when migrants and natives workers are relatively 
equally distributed. The index is greater than one if migrant workers are over-represented in 
the industry-skill group k relative to native workers. Index is computed for each year.  
In the final analysis the first-difference regression model is defined with lagged wage index. 
1kc kc kcZ                     (3) 
In the alternative specification the model is augmented with the country specific 
unemployment rate and GDP per capita. Estimates are presented in Table 8. 
 
Results 
Table 7 reports patterns of shortages across the industry-skill groups measured as 
changes in ranks of industry-skill groups over time. We report rank changes for the 
whole studied period 2004-2010, as well as the periods preceding and through the 
Great Recession. We observe that over the studied period skilled non-manual workers 
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in education and public administration, highly skilled workers in transport and 
accommodation, and skilled manual workers in trade and finance and 
communication improved their position, mainly due to relative gains (over other 
industry-skill groups) during the Great Recession. Skilled non-manual workers in 
construction and transport and accommodation, elementary workers in 
manufacturing, education and health sectors, and highly skilled workers in education 
and finance and communication suffered from major rank losses, again mainly 
during the Great Recession. Construction generally suffered major rank losses during 
the Great Recession, following rank improvement over the period preceding it. Public 
administration is the only industry that shows rank improvement over the studied 
period across all skill-groups.  
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Table 6: Labour shortage and relative supply index by industry and skill 
 Industry  Skill 
Rank shortage change 
2004-10 2004-7 2007-10 
Education 
Skilled non-
manual 6 3 3 
Transport, accommodation Highly skilled 4 -1 5 
Trade Skilled manual 4 2 2 
Public administration 
Skilled non-
manual 3 1 2 
Finance, communication Skilled manual 3 -1 4 
Transport, accommodation Elementary 2 0 2 
Trade Elementary 2 3 -1 
Public administration Elementary 2 3 -1 
Public administration Highly skilled 1 0 1 
Trade Highly skilled 1 0 1 
Manufacturing Skilled manual 1 1 0 
Health 
Skilled non-
manual 1 1 0 
Public administration Skilled manual 1 -3 4 
Trade 
Skilled non-
manual 1 3 -2 
Finance, communication Elementary 1 -1 2 
Agriculture Skilled manual 1 1 0 
Manufacturing Highly skilled 0 0 0 
Construction Highly skilled 0 1 -1 
Manufacturing 
Skilled non-
manual 0 1 -1 
Transport, accommodation Skilled manual 0 1 -1 
Construction Skilled manual 0 3 -3 
Health Highly skilled -1 0 -1 
Finance, communication 
Skilled non-
manual -1 0 -1 
Construction Elementary -1 4 -5 
Agriculture 
Skilled non-
manual -1 0 -1 
Health Skilled manual -1 0 -1 
Agriculture Elementary -1 1 -2 
Finance, communication Highly skilled -2 0 -2 
Education Highly skilled -2 0 -2 
Health Elementary -2 0 -2 
Transport, accommodation 
Skilled non-
manual -3 0 -3 
Education Elementary -4 -3 -1 
Manufacturing Elementary -7 -2 -5 
Construction 
Skilled non-
manual -15 -5 -10 
Source: EU-SILC, LFS, own calculations.  
Note: Information in the table is based on 2004-2010 data. Labour shortage is computed as 
the residual from equation (1) (averaged over countries), changes in ranks shortages are 
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calculated as difference over time of within-year shortage ranks (within each year higher 
shortage is assigned higher rank).  
 
The estimates of regression presented in Table 8 imply that the industry-skill-country 
specific wage differential between countries is positively correlated with the relative 
supply of immigrants. Findings confirm that Europe’s labour markets are 
characterised by a higher responsiveness of migrants to labour shortages than that of 
the natives. In other words, immigrants effectively fill in gaps across industries, 
countries or occupations across the EU. More specifically, a positive increase of wages 
within industry-skill-country group by 12 percentage points (that is equal to one 
standard deviation of wage index) leads to an increase in the relative supply of 
migrants (i.e. share of migrants over share of natives in the given cell) by 1.3 
percentage point. This implies an elasticity of supply of about 0.1 for immigrants 
relative to natives. Interesting results emerge when we add unemployment rate and 
GDP per capita to the specification. A significant estimate on unemployment rate 
implies the supply of immigrants is more sensitive to labour market conditions in the 
country relative to natives. As unemployment in the country increases, the immigrant 
labour force declines more relative to the native labour force. The estimate on GDP is 
not significant, meaning that economic changes tend to influence the supply of 
immigrants and natives equally.  
 
Table 7: Relative supply of migrants 
             
Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Labor shortage 0.125** 0.105* 
             (0.062) (0.063) 
Log GDP pc            0.375 
                        (0.611) 
Unemployment  
rate 
           -0.009* 
           (0.005) 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
R2           0.207 0.209 
N            1751 1751 
 
Source: Based on EU-SILC, EU-LFS, and WDI data. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Note: Dependent variable is the measures of the relative supply of immigrants. All variables are lagged 
and models include time and country fixed effects.  
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7.4. Household level costs and benefits: micro-level results  
Reconciliation of the economic benefits and costs of migration at the household level 
requires further policy attention. This includes visa regimes, recognition of 
qualifications, management of transitions between jobs, as well as access to social 
and health services.    
Receiving countries’ migration frameworks affect possibilities for circular 
migration and affect migration practices and strategies.  
 
In order to complement and enrich the findings of the macro-level investigations of 
costs and benefits presented so far, we have sought to provide in-depth insights into 
the particularities of migrants’ choices, experiences and trajectories at the household 
level.  To that end we conducted a small-scale ethnographic qualitative field research 
to study individual and household level costs and benefits in the context of temporary 
and circular migration of Ukrainian nationals to two EU countries, the Czech 
Republic and Italy. These EU states represent two most popular EU destinations for 
Ukrainian migrants,18 but differ in a number of important aspects which help us to 
cover a range of factors likely to impact migration costs and benefits at the micro-
level. These include sectors of employment (construction and retail in CZ, geriatric 
care in IT), cultural and language affinity (linguistic closeness of Ukrainian and Czech 
languages) and histories of migration (longer history of migration between Ukraine 
and the Czech Republic, while only recently emerging migration between Italy and 
Ukraine). Qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted with small number 
but a diverse group of migrants, following similar approach in Kindler (2011), 
Tolstokorova (2010), or Solari (2010). This methodology is suitable to understand 
mechanisms and to gather rich details on aspects of behavioural strategies of 
migrants in their coping with barriers they face when migrating and working in the 
EU. Further methodological details of field work are presented in Box 5.2. 
 
Box 5.2: Description of field research 
The field research was conducted between May and September 2012 and altogether 
11 respondents were interviewed in Prague and 10 in Bologna. Two different 
strategies were applied in contacting respondents in Czech Republic and Italy. In 
Prague, the first five interviewees were contacted through a Ukrainian worker of an 
organisation providing legal support to migrants. One interviewee was reached 
through social networks such as Facebook and a note about the research that was 
placed in the Ukrainian online portal in the Czech Republic.  The rest of the 
respondents in Prague were found through a “snow-ball technique,” when each 
respondent was asked to recommend an acquaintance for an interview. In Bologna, 
the original contacts came from an NGO of returnee migrants in Ivan-Frankivsk, 
                                                 
18 Roughly over 12 per cent of Ukrainian migrants go to the Czech Republic and 15 % to Italy (Ukrainian 
Country Study - Coupe and Vakhitova, 2012).  
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Ukraine (who recommended some contacts of current migrants in Bologna), Bologna 
parish of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and, further on, through the snow-
ball technique.  
The majority of the interviews in Prague were conducted in neutral locations in 
public spaces in out-of-work time for migrants. Two interviews were conducted in 
migrants’ homes. In Italy, 3 interviews were conducted at the migrants’ work place – 
the house of an Italian employer, where the migrants were performing their duties of 
geriatric care. The rest were recorded, as with the Czech interviews, in various public 
spaces. All interviews were anonymous, lasted from 40 minutes to one and a half 
hours, and were conducted in the original language of the interviewee (Ukrainian or 
Russian). 
In spite of a limited number of respondents, the interviewed migrants were rather 
diverse, with more variety in the Czech cohort. In the Czech Republic the total of 6 
women and 5 men of different age (between 20 – 62 years of age) were interviewed. 
Among them 3 men were construction workers from Transcarpathian region, 2 
women were employed in temporary, low skilled jobs, 2 respondents (a man and a 
woman) were relatively high-skilled employees of multinational IT companies. 3 
respondents came to the Czech Republic for re-unification with their families. One 
woman came as a low-skilled migrant 20 years ago and worked her way up to a 
better position (an administrator in a private school). The legal status of migrants 
also varied significantly: from permanent residence through a entrepreneurial and 
work visa, to a family dependent without the right to work. Among the respondents 
only 1 person was not working (a woman fully dependent on the income of her 
partner).  
In Italy, 9 women and 1 man between the age of 33 and 70 were interviewed. 6 out of 
9 women worked in geriatric care, 1 (the youngest women) worked as a baby-sitter 
and 2 were self-employed (one was running a cleaning agency and the other, a 
women's clothes shop). The interviewed man was out of work. Additional details 
about research methods, interview questions and respondents can be read in Fedyuk 
(2012).   
 
Field research gathered empirical evidence about practical functioning of labour 
mobility in order to gain a deeper understanding about institutional, economic, social 
and cultural incorporation of Ukrainian migrants in host and home economies.19 The 
results highlight complexities of circular and temporary migration, which has been 
advocated as a favourable policy paradigm in the recent policy discourse (Constant, 
Nottmeyer and Zimmermann, 2012). With respect to patterns of migration, we found 
that receiving countries’ migration frameworks (specific migration policy, access to 
social system for migrants) but also general institutional and structural environment 
(migrant sectors, labour market regulation, range of contractual arrangements, etc.) 
strongly affect the possibilities for circular migration, especially of migrants 
                                                 
19 The field research was conducted between May and September 2012 and altogether 11 respondents were 
interviewed in Prague and 10 in Bologna. Details about research methods, interview questions and respondents 
can be read in Fedyuk (2012).   
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employed in low-skilled sectors. The external position to the EU and consequent visa 
regimes tend to create a permanent complication of the circulation, through border 
controls, contract-dependent stay permits, lengthy bureaucratic processes of 
applications and renewals of the documents. On an individual level all these obstacles 
translate into years of efforts in which migrants often develop various forms of 
dependencies on employers and intermediaries (see also IOM 2013a). “Circularity” in 
migration can be hindered not only by limitations of legal status of a migrant but also 
by the informal arrangements at work (employer’s unwillingness to accommodate 
such pattern), the lack of a trustworthy partner who would substitute a migrant at 
work at times spent at home, distance and expenses connected to traveling home, 
lack of opportunities for meaningful and profitable activity during the stay in home 
country and economic non-sustainability of such visits (i.e. when  the  times of ‘not 
earning’ at home lead to too drastic expenditures and gaps in the household income).  
Distinct migratory regimes – a “work-linked visa regime” of the Czech Republic and a 
“tourist visa-regularisation regime” in Italy – had an influential impact on the 
differences in the migratory practices and strategies. The fact that most of the Czech 
respondents entered on a valid work visa secured them from the need for prolonged 
uninterrupted stays after the first migration. The majority of Italian respondents 
entered Italy on the tourist visas and could regularise their work and stay only after a 
few years; they therefore had to invest several years into building a personal 
relationships and trust with the employer who would secure their regularisation 
through the Italian quota system. Different forms of residence permits created 
different obstacles to circularity in the Czech Republic and Italy: while the Ukrainian 
migrants in Italy could not afford prolonged visits home due to the nature of their 
duties as domestic and care-workers, the Czech respondents could not afford longer 
stays in Ukraine due to the type of entrepreneurial license, that obliged them to pay 
taxes even during the periods of economic inactivity.  
Importantly, geographic proximity in interaction with the migration regime played a 
role in the accessibility of the destination country and especially the price of the 
initial migration, and consequently had most direct impact on migrants’ indebtedness 
(i.e. time necessary to pay back the debt) and frequency of travelling home.  
Interviews revealed that respondents in Italy seemed to have invested much more 
considerable sums of money into initial migration and tend to stay in Italy for longer 
non-interrupted periods of time, even if their legality status allows them to travel.  
Due to restricted migrant entry to the EU countries, the process of gaining legal entry 
of Ukrainians was often complicated and had a direct and often quite high monetary 
price. Among the issues that often complicated or prolonged the process of the legal 
entry, the role of middle men in initial migration, the role of the employer in 
negotiations for employment contract, or poor direct access to migration assistance 
institutions were identified as the main obstacles. In addition, despite the legal 
protection of legalised foreign workers, many migrants continue to face informal 
arrangements in negotiations of salaries, working hours and duties in the routine 
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interactions with the employers. This was especially the case for those working in 
domestic and care sectors (see also IOM 2013a, p. 22). Importantly, legality was seen 
as a key point by most of the respondents; it represented freedom of movement and 
access to labour markets with more work and better salaries. It embodied a secure 
alternative in case developments in Ukraine were unsatisfactory and an opportunity 
to respond quickly to labour demands across the borders. Although many of the 
respondents did not particularly use social security guaranteed by legal status, they 
saw a regular and precise payment of taxation as obligatory if not symbolic exchange 
for their right to be legal.  
While the majority of the migrants had the right to access social security which came 
through their legal status in the country, many raised the issue of accessibility of such 
services. Generally, the access to social benefits was among the least secure points of 
migrants’ status. Many of respondents made full contributions to the social system of 
the receiving country without clear assurance of the rights to draw these benefits in 
the future. Even if regulations on the transferability of social rights, such as pensions, 
existed, most of the migrants voiced uncertainty due to the lack of clear regulations, 
the changes in the current regulations concerning the status of immigrants’ pensions 
or insufficient knowledge of the system. Moreover, most migrants were not 
contributing to the Ukrainian social security system during their migration project. 
These migrants, should they return to home country, are likely to face a significant 
uncertainty as to their old-age security beyond the money earned in migration.  We 
found a more balanced situation in relation to access to the health care systems. The 
migrants split into those who could make regular use of the health services, and those 
who preferred to take care of health problems in Ukraine, despite the paid 
contributions. Migrant income positioned these migrants more favourably in 
comparison to Ukrainian stayers and allowed privileged access to typically private 
health services. In host countries, medical care was generally described as 
satisfactory, but several important gaps were pointed out, especially in relation to 
child birth and specialized doctors (e.g. dentists, gynaecologists).  
The project gathered important nuances related to the concern of brain drain and 
brain waste noted in the country studies and problematised the concept of mismatch 
between the level of education and low-status jobs that migrants occupy in the 
receiving countries. While the interviews confirmed that most of the respondents had 
to change their original qualifications and took on jobs which were not directly linked 
to neither their educational nor previous professional experience in Ukraine, limited 
employment opportunities and poor working conditions in Ukraine were among the 
key drivers of migration. The interviewees revealed that prior to migrating they have 
either lost their jobs and could not find meaningful employment, were in danger of 
becoming unemployed or had a job that paid insignificant wages.  We noted a 
particular problem with respect to employment of graduates with tertiary degrees to 
find meaningful employment at home (see also Barbone, Bonch-Osmolovskiy and 
Luecke, 2013). While migrants valued the experience they gained abroad and stated 
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that migration taught them new and valuable occupational and professional skills, 
they did not consider these skills useful and directly employable in the home country 
context. This in turn questions the possibilities for meaningful labour market 
integration of these migrants after return. Indeed, the sole professional experience 
from migration period in life for some of the respondents figured as a serious obstacle 
for considering return.   
The economic crisis appears to have had a more immediate impact on the 
respondents in the Czech Republic than in Italy, which is clearly related to the sectors 
of employment. Ukrainian migrants in the Czech Republic felt a negative change in 
their situation after the economic crisis in 2008 more strongly. The response to a 
more tightened migration policy was not necessarily a return, but rather switching 
shift from work-visas to entrepreneurial license, even if they in fact remained 
employees (Leontiyeva, 2011).20 In Italy domestic workers noted an occasional 
reduction of hours in their employment, which corresponded with the willingness of 
their Italian female employers to do some part of the tasks by themselves. 
Interestingly, even under hardened conditions of migrant stay, the respondents did 
not consider returning home a better option, fearing that the situation in home 
country might be even worse.  
In sum, receiving countries' institutional framework including migration policy, 
access to social security system, labour market regulation and contractual 
arrangements, as well as economic structure determining sectors in demand of 
migrant workforce seem to impact the costs and benefits of individual migratory 
projects in multiple ways. The broader policy recommendations point to increased 
attention to the areas of visa policy, recognition of qualifications, management of 
transitions between jobs, as well as access to social and health services, but also 
access to labour market information for migrants and also employers (see IOM 
2013a).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Czech entrepreneurial license in fact served as a residence permit for many Ukrainian migrants. It 
requires quarterly payments of all taxes, which is the basis for further extension of the status. In this 
arrangement the “cost” of migrants’ legal stay in Czech Republic was the need to pay taxation even 
during the times of unemployment or seasonal visits home. 
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7.5. The role of industrial relations for costs and benefits 
of mobility in the EU  
 
More encompassing bargaining may preclude mass labour force immigration, but 
on the other hand it facilitates a more balanced outcome of migration for both 
immigrants and the society as a whole.  
A dualised bargaining system, with a clear institutional separation between 
insiders and outsiders seems to be the least effective both from the perspective of 
migrants and trade unions, especially if coupled with informality of outsiders. 
Fragmented bargaining systems allow mass immigration, possibly also precarious 
labour, but because the labour market under this system is flexible, negative shocks 
such as the 2008 crisis affect immigrants and nationals more equally. Besides, in 
this case trade unions can take advantage of immigration as a source of 
revitalisation. 
 
Despite some EU-level regulations, nation states still show a great deal of diversity in 
terms of the share of non-nationals within their labour force and in the way the 
employment of non-nationals is structured and rewarded. One source of this 
variation is the difference in industrial relations systems. The extent of corporatism 
(tripartite wage coordination), social dialogue (the involvement of social partners in 
policy making), collective bargaining practices between employers and trade unions, 
collective agreement coverage rates, and trade union recruitment strategies are 
factors that can all potentially affect the demand for and the integration of the 
immigrants in the labour market. Indeed, we seem to find a relationship between 
collective bargaining coverage rates and migrant labour market integration (Figure 
9).  
We expect that the differences across industrial relations arrangements, in 
interaction with other variables (e.g., the state of the economy and labour markets, 
political cycles and national migration policy, public opinion, traditions and attitudes 
of employers towards migrant workers, etc.) will also signal different implications for 
the costs and benefits of migration. Strong trade unions have the potential to 
influence costs and benefits of migration either directly through their action targeting 
migrant population, or through institutional arrangements, such as bargaining for an 
extended coverage of collective agreements, monitoring compliance with relevant 
legal regulation, negotiating particular collective agreement provisions for migrant 
workers, or protecting the interests of migrants and raising their awareness on 
entitlements related to work and welfare system provisions in the receiving countries. 
Given that migration is often related to non-standard, or precarious employment, 
particular focus should be given to outlining how industrial relations might be 
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affecting migration flows, and costs and benefits through affecting precarious 
employment. 
Figure 9: Relationship between collective bargaining and migrant 
integration 
 
Source: Labour market mobility: MIPEX index (http://www.mipex.eu/download), collective 
bargaining rates: ICTWSS database (http://www.uva-aias.net/208).  
 
For the costs and benefits of migration, coordinated bargaining means that migrants 
should receive the same kind of treatment as native employees and therefore 
migration shall not significantly affect labour market developments (for example, the 
changes in aggregate demand because of employers’ preferences for migrants who are 
willing to work for lower wages and/or inferior working conditions). The inflow of 
migrants shall not increase unemployment among the native-born population, 
because migrants are also covered by collective wage settlements, which precludes “a 
race to the bottom” where employers take advantage of the willingness of immigrants 
to accept lower wages. Furthermore, migrants’ purchasing power and wages are 
similar to native workers; and this has positive effects on the receiving country’s 
consumption and GDP. The wage gap between native and migrant workers under 
coordinated bargaining shall remain marginal or not exist at all.  
We systematise the link between migration outcomes and industrial relations 
institutional framework, based on empirical evidence presented earlier and own 
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additional research, in Table 9.  We include the country studies – Germany, UK and 
Spain – and in addition consider Sweden as a Nordic country. There the collective 
bargaining system is particularly well developed which helps us emphasise key 
differences on the possible relationships between the collective bargaining systems 
with the levels of migration, and macro and micro-level costs and benefits of 
migration.   
 
Table 8: Bargaining systems and migration trends 
 
 
Sweden Germany UK Spain 
Collective 
bargaining 
system 
encompassing dualised fragmented informal-statist 
Overall 
migration 
levels 
low levels of net economic 
immigration in the 2000s 
high levels of immigration in the 
2000s 
Typical 
sector/  
employment 
type for 
migrants 
equally 
distributed 
across sectors 
atypical 
employment in 
services 
services 
construction, 
agriculture, 
personal 
services  
Benefits for 
migrants 
possibilities for 
upward mobility, 
more equal 
wages 
entry to the 
labour market of 
formerly 
excluded (youth, 
female) groups of 
migrants  
easy entry to 
the labour 
market in good 
times, low 
levels of labour 
market 
segregation 
easy entry to 
the labour 
market in good 
times 
Benefits for 
the economy 
as a whole 
maintenance of 
solidarity and 
the fiscal base of 
the welfare state 
increasing 
employment 
(without  
disrupting the 
productivity 
coalition of core 
sectors) 
flexibility flexibility 
Costs for 
migrants 
difficult for 
immigrants to 
find entry points 
segregation, no 
upward mobility 
social 
dislocation in 
hard times 
insecurity in 
good times, 
dislocation in 
hard times 
Costs for the 
economy as a 
whole  
possible atrophy 
of the system 
through 
loopholes 
(posted workers) 
redistributive 
struggles between 
insiders and 
outsiders, wage 
dumping in 
certain sectors  
pressure to 
lower wages in 
the low-skilled 
sector 
loss of tax 
revenue in good 
times, social 
upheaval in 
hard times 
Source: Kahancová and Szabó 2012, see this study also for more details on empirical aspects of 
industrial relations in the given countries.  
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In general, coordinated market economies (either with encompassing or with 
dualised bargaining systems) are associated with lower levels of immigration than the 
liberal market economy of the UK and the Mediterranean-statist model of Spain. 
Accordingly, the costs and benefits of migration for the immigrants themselves and 
for the host societies differ too in these systems.  
More specifically, once entry into the Scandinavian labour markets is established, 
equal wages and upward mobility for migrants is more likely than in the other 
models. These favourable conditions (relatively low intensity and a non-segregated 
form of migration) also enable Scandinavian unions to be rather active and successful 
in organising non-national workers. In the dualised bargaining system of Germany, 
the mushrooming of atypical jobs in recent years provided employment opportunities 
for those migrants who were previously excluded from the labour market completely, 
but this comes at a price of limited upward mobility, and a redistributive struggle 
between insider (nationals) and outsider (non-nationals) about welfare services. 
Trade unions are caught up in this divide. Partly because of the divisions of trade 
unions and partly because of the institutional embeddedness they enjoy, they were 
not forced to see immigrants as a possible source of organisational revitalisation. In 
consequence, their record in attracting immigrant workforce lags behind both 
Scandinavian and British trade unions. The UK with its fragmented bargaining 
system was one of the main targets of immigration in the 2000s. While there is no 
clear separation between insiders and outsiders as in the case of Germany, there is 
some evidence about downward pressure on wages in the low-skilled service sector. 
Nevertheless, trade unions were quite successful in organising immigrants as part of 
their revitalisation strategy and the crisis did not impinge disproportionately on 
migrant workers either. In Spain, migration was a similarly intense process during 
the 2000s, framed by informality and periodical state intervention. However, crisis 
effects on immigrants were much harsher, and due to problems of informality and 
sectoral divides, unions can achieve only partial results in organising immigrant 
labour. 
In general, more encompassing bargaining can preclude mass labour force 
immigration, but on the other hand facilitates a more balanced outcome of migration 
for both immigrants and the society as a whole. A dualised system, with a clear 
institutional separation between insiders and outsiders seems to be the least effective 
both from the perspective of migrants and trade unions. Besides, if dualism is 
coupled with the prevalence of informality for outsiders, then migrants are deprived 
of any possible means of formal representation. Finally and most interestingly, the 
fragmented systems allow mass immigration of precarious labour, but because the 
whole labour market is quite flexible, negative shocks such as the 2008 crisis affect 
immigrants and nationals equally. Besides, the example of the United Kingdom 
demonstrates that trade unions can take advantage of immigration as a source of 
revitalisation even in an institutionally adverse environment.  
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From the policy perspective, policies that would aim at better enforcement of equal 
rights and opportunities of migrants and native workers would promote easier 
circulation of labour force present in a country, balance flexibility and migrant rights, 
and prevent establishment of migrant-dominated occupational enclaves. Labour 
unions can play a key role on this, even in the context of weak bargaining position. 
Indeed, existing examples of the work of labour unions (e.g. UK) demonstrate that 
trade unions even in an institutionally adverse environment can assist migrants in 
important areas, such as the recognition of qualifications and information sharing on 
national labour law legal framework, and so facilitate better integration of migrants 
and costs and benefits of migration to the society and migrant workers.  
 
Box 5.3:  IZA Expert Opinion Survey 2012: Experts’ view on attitudes of 
stakeholders towards migration  
The survey also sought to identify stakeholders most and least in favour of more liberalised 
policy as well as the greatest and the smallest beneficiaries of such policy change. About two 
thirds of the experts identified employers and employers’ associations as the group likely to 
support most as well as to benefit most from a more liberalised migration policy towards 
EaP countries. Universities, academic and research community and EU institutions were 
viewed as inclined to such policy shift by more than a third of experts and were generally 
seen as beneficiaries. While a similar share of experts considered general public as likely to 
benefit the most (30%), almost two thirds identified public as the least likely stakeholder to 
support such change. Workers, unions and employees associations are generally seen as 
opponents and non-beneficiaries of more liberalised policy framework with EaP countries. 
Interestingly, a good share of experts (33%) sees their respective governments as likely to 
oppose such policy change.  
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8. Existing legal frameworks and policies  
 
National-level labour migration legal frameworks and policies vary significantly 
across the European Union.  
 
They together create a complex system of regulations, characterized by  
- Lack of harmonization across Member States 
- Lack of transparency of immigration procedures 
- High pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of immigration procedures for 
migrants and administrators 
- Lack of provisions for tied migrants (including spouses, children or parents) 
- Limited access of migrants to labour markets, social assistance and services, 
or other markets, services or institutions.  
- Insufficient capacity of the administration to deal with various contingencies 
- Generally reserved approach towards migrants 
 
While migration policy remains a national competence, based on economic 
competitiveness but also developmental objectives the European Union has in the 
recent past advanced policy-making in this area.  In the following section we briefly 
review the key EU directives and assess their goals and, where possible, comment on 
their functionality and effectiveness. Mobility Partnership Agreements provide an 
EU-wide tool within which bilateral arrangements can be furthered. These are 
reviewed at length in the EaP Synthesis Report (Barbone, Bonch-Osmolovskiy and 
Luecke, 2013) and hence we do not evaluate them here extensively. We then focus at 
discussing mainly legal frameworks in the five EU countries covered by the country 
studies and comparatively review their specific approaches towards the EaP countries 
with respect to visa requirements and labour migration schemes. We evaluate a 
possible impact of the existing frameworks on the composition and magnitude of 
flows into these countries.  
Similarly to the EaP Synthesis Report (Barbone, Bonch-Osmolovskiy and Luecke, 
2013) we note a wide diversity in the existing frameworks. In addition to varied 
country-level labour migration schemes, differences exist also in the application of 
EU-wide frameworks, such as the requirements for the provision of long-term term 
visa in the Schengen area and outside (e.g.. UK). In most cases specific governmental 
programs (e.g. point systems, quotas, special card systems) do not target specifically 
EU Eastern neighbours or the Caucasus region but rather apply to third country 
nationals generally. Migrants from some EaP countries, especially Moldova and 
Ukraine, may enjoy certain benefits within the framework of special bilateral 
agreements concluded by each Member State and the EaP governments.  
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8.1. EU-level migration-related directives 
Through a range of recently drafted directives, the EU has advanced its efforts in 
making migrant entry administratively less burdensome by streamlining 
procedural aspects of entry and dedicating focus to equal rights and better 
conditions of migrants.   
 
However, the implementation of several programs, including the Blue Card, falls 
short of the expectations.   
 
The introduction of the Blue Card program is the flagship EU initiative specifically 
targeting high skilled workers from third countries. Apart from simplified admission 
procedures, migrant workers who are Blue Card holders should also have equal 
access to employment, pensions and social security schemes as well as equal rights 
concerning recognition of qualifications and freedom of association. Eligibility 
criteria consist of a valid work contract, necessary professional qualifications and a 
salary 1.5 (in some cases – 1.2) times higher than the average in the receiving 
Member State. These relatively strict conditions as well as quotas set on the national 
levels may hinder skilled labour flows under the Blue Card scheme. While all Member 
States have transposed the Directive into the national legislations, no statistics are to 
date available on Blue Card holders to evaluate the scheme.  Kahanec and 
Zimmermann (2011) contend that its strict conditionality continues to project a 
generally negative attitude of Europeans towards immigration and question its ability 
to attract high-skilled immigrants effectively. In addition, the Blue Card 
disadvantages prospective younger migrants who typically start at lower wage scale 
than the wage criterion defined by the Blue Card. For this reason, amending Blue 
Card towards selection based on a points system considering criteria such as age, 
qualifications, or language skills would enhance its usability and effectiveness.  
Apart from the Blue Card Directive, the EU framework already ensures easier entry of 
researchers.  The Directive on a specific procedure for admitting third-country 
nationals for the purposes of scientific research (2005/71/EC), the so-called 
Researchers Directive, simplifies the admission procedures for third country national 
having hosting agreement with an EU research organisation. The Directive facilitates 
mobility by means of withholding the requirement to possess a work permit in order 
to be admitted to the EU Member State (excluding United Kingdom and Ireland, as 
well as Denmark). Researchers are entitled to equal economic and social rights 
regarding recognition of qualifications, working conditions, certain social security 
schemes, tax benefits and access to goods and services and the right to teach. To date 
the Researchers’ Directive failed to attract a larger number of researchers into the 
EU, the EaP countries are underrepresented and gender imbalance remains a 
problem. As already suggested in the European Commission’s own evaluation, 
streamlining of procedures and definitions and enhanced promotion through 
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mobility partnership and the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility framework 
can make it a more powerful tool in the key partner countries, including EaP 
(European Commission, 2011).  
Additional important frameworks for facilitating exchange of knowledge are the 
schemes supporting inflows of foreign students to the EU.  With respect to EaP 
countries, specific instruments in educational cooperation are already in place under 
the Erasmus Mundus, Youth in Action and Jean Monnet programs. The number of 
students who come, however, has been generally rather low. This limited success of 
academic exchange programs is generally attributed to a low level of awareness about 
EU programs among university students. Until 2010 the EaP countries have made 
little effort to promote youth mobility on the regional level with international 
cooperation mainly carried out by individual universities or research groups 
(Levandovska, 2010). Administrative complications related to recognition of earned 
credits or degrees after return might be another hindering factor discouraging more 
students to enter the EU. Starting from 2011 onward, however, significant efforts 
have been made to improve the situation. Funding for higher education programs 
such as Erasmus Mundus and Tempus have been increased and, from 2014, mobility 
from the EaP to the EU are expected to grow even further, modelled after the current 
intra-EU Erasmus scheme. 
The efforts have recently advanced at the EU level with respect to entry, employment 
and stay of third-country nationals. A number of Directives have been drafted and 
currently are in the approval or transposition phase. These are summarised in Box 
6.1. While they represent a step forward, Directives continue to enable Member States 
to implement a number of limitations which might be hindering immigration and 
making it costly for the migrants or companies interested to hire foreign workers.  
Box 6.1: EU migration-related directives under the negotiation process 
or in the transposition phase  
Directive on a Single Application Procedure for a Single Permit 
(2011/98/EU) simplifies administrative procedures for third country migrants by 
establishing a single application procedure for permits to reside and to work in an 
EU member state. It grants entry, re-entry and stay in the issuing Member State, free 
movement within this state and exercising of the activities authorized under the 
single permit, but migrants cannot seek employment across member states freely. 
The duration of the permit and the conditions under which it is granted, renewed 
and cancelled remain to be decided by the Member States. In addition, several key 
categories of third country national are excluded, such as seasonal workers, 
transferred workers, and posted workers. Migrants are granted equal treatment with 
nationals in important areas, including working conditions, recognition of diplomas, 
social security, healthcare, or tax benefits. Member states can decide to limit access 
to housing and unemployment benefits. Due to these  limitations, it is considered 
only a small step forward (Pascouau & McLoughlin, 2012). Directive is in the 
transposition stage and its benefits cannot be yet analysed.   
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Directive on Entry and Residence of Third-Country Nationals in the 
Framework of an Intra-Corporate Transfer targets managerial and qualified 
employees (2010/0209) with an assignment letter or training agreement. The 
Proposal includes an abolition of market test and proposes fast track application 
procedure for residence permit valid up to 3 years. The Directive does not provide 
for equal treatment in terms of education, vocational training, public housing and 
counseling services, but grants equal rights to recognition of qualifications and 
freedom of association. The Directive currently awaits first reading in the European 
Parliament. 
Proposal for a Directive on Common Entry and Residence Conditions for 
Third-Country Seasonal Workers (2010/0210) is currently under discussion 
among the European institutions. It is aimed at promoting circular migration and 
intends to establish fast track procedure for admitting third country seasonal 
workers who have binding job offers for up to 6 months in any calendar year. Apart 
from positive provisions such as equal treatment, the possibility to change the 
employer and procedures for making complains about discrimination, it includes 
safeguards such as a specified salary and guarantee of accommodation. The right to 
determine the number of workers remains Member States’ competence. The 
Directive introduces a multi-seasonal permit or a facilitated re-entry procedure for a 
subsequent season with the aim of encouraging legal migration for seasonal work. 
This should promote circular migration, flows of remittances and transfer of skills 
and investment to third countries, thus reducing poverty and contributing to the 
European Union’s development policy. Elsewhere in the report we will highlight that 
circularity is difficult to maintain and that supportive framework in home countries 
need to be developed in order to facilitate more suitable conditions of economic and 
social existence of migrants in both countries. 
 
8.2. Visa Policy Instruments  
Entry costs, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, for non-EU migrants to enter the 
European Union are very high. 
 
Visa policy instruments are complex, administratively burdensome, and migrants 
lack information how to deal with various requirements in the process of obtaining 
the visa.    
 
This tends to dis-incentivize migrants from seeking legal routes of entry and 
employment, sometimes diverting them to irregular modes of entry. 
 
All EaP migrants fall under specific EU regulations concerning entry and 
employment in the EU territory. Entry rules are harmonized in the specific Visa 
Code21 applying Schengen acquis and regulating entry of third country nationals.22 
                                                 
21European Union. 2009. “Visa Code”. 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigrati
on/jl0028_en.htm 
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Even though the general rules are harmonised, Member States have the authority to 
set their own regulations concerning the visa issuance procedure, for example, a list 
of required documents, the ways to apply for a visa, the waiting period for a decision, 
etc. Visa schemes in Schengen are similar with respect to requirements for short-stay 
visa, but differ for national long-term visa for the purposes of employment. For 
example, the German system requires that the applicant delivers in addition to an 
employment contract and a medical insurance also a proof of qualification (see Table 
C.1 in Annex C).  
 
Visa issuance practices are often subject to critique and seem to contradict the goals 
of the EU Visa Code. For example, according to the survey conducted among visa 
applicants in Ukraine in 2010, problems such as a lack of a unified set of documents 
necessary for visa application in different EU Consulates, long visa processing 
duration, high visa costs (especially where the Consulates resort to the services of 
intermediary visa issuance companies), lack of available information (particularly 
concerning categories of citizens who are exempt from visa fees), lack of information 
on refusal reasons, inadequate requirements concerning documentation and a 
frequently discourteous disposition of visa officials towards visa applicants result in a 
deteriorating image of several EU Member States and a rise in illegal visa issuance 
practices through intermediaries (EWF, 2010). To respond to these set-backs, visa 
facilitation agreements can be of crucial importance for enhancing freedom of 
movement and consequently employment opportunities for migrants from EaP 
countries. To date these have been signed with Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia.  
 
Importantly, accession of the new member states to the Schengen zone had direct 
implications on visa policies between these countries and the Eastern Neighbourhood 
region. Labour migrants from former Soviet Union countries lost their residence and 
employment rights and were forced to re-apply for visas or residence permits. Some 
CEE countries (i.e. Poland, Slovakia, and the Baltic States) have since then gradually 
waived fees for national long term visas for Ukrainian or Belarusian citizens. As of 
July 2012, European Commission approved for Ukrainian citizens further facilitation 
of visa issuance procedures by enhancing a list of citizens’ categories eligible for free-
of-charge multiple entry visas valid for a year, as well as simplifying the list of 
necessary documents to be presented at the Consulates. The provision on long-term 
visas valid up to five years was also made more concrete, as previously Consulates 
mostly avoided issuing such long-term visas. The changes to the Visa Facilitation 
Agreement are now waiting for the approval by the European Parliament and 
ratification process.  
 
To sum up, entry costs for non-EU migrants are very high: legal employment is 
expensive and administrative procedures are cumbersome. There are strong 
indications that this might be dis-incentivizing migrants from seeking legal routes of 
                                                                                                                                                        
22 Great Britain, Romania and Bulgaria have national rules for entry as non-participants of the Schengen 
Agreement.  
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entry and employment (cf. Fedyuk 2012). We now turn to discuss national-level 
labour migration policies.  
 
8.3. National-level labour migration policy frameworks 
The existing labour migration policy frameworks are diverse and differ in their 
scope, and EaP targeting.  
Existing legal frameworks shape migration patterns by influencing length of stay, 
routes of entry and sectoral allocation. 
Overly complicated and pricy administrative procedures for gaining work permits 
appear to be increasing the share of illegal immigrant labour, especially if demand 
in low-skilled sectors is strong. 
With weaker enforcement frameworks and high shares of irregular migrants 
countries opt for amnesties and regularisation to legalise migrants. This helps to 
prevent migrants from being exploited in the shadow economy and generates 
welfare benefits for the receiving country, but it also may result in a moral hazard 
problem. 
Complementary policies in the welfare domain (e.g. pension portability) are 
necessary to facilitate temporary migration flows and the benefits from such 
migration.  
National-level policies targeting high-skilled migrants have had limited success and 
Europe lags behind in ability to attract highly skilled migrants.  
In the area of highly-skilled migration, further scope exists for the EU to push for a 
systematic and more open immigration policy.  
 
Migration policy framework currently applied in individual EU countries represents a 
range of different approaches. Table 10 summarises the types of general schemes 
which are currently implemented in the five EU countries analysed in depth. With the 
exception of the Blue Card, these are national-level specific frameworks. We discuss 
the key schemes and their targeting of the EaP countries, their changes over time and 
possible impact on the EaP migration.  
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Table 9: Policies towards third country nationals in five EU counties: general overview 
Country Visas 
Work 
permits 
Occupational 
quotas 
and/or 
shortage list 
Blue/ 
green 
card 
Points 
system 
Self-
employment 
Provisions 
for 
staying 
students 
Other 
Italy + + + +/- + + - - 
Germany + + - +/* - + + - 
Poland + + + +/- - + + 
Local 
border 
agreements; 
Card of a 
Pole 
Spain + + + +/- - + + - 
UK + * + -/- + + + - 
 
Note: As of 2012: (+) currently operating, (*) previously applied, but not anymore, (-) not applied in the country. Source: Own compilation based on the 
websites of relevant national Ministries (Ministry of Interior/Labour Policy), IOM (2009) and EMN (2011). UK Border Agency, Kahanec and Zimmermann 
(2011), Deloitte Comparative Study. Immigration 2010-2011.  
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Italy regulates the inflow of labour migrants via a central quota system introduced in 
2002. The quota system is organised by country of origin and according to the sectors 
of labour shortage and regional needs. There are also preferential quotas set for 
migrants from the countries that signed bilateral cooperation agreements with Italy 
on migration, out of EaP region Georgia is included. The quota levels cannot embrace 
all third country nationals wishing to legally work in Italy. It is restrictive for new 
migrants, as the system includes foreigners already residing in Italy. Moreover, the 
employment scheme attached to the quota system remains rather complicated. 
Combined these factors tend to encourage irregular migration. Through frequent 
amnesties and regularisations, the governments have regularised high numbers of 
Eastern European migrants. In spite of importance and positive contribution of EaP 
migrants to the Italian economy, EaP targeted efforts remain limited. Italy has been 
strengthening relations with non-EU Mediterranean countries and Sub-Saharan 
countries, dedicating lower priority to the EaP region.  One of the innovations 
introduced by Italian government in 2012 is the point-based residence permit (for 
general purpose) (Baron, 2012). Since March 2012 all new migrants to Italy are 
obliged to sign the integration agreement with a relevant Police department on the 
basis of which they will be issued a residence permit in less than a year subject to 
acquiring sufficient number of points (points to be given for the knowledge of Italian 
language, Constitution, public institutions, civic life in Italy after completion of 
educational courses). The effect of this new instruments remains to be seen ( 
Marchetti, Piazzalunga and Venturini, 2013; Gordon 2012).  
In Germany the current framework does not contain particular facilitations for 
fostering access from the EaP countries. EaP nationals are subject to visa restrictions 
according to the Immigration Act of 2005. Due to a relatively restrictive nature of the 
procedures for gaining employment in Germany, study route and family reasons 
route are important avenues for the entry of EaP migrants. Of those EaP migrants 
with a work permit, the majority were categorised as unskilled workers. It is not clear 
whether these immigrants lack human capital, or whether their credentials cannot be 
transferred. The Recognition Act of April 2012 has instituted a standardised 
procedure to recognise all qualifications acquired abroad. While foreigners have to 
bear the costs of the recognition fees, applicants do not need to submit any 
supplementary documents and presence in Germany during the recognition process 
is not necessary. This might facilitate further work-related immigration and ensure 
better matching at lower costs of migrants and lesser mismatch and illegal work.  
Germany has valid Mobility Partnership Agreements with Moldova (2008), Georgia 
(2009), and Armenia (2011). Stimulated by the European Commission also dialogues 
with Moldova and Ukraine on readmission and visa facilitation agreements are in 
place, and a perspective to start such dialogues also with Armenia and Azerbaijan 
(Biavaschi and Zimmermann, 2013)  
Poland has taken a different route than a majority of EU member states. In view of 
the country’s skill shortages which arose after EU accession, Poland liberalised the 
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legislation on employment of third country nationals by introducing simplified 
declaration-based employment procedure. Such procedure allows working in Poland 
for a limited period of time without the necessity to hold a permit. Importantly, it 
discriminates in favour of several EaP countries: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, 
and targets also Russia.  Currently the main entry gate for migrants from the EaP, it 
has been successful in channelling previously irregular employment into regular 
forms, and in filling labour market gaps in national labour market, especially in 
seasonal sectors such as agriculture, gardening and construction. Simplified 
procedures are also applied to recent university or high school graduates (graduation 
within the last 3 years) from Polish schools, the EEA and the Swiss Confederation. 
This impacts positively Ukrainian and Belorussian students who belong to the most 
populous groups.  Specific additional categories of EaP citizens do not need work 
permits: those of Polish descend or in possession of a Polish Card; language teachers, 
trainers, journalists, athletes, artists, and researchers. 
Parallel to this, a standard work permit procedure is in place. Granting of work 
permit is subject to a dual labour market test (on wage and shortage) with the aim to 
prevent any substitutive effects of Polish workers by foreign workers, and results 
from the experience of large unemployment prior to the 2004 labour market 
improvements. The labour market test does not need to be performed if a list 
signalling a specific skill shortage has already been published by a voivode (official 
representative of the government at the regional level) or if a foreign national has 
already been employed with a specific employer. For members of management 
boards and posted workers a separate legislation applies. Due to relatively little 
immigration prior to the late 2000s, Poland so far does not face social or economic 
problems resulting from former immigrant inflows. It has challenges ahead 
stemming from designing immigration and integration framework that will effectively 
manage inflow of immigrant labour into filling the existing demand, which is likely to 
continue (Duszczyk, Góra and Kaczmarczyk, 2013).   
Spain does not have any EaP-specific migration policy in place, but has seen a major 
change in migration legal framework in the past decade. Up to 2000, Spain’s 
immigration policy for non-EU migrants was very restrictive; in order to gain legal 
status, immigrants were required to acquire work and residency permit which then 
restricted them geographically and to a particular activity. In spite of contributing to 
social security, they were not immediately eligible to any social benefits. Restrictive 
framework contributed to high numbers of irregular immigration whereby migrants 
would enter on tourist or short-stay visa and then prolong their stay illegally. To 
regularise their status, several regularisations and amnesties took place.  
Spanish labour admission channels were reformed in 2004 in response to the 
structural weaknesses of the Spanish labour market and to the pressure exerted by 
employers. The aim of the reform was to establish a migration model based on the 
interconnections among different policy fields related to immigration, such as the 
management of regular migration flows, the fight against irregular migration, the 
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strengthening of border controls, the relationships with third-world countries and the 
integration of immigrants (Finotelli 2012). Currently two parallel regime exist: the 
General Regime (Regimén General) in which individuals are recruited based on an 
employer’s application to hire a certain worker. This employment route is subject to a 
labour market test by the relevant Public Employment Service. Due to high 
administrative burden, irregular employment is said to remain attractive (Finotelli 
2012). The Contingente Regime allows hiring a foreign worker without the labour 
market test for filling occupations included in the “Catalogue of Hard-to-Fill 
Occupations” (Catalogo de ocupaciones de dificilcobertura). The workers have to 
possess the credentials that are necessary according to the Spanish law to execute the 
required activity. The inflows through Contingente Regime have declined 
significantly during the crisis. Moreover, regime relies on bilateral migration 
agreements which to date have not been concluded with any EaP country. Country 
experts evaluate that the current provisions do not seem fit to yield any substantial 
influence on migration patterns and to generate benefit from (EaP) migration into 
Spain. In response to the crisis in 2008, the Spanish government introduced the Plan 
de Retorno Voluntario – a pay-to-go system which gives unemployment benefits to 
non-EU nationals who agree to return home. It has not fostered return migration as 
much as expected (Farré and Rodríguez-Planas, 2013).  
EaP migration to the United Kingdom has been greatly affected by recent 
migration policy reforms as well as liberalisation of the British labour market to 
intra-EU migrants. The fall in inflows of migrant workers from Eastern Partnership 
countries (especially Ukrainians) is principally related to a refocusing of the Seasonal 
Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) and Sector Based Schemes (SBS) and the 
introduction of the Points Based System (PBS) in 2008.  Although the SAWS and SBS 
only provide temporary or seasonal employment in agricultural and related sectors, 
the restriction of these schemes to just Bulgarian and Romanian migrants leave 
limited opportunities for migrant workers from the EaP countries.  
The introduction of the PBS in 2008 introduced a “shortage occupation list” which 
pertains to Tier 2 of the PBS – medium and high-skilled migrants with a job offer. 
The shortage list is prepared by Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) which 
combines statistical information with qualitative information to determine shortages 
of skills that are strategic to the UK economy and cannot be filled by natives or EU 
citizens. Future opportunities for migrants from outside the EEA, including those 
from EaP countries, will therefore exists in skilled occupations identified by MAC. 
The PBS, with its focus on migrant skills, is likely to foster immigration of younger 
and more skilled migrants into the UK. As such it impacts migration patterns and 
seems fit to increase benefits from immigration for the UK, with the associated risk of 
brain-drain effects for the countries of origin.  
While the UK government has signed a range of bilateral agreements with Eastern 
Partnership countries, these do not cover special arrangements for migrant labour. A 
trend towards limitations on the entry to the UK of migrant labour according to the 
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increasingly constrained points-based system, coupled with moves to limit 
progression towards permanent settlement and eventual citizenship is evident. In 
light of this, it is highly unlikely in the short to medium term that the UK will 
consider opening up its labour markets to workers from the Eastern partnership 
countries (Clark and Drinkwater, 2013, Milio, 2012). 
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Table 10: Overview of key temporary migration frameworks 
 
Country Relevant migration 
framework 
Skill focus Sectoral focus Impact on and relevance for  
EaP countries  
Quota 
Italy Central quota system Labour shortage 
based 
Labour shortage 
based, high quota 
granted to care sector 
Bilateral agreement in place with 
Ukraine and Moldova;  
Care sector regularisation in 2009  
Yes. 
Defined at the beginning of the 
year, but is lower than the 
actual labour demand  
Germany Residence permit qualifying for 
employment 
(no specific framework 
applicable to EaP) 
Qualifications 
have to be 
proven 
Labour market test to 
establish shortage, 
tied to job offer   
Employment related entry remains 
difficult  
No.  
Spain “General regime”  Based on labour 
market test 
Based on labour 
market test 
EaP migrants can enter through 
this legal route 
No  
“Contingente regime” Based on list of 
shortage 
occupations 
Based on list of 
shortage occupations, 
since crisis mainly 
fishing and naval 
sectors  
EaP countries are not among the 
countries where migration 
agreements were signed to manage 
the flows within Contingente 
Based on existing shortage, 
limited to countries with which 
Spain signed bilateral 
migration agreements 
Poland Simplified employer-
declaration-based procedure 
Not given 
centrally, based 
on employers’  
demand 
Not given centrally, 
based on employers’ 
demand 
Has served as major channel for 
hiring seasonal workers from EaP  
No quota, but selective by 
sending countries: Ukraine, 
Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, 
Russia 
Work permit Subject to labour 
market test 
Subject to labour 
market test 
Serves as a more cumbersome 
procedure for possible entry of EaP 
migrants 
No 
UK Seasonal Agricultural Workers 
Scheme (SAWS) 
Low-skilled, as 
defined by 
agrisector needs 
Scheme for 
agricultural sector  
EaP migrants are largely excluded Quota is set, and 40% 
earmarked to EU2 migrants, 
60% to students from non-
EEA countries 
Point-based system Skilled workers Occupations defined 
based on skill needs 
by Migration Advisory 
Committee 
Favors skilled EaP migrants, Tier 2 
most used, but access for EaP 
migrants is tight   
Cap on total migration  
Tier quota changes based on 
regular evaluations of skill 
needs. 
Source: Based on EU country studies and Finotelli 2012, Ministry of Labour and Immigration in Spain 2009, Milio 2012, Gordon 2012.  
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The EU country study experts proposed a range of policy interventions in which they 
identified scope for further scaling up of EaP migration or improvement in the 
outcomes. We summarise these specific interventions in Table 12 below. Importantly, 
these recommendations call for improvement in existing migration frameworks, 
suggest possible development of new schemes, but also point to the importance of 
accompanying non-migration policies, such as migrant integration and equal 
treatment policies and their enforcement.  
Table 11: Recommended policy changes: EU country study findings 
Country Scope Policy Recommendations 
Italy 
General  
- demand for unskilled labour will continue, currently there is a mismatch 
between the quota system and levels of applications 
- selection and hiring of immigrants should be reformed as well as the process 
of integration in the Italian labour market 
  - temporary & circular forms of migration should be supported 
EaP 
migration 
specific 
- EaP migrants in Italy do not receive adequate attention 
 - more attention should be given to the problematic issues such as employment 
in the informal economy, channelling of migrants into sectors perceived as 
“jobs for foreigners”, and unfavourable employment situation in the care and 
domestic sector of female EaP migrants 
Germany 
General 
- higher immigration should be stimulated, along with mobilisation of internal 
capacities 
EaP 
migration 
specific 
- Visa facilitation agreements for highly qualified EaP workers 
- temporary migration schemes 
- improving migrant selection and matching by improved system of recognition 
of foreign qualifications 
Poland 
General 
- development of an institutional framework for the management of 
immigration flows 
EaP 
migration 
specific 
- special attention to Ukrainian immigration in the development of an 
institutional framework for the management of immigration flows 
Spain 
General 
- correct design, regulation and implementation of migration policies to ensure 
better matching between immigrant skills and labour market needs 
- clarification of legalisation processes for those already in the country 
- employment equity policies and anti-discrimination policies 
- reduction of the informal sector and structural change of the Spanish 
economy 
EaP 
migration 
specific 
- suggestion to establish bilateral agreements with EaP countries to cover the 
anticipated demand in the care sector 
UK 
General 
- employer interests should be better taken into consideration in the “shortage 
occupation list“ 
EaP 
migration 
specific 
- bilateral agreements are suggested with certain EaP countries and for 
particular sectors (e.g. agriculture), but scope for more extensive EaP  
immigration is limited politically and economically  
Source: EU country studies 
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8.4. Frameworks for highly skilled migrants  
With respect to frameworks for high-skilled migrant, the Member States apply 
different criteria in their definitions of high-skilled workers.  Generally, three types of 
criteria – education level, salary level or skill level – are used. These differences might 
transpire in the details of the implementation of EU directives, but especially in 
framing of national policies targeting high-skilled migrants (Kahanec and 
Zimmermann 2011). In most countries certain categories of workers are defined as 
high-skilled which typically includes managers, executives, researchers, university 
professors, artists, and athletes.  
Table 13 reviews the key approaches to high-skilled immigration in five EU countries. 
All countries with the exception of the UK apply special provisions for researchers 
(Researchers’ directive). In addition to this and the Blue Card directive launched in a 
recent past, several national-level initiatives exist. Germany stopped its Green Card in 
2004, but now has in place preferential treatment for highly-qualified workers and 
their family members who do not need to undergo a market test. Fast-track 
procedures for some categories of highly skilled migrants are applied in Italy and 
Spain, while Italy also implements quotas on highly skilled immigrants (with the 
exception of nurses). In Poland a new immigration policy was agreed in 2012 by the 
Cabinet, and awaits a more specific development. The UK in its Tier 1 targets “high 
value” migrants, and defines certain skilled categories in its Tier 2 system.  
Regardless of efforts made on the EU level and by individual Member States research 
shows that shortage of skilled labour in the EU still persists and that the EU is unable 
to attract innovative human capital (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2011, Kahanec 
2013). The newly proposed Directives discussed earlier have taken steps in the right 
direction. Their implementation practices and impact should be evaluated in order to 
amend them as needed.  At the same time, it is clear that country-specific frameworks 
for highly skilled migrants in the EU have had limited effectiveness. Those applied in 
the past showed generally poor performance which then led to their abolition (e.g. 
Green Cards in Germany, Czech Republic). Companies in different sectors find it 
challenging to recruit on international markets which is some sectors, such as IT, 
might be hindering their innovativeness potential (Beblavý and Kureková, 2012). In 
the area of highly-skilled migration, further scope exists for the EU to push for a 
systematic and more open immigration policy. 
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Table 12: High-skilled migration frameworks in five EU countries 
Country Policy description 
Germany 
- Special provisions for researchers (Implementation of the Directive 
2005/71/EC); 
- Permanent residence and exemption of Federal Employment Agency 
Assessment for highly- qualified workers and their family members (job offer, 
salary criteria); 
- Green Card for professionals in IT sector/engineers was used in 2000-2004 
Italy 
- Special provisions for researchers (Implementation of the Directive 
2005/71/EC); 
- Quotas for highly skilled (except nurses) 
- Fast track procedures for managers (intra-corporate transferees) and highly 
qualified personnel (professional and education criteria); 
Poland 
- Special provisions for researchers (Implementation of the Directive 
2005/71/EC); 
- Draft new immigration policy adopted by Cabinet of Ministers (July 2012) lists 
special treatment for highly skilled migrants (to be further elaborated in 
procedures) 
Spain 
- Special provisions for researchers (Implementation of the Directive 
2005/71/EC); 
- Fast track procedure for highly qualified migrants (exemption of the market 
test, however, certain limitations exist concerning Spanish employers; salary 
and education criteria) 
UK 
- Tier 1 – several categories for  high value migrants 
       + Exceptional Talent; General for highly skilled (currently closed to outside 
applicants); Graduate Entrepreneurs (subject to quotas); 
- Tier 2 - for skilled migrants: 
     + General; Ministers; Sportspersons; Intra-Corporate Transferees 
 
To sum up, the existing labour migration policy frameworks are diverse and differ in 
their scope, and level of EaP targeting. This can partially be explained by different 
labour market structures, different migration histories vis-à-vis the EaP countries as 
well as the impact of financial crisis which has in some countries led to more 
restrictive migration policies. As partially shown above, existing legal frameworks 
shape migration patterns by influencing length of stay, routes of entry and sectoral 
allocation. First, countries with weaker enforcement frameworks and high shares of 
irregular migrants (especially Italy and Spain) have used amnesties and 
regularisation to legalise migrants, many of which are of EaP origin. Regularisations 
help both to prevent migrants from being exploited in the shadow economy and to 
generate welfare benefits for the receiving country. They may, however, create a 
moral hazard problem. Such migration policy framework has been found to lead to 
informal channels of recruitment based on personal networks or direct referrals from 
current employees (IOM 2013a). Second, those regulations that promote temporary 
and circular arrangements seem very beneficial to the respective countries, yet create 
many demands on migrants. Migrants are more prone to exploitation and 
dependence on employer, face isolation, unfavourable working conditions, and 
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problems of transferability of pension and other welfare entitlements. Therefore, in 
order for temporary migration to bring most benefits to host countries as well as to 
migrants, supportive institutional framework in home as well as host country is 
essential, especially in the areas of social rights and responsibilities (e.g. pension 
portability schemes). Fourth, overly complicated and pricy administrative procedures 
for gaining visa and/or work permits seem to be increasing the share of illegal 
immigrant labour, especially if demand in low-skilled sectors is strong. Fifth, a 
success of policies aimed at attracting workforce in innovative sectors has been to 
date limited, but new national-level efforts have been put forward in some of the 
countries.  
A range of directives responding to the critical points raised in this discussion have 
recently been implemented or are under debate at the EU level. They generally seem 
to be shifting the policy in a good direction by simplifying administrative procedures 
and putting migrant workers of different categories on a more equal footing with 
national workforce.  However, their precise forms and effective implementation will 
be crucial to truly make a difference. In addition, it seems that scope exists for further 
advancement in highly-skilled immigration to which Blue Card directive might have 
only a limited contribution. While EaP migration to high-skilled occupations and 
sectors is so far limited, human capital endowments of these countries are favourable.  
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Box 6.2: IZA Expert Opinion Survey 2012: Preferred immigration policies  
The experts were asked to identify up to three types of policies which they considered 
to be able to most efficiently address the economic and labour market needs of their 
country. In the expert community, complete liberalisation of migration policy has 
considerable support and was marked by nearly a fifth of experts. The most favoured 
policies, however, were job dependent immigration based on labour market selection 
(42%), followed by positive selection on skills and education (35%), and quota system 
(23%). More than a fifth considered as favourable a policy based on migrant needs, 
i.e. open to refugees (22%). No expert considered closed border policy or policy based 
on selection of less skilled migrants as efficient for the needs of their economies.    
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9. Potential costs and benefits of increased mobility 
under alternative scenarios  
 
This section of the report focuses on two related tasks: to assess potential future flows 
from the EaP countries and to evaluate their macro-economic effects in the context of 
different scenarios of economic development and migration policy framework.   
 
9.1. Preliminaries 
In spite of the adverse demographic situation and alternative migration 
destinations such as the Russian Federation, there is a definite migration potential 
towards the EU in the EaP.  
Due to restrictive policies towards EaP migrants in the EU this potential remains in 
large part latent. 
 
Before we set out to project migration flows from the EaP countries to the EU, we 
review the lessons about the effects of liberalisation of migration flows from the 
experience of new Member States upon their accession to the EU in 2004 and 2007. 
As the first lesson, there is a latent supply of migrants in Central and Eastern Europe 
that can be triggered by changes of migration policy in receiving countries. While this 
supply is limited by adverse demographic developments in most of CEE, 
liberalisation of migration policies in the destination countries leads to additional 
East-West migration flows. Therefore, to reliably project migration flows, we need to 
take into account demographic projections, which measure the migration potential, 
as well as the economic prospects, the effects of migration policy changes and the 
multiplier power of migrant social networks. These latter variables measure the costs 
of migration as well as the pull and push factors, and thus significantly affect 
migration flows.  
Another important lesson is that such potential exists even if there is an alternative 
destination with a liberal migration policy, like Russia is for most of the EaP 
countries. If we consider the case of Slovakia, with a decades-long tradition of 
migration to the Czech Republic, and its experience after 2004, we see that the 
liberalisation of migration policy has the potential to unleash substantial additional 
migration flows and change the shares of destination countries in favour of newly 
liberalised ones. This is illustrated in Figure 10.     
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Figure 10: Migration from Slovakia, main destinations 
 
Source: Slovak Statistical Office based on LFS 
Notes: IT = Italy, DE = Germany, IR = Ireland, AT = Austria, HU = Hungary, UK = United Kingdom, 
CZ = Czech Republic 
 
An additional insight into the migration potential in EaP countries is offered by 
Danzer and Dietz (2013) who study the INTAS data that map migration intentions 
and their directionality in the EaP countries, except for Azerbaijan. While self-
reported migration intentions do not perfectly predict actual migration decisions, 
they add to our understanding of the migration potential and its directionality across 
the EaP. More specifically, the INTAS dataset contains a variable that measures 
whether the respondent intends to migrate abroad, and if so, where to. The message 
transpiring from Table 14 is clear: significant proportions of EaP populations intend 
migration for at least some months or years and, excluding Armenia, the EU 
distinctly dominates Russia as the intended destination. These findings indicate that 
the migration potential in the EaP countries targeting the EU is well-defined, but 
given the restrictions on migration flows to the EU it remains in large part latent. 
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Table 13: Migration intentions across the EaP countries 
Country   male female 
Armenia EU, some months 13.6 5.7 
EU, some years 10.2 3.9 
Russia, some 
months 24.6 7.1 
Russia, some years 16.1 5.3 
Belarus EU, some months 23.4 18.2 
EU, some years 13.3 8.3 
Russia, some 
months 12.0 2.9 
Russia, some years 6.3 0.8 
Georgia EU, some months 10.1 13.3 
EU, some years 10.1 11.4 
Russia, some 
months 3.6 3.0 
Russia, some years 3.6 2.7 
Moldova EU, some months 35.3 30.9 
EU, some years 27.5 23.2 
Russia, some 
months 16.2 12.4 
Russia, some years 5.4 5.2 
Ukraine EU, some months 20.9 22.2 
EU, some years 9.5 11.5 
Russia, some 
months 7.4 5.2 
Russia, some years 2.0 2.4 
Source: Calculations courtesy of Alexander Danzer, Danzer and Dietz, 2013. Notes: Per cent of the 
respondent population. No data for Azerbaijan.  
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9.2. Estimation of potential flows from the EaP countries 
under different migration scenarios  
Based on an established prediction model taking into account  
- demographic variables 
- economic variables 
- policy variables 
- network effects (diaspora) 
we project modest migration flows from the EaP to the EU until 2020. 
 
Our analysis shows that between 2011 and 2020 we can expect the following net 
migration flows from the EaP countries to the EU14:  
- under the baseline scenario of no policy change on average about 100 
thousand migrants per annum (1.03 million migrants over 2011-2020), 
- liberalisation of short-stay visa leads to essentially no additional migration, 
- labour market liberalisation is projected to result in on average 100 to 300 
thousand additional migrants  per annum (0.96 to 3.03 million additional 
migrants over 2011-2020), depending on economic conditions as well as 
migration policies (selective or full liberalisation).   
 
Correspondingly, for the EU8 we can expect: 
- under the baseline scenario of no policy change on average about 40 
thousand net migrants from the EaP per annum (0.4 million migrants over 
2011-2020), 
- essentially no additional migrants if short-stay visa is liberalised, 
- selective labour market liberalisation is projected to result in little additional 
migration, up to 8 thousand migrants per annum; full liberalisation is 
projected to result in on average 37 thousand additional migrants per annum 
– this implies between 0.08 and 0.56 million additional migrants over 2011-
2020, depending on economic conditions as well as migration policies 
(selective or full liberalization).  
  
Most migrants are predicted to go to Italy and Germany, and originate from 
Ukraine. 
 
 
Drawing on Fertig and Kahanec (2013), this section aims to assess potential future 
migration flows from EaP-countries to the EU by utilizing the experiences of the EU 
enlargement wave of 2004. Similarly to the recent enlargement context, income gaps 
between the EU countries and EaP countries are substantial. The average GDP per 
capita (pc) in purchasing-power-parity (PPP) in these countries amounts to slightly 
more than 6,870 USD in 2009 according to IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database 
(September 2011). However, there is quite a large heterogeneity within this country 
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group. On the lower end of the distribution, Moldova displays a GDP per capita in 
PPP of around 2,860 USD, whereas Belarus forms the upper end with slightly more 
than 12,700 USD according to official statistics. For comparison, the average GDP per 
capita in PPP of the EU in 2009 amounts to almost 29,700 USD, that of the Euro-
area to even more than 31,800 USD. In 2009 the two countries with the lowest 
income per capita among the new Member States, Bulgaria and Romania, attained 
GDP per capita PPP comparable to Belarus, at 12,600 and 11,900 USD, respectively.   
According to IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database (September 2011), the six 
Partner countries exhibit a population of almost 76 million people in 2009 (i.e. 
around 15% of the EU), of which about 46 million live in Ukraine. This approximately 
equals to the number of citizens living in EU8 countries when joining the EU in 2004, 
when Poland was the most populated and the other accessing countries were 
relatively smaller in population size.   
To estimate potential future flows from EaP countries to the EU27, we conduct a 
double extrapolation exercise – in time and in space. Before that, we use a well-
established model to estimate the determinants of immigration from the 2004 
accession countries to the EU. Specifically, we estimate the structural relationship 
between migration flows and its determinants using an adaption of the model of 
Hatton (1995) to time series-cross sectional data (for a detailed description see Annex 
D and Fertig (2001)).  
This model is estimated using net-migration rates from the EU8 to the EU15 without 
Luxembourg23 (EU14 for short) which were constructed from Holland et al. (2011) 
and updated using Eurostat Population Statistics. Due to a lack of real wage 
information, wage rates are approximated by per-capita-income (PCI) in purchasing 
power parities to account for differences in living costs. Ignoring participation issues 
we approximate employment rates as 100 per cent minus the unemployment rate 
since employment rates are not available for all countries. Our sample comprises 
information for the time period from 1998 up to 2010. Hence, we have six years 
before and six after enlargement to identify the effect of enlargement on observable 
migratory movements from the EU8.  
 
Determinants of EaP mobility 
Our estimation results (see Table D.1 in Annex D) show that economic conditions in 
the destination countries play an important role in explaining observable migration 
flows. Both the PCI-ratio between the destination and sending countries as well as 
employment rates in the EU8 exhibit a significant relationship to net-migration. The 
higher the PCI-ratio, the higher are observable flows, all other things equal. The 
                                                 
23 Within the EU15 Luxembourg is by far the smallest (in terms of population) and simultaneously also the 
richest country. To avoid biased estimation results for the per-capita-income variable Luxembourg was therefore 
excluded from the sample of destination countries. In quantitative terms this exclusion is negligible since the 
stock of migrants from the EU8 living in Luxembourg amounts to merely 0.4% in 2009. 
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opposite holds for the employment rate in the origin countries, which affects 
migration flows negatively. By contrast, the employment rate in the EU14 seems to be 
of minor importance. Hence, our results suggest that migrants’ income opportunities 
in the destination country compared to the home country have a systematic impact 
on their decision to leave the country.  
However, estimation results also clearly indicate that the costs of migration are 
important. In line with the literature, the stock of migrants in the destination country 
exhibits a statistically significant positive impact on net-migration which suggests 
that existing migrant networks in the destination countries – immigrant diasporas – 
help to attract further migrants.   
Furthermore, the set of sending-country-specific intercepts suggest that migration 
costs vary by country and react to policy. The results of the preferred model 
(specification 3 in Table D1 in Annex D) suggest that country-specific migration costs 
exhibit a largely different pattern before and after accession of the EU8 countries. 
Controlling for a range of economic and social variables, before accession the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovenia display significantly and substantially higher 
migration rates to the EU14 than Poland, whereas those of all other sending countries 
do not differ systematically from Poland. We also observe that beyond the effects on 
migration costs of liberalisation of migrants’ access to EU15 labour markets, which 
were positive, accession did not significantly affect migration rates (and thus costs of 
migration) for citizens of most EU8 countries. The results show, however, that 
migration costs decreased for Latvians, Lithuanians and to a lesser degree also 
Estonians after accession. The inclusion of the initial stock of migrants from home in 
destination country and country-specific intercepts also controls for time-invariant 
factors affecting migration flows, including the existence of alternative destinations.24 
Short-term variation in economic variables does not seem to matter too much. The 
estimated coefficients of the changes in economic indicators are all statistically 
insignificant, except that of the employment rate in the destination countries. It is 
worth noting that the significant negative impact of the lagged net-migration rate 
suggests that immigration to the EU14 is varying around a stable level. Thus, unless 
dramatic changes in economic, social, political or policy-related conditions occur, 
there is no reason to expect immigration to the EU to be ever increasing in the future. 
Remarkably, the largest single impact on observable flows can be observed for policy 
indicators. Hence, policy regimes regulating access to destination labour markets 
matter more than migration costs and economic conditions. Whereas selective 
liberalisation does not have a significant effect on net-migration, the number of years 
of free movement unfolds a significant and quantitatively substantial impact on 
observable flows. Controlling for other factors, this impact follows an inversely u-
                                                 
24 To the extent that past migration flows reflect the opportunity costs of choosing various alternative migration 
destinations and their effects remains structurally stable, the inclusion of the initial stock of migrants from home 
in destination country enables our model to account for the effect of Russia as an important alternative 
destination for EaP migrants.  
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shaped pattern, i.e. immigration increases in the first years after opening up labour 
markets completely, reaches its maximum in year four and declines thereafter.25  
By contrast to that, liberalisation of short-stay visa is found to have essentially no 
effect on migration flows. Although EU8 countries enjoyed visa-free regime vis-à-vis 
the EU15, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and the UK for various periods of time 
introduced short-stay visa for Slovak citizens prior to Slovakia’s accession to the EU. 
We estimated a separate econometric model including a variable indicating whether 
short-stay visa was applied or not. The analysis showed that inclusion of the visa 
variable had essentially no effect on the model, and was statistically insignificant. 
This result enables us to conclude that liberalisation of short-stay visa for EaP citizens 
will not lead to any noticeable additional immigration to the EU. In addition, this 
finding tells us that our models well describe the structural features of migration 
flows under a visa-free regime (as was the case for most EU8 countries prior to their 
accession) but also if short-stay visa is applied, as is the case today for EaP citizens.26 
 
Scenario description 
To perform forecasts of the immigration potential from EaP-countries to the EU we 
use the long-run coefficients from specification 3 in Table D.1 (Annex D). Since no 
common migration history involving different policy scenarios or transitional 
arrangements between the EaP countries and the EU is available, we perform a 
double extrapolation exercise – over time and across space. For this we invoke some 
identification assumptions which have to hold a priori to ensure that the forecasts 
are valid. The most important of such assumptions is that the structure, which quite 
accurately describes the determinants of migration from the EU-8 to the EU14, 
remains stable in the future and also holds for the behaviour of future migration from 
the EaP-countries. In addition, we need to make assumptions about the development 
of the exogenous variables in our model (i.e. GDP and employment). Finally, we have 
to invoke an assumption for country-specific migration costs. Given that the 
likelihood that the estimated structural relationships describe migration decisions 
will decrease over time, we restrict our projections to cover not more than a decade 
after the last observable data point.  
The forecasts are performed for different sets of assumptions combined into 
scenarios.  In all forecasting scenarios we assume GDP growth rates summarised in 
Table 15 for the EaP-countries. 
 
 
                                                 
25 Although we control for a range of economic variables, we cannot completely exclude the possibility that the 
timing of this reversal is partly driven by the onset of the Great Recession.  
26 Short-stay visas were reintroduced for Slovak citizens in reaction to inflows of migrants who applied for 
refugee status upon immigration. This could lead to a positive correlation of between immigration and 
introduction of short-stay visa; however, our migration data generally do not include these asylum seekers.  
103 
 
 
Table 14: Assumed annual growth of per-capita-income in EaP-countries 
(in per cent) 
  
2011-
2014 
2015-
2019 
2020-
2030 
Armenia 4 5 5 
Azerbaijan 2.5 4 5 
Belarus 4 3.5 3.5 
Georgia 5.5 6 6 
Moldova 5 6 6 
Ukraine 3.5 4 4.5 
Source: EaP country experts. 
 
Furthermore, EU14 and EU8 countries are divided into three groups according to 
their labour market situation in 2010: 
 High employment countries: Austria, Denmark, and the Netherlands 
 Medium employment countries: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
 Low employment countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Spain 
The argument of convergence is applied when making assumptions about 
employment trends in the country groups under different general growth 
assumptions. Based on this argument we assume less favourable figures for 
employment changes in high-employment countries than in low-employment 
countries.  
For the migration forecasts we combine these assumptions into nine scenarios for 
different time horizons. The nine scenarios are defined as summarised in Table 16. 
All the scenarios assume that none of the EaP countries becomes a member of the EU 
during the studied period. We distinguish three regimes of liberalisation of access to 
EU labour markets for EaP migrants: no liberalisation (status quo), selective 
liberalisation (e.g. liberalisation of some professions and/or simplification of 
procedures27), and full liberalisation (no work permit needed).  
 
 
 
                                                 
27 As was the case when some EU15 countries partly liberalised access to their labour markets for citizens from 
new Member States, while still applying transitional provisions. This includes selective liberalization by 
Belgium that made it easier to get work permits in sectors of the economy where jobs were hard to fill (nurses, 
plumbers, electricians, car mechanics, builders, architects, accountants, engineers and IT workers in the Brussels 
Region); liberalization measures adopted by Denmark permitting workers from new Member States to look for a 
job for six months, and providing them with residence and work permits if they succeed in obtaining a full-time 
job complying with Danish standards; and Germany, which in spite of generally restrictive policy simplified the 
procedures and facilitated acquisition of work permits for citizens from new Member States in practice. See also 
Table 2.  
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Table 15: Design of modelling scenarios: economic performance and 
migration policy matrix 
  
Economic developments (% 
change) 
Migration policy 
  
No 
liberalisation 
Selective labour 
market  
liberalisation  
Full labour 
market 
liberalisation 
2011-2014 Per-capita-income in EU14: 0% 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2   
  Employment in EU14:  
Short-
term 
European 
recession 
scenario 
-0.3% for high employment 
countries; 
-0.1% for medium group;  
0.2% for low employment 
group. 
2015-
2020 
Per-capita-income in EU14: 1% 
 Scenario 1’ Scenario 3 
 
 
Employment in EU14:  
Medium-
term I, 
weak EU 
recovery, 
weak job 
growth 
-0.1% for high employment 
countries; 
0.1% for medium group; 
0.3% for low employment 
group.  
2015-
2020 
Per-capita-income in EU14: 2% 
Scenario 1” Scenario  4 Scenario 5 
  Employment in EU14:  
Medium 
Term II, 
sustained 
EU 
recovery, 
stronger 
job 
growth 
0.15% for high employment; 
0.3% for medium group;  
0.6% for low group. 
2021-
2030 
Per-capita-income in EU14: 2.5% 
  Scenario 6 Scenario 7  
 Employment in EU14:  
Long-
term 
sustained 
growth 
  0.15% for high employment;  
  0.3% for medium group;  
  0.6% for low group. 
 
Migration forecasts 
Migration projections based on the projection model outlined above are summarised 
in Table 7.4.  For sake of comparability with EU’s experience with 2004 and 2007 
enlargements we first focus on migration projections to EU14 countries only. Starting 
the forecasts in 2011 (actual migration data are available until 2010) and assuming 
medium country-specific pre-accession migration costs (i.e. applying the mean of the 
estimated sending-country-specific intercepts for the EU8 to all EaP-countries) yields 
forecasts of approximately 1.03 million incremental migrants until 2020 if the status 
quo is maintained and no liberalisation takes place. Various scenarios of 
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liberalisation lead to 0 to 3.03 million incremental migrants from the EaP to the 
EU14 depending on the assumptions on economic development (weak EU recovery 
versus sustained EU recovery) and policy regulations. In particular, we project 
essentially no incremental net migration if visa regimes (but not access to EU labour 
markets) are liberalised. Under labour market liberalisation we project 0.96 to 3.03 
million incremental migrants to the EU14 from 2011 to 2020, depending on the scope 
and timing of labour market liberalisation. For example, under the scenario of 
selective liberalisation of access to all EU labour markets until 2020 and gradual 
recovery in the EU we project about 1.40 million incremental migrants to the EU14 
over the decade (i.e. 140 thousand per annum).  
We separately present the results for projected migration flows from EaP to EU8 
countries, as we acknowledge that these projections are based on a non-trivial 
assumption that the structural model describing migration from the EU8 to the EU14 
is valid also for migration from the EaP to the EU8. Under the baseline status-quo 
scenario about 400 thousand migrants are projected to set out from EaP countries to 
the EU8 between 2011 and 2020. Over the same period the projected incremental 
migration flows from the EaP to the EU8 are projected to be modest, with EaP 
migrants actually leaving several EU8 countries under a range of scenarios. For 
example, in case of selective liberalisation and gradual recovery (Scenario 2+4), of 
EU8 countries only the Czech Republic and Slovenia, the two most affluent countries 
among the EU8, are expected to still retain Ukrainian diasporas in 2020 (circa 275 
thousand in the Czech Republic and 36 thousand in Slovenia). Under the scenario 
with most liberalised labour markets strong economic performance in the EU (2+5), 
EU8 countries are projected to attract about 566 thousand additional migrants over 
2011-2020. 
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Table 16: Projection result under proposed scenarios, EU14 
Net migration 
to the EU14 
from: 
Baseline net 
migration* 
Incremental effects of policies on net migration 
Scenario 
1+8 
Scenario 
1+9 
Visa 
liberalization 
Scenario 
1+3 
Scenario 
2+3 
Scenario 
1+4 
Scenario 
2+4 
Scenario 
2+5 
Scenario 
1+5 
Armenia 65,731 65,792 No effect 135,390 166,049 161,870 168,972 244,523 212,773 
Azerbaijan Negative Negative n/a Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
Belarus Negative Negative n/a Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
Georgia 87,283 87,366 No effect 75,496 105,770 99,868 109,880 216,253 184,492 
Moldova 32,730 32,798 No effect 75,474 97,253 92,491 100,589 186,799 163,814 
Ukraine 845,779 846,706 No effect 675,795 972,091 743,222 1,021,571 2,381,376 2,069,431 
EaP-countries* 1,031,523 1,032,662 No effect 962,155 1,341,163 1,097,451 1,401,012 3,028,951 2,630,510 
* Only non-negative values. Predicted emigration from Azerbaijan and Belarus exceed the 2010 stock of migrants in the EU14 countries in most cases. The 
projections for the baseline scenarios 1+1’ and 1+1” are based on pre-accession data only.  
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Unsurprisingly, in all scenarios the bulk of migrants from the EaP-countries stem 
from Ukraine since it is – in terms of population – the largest among all sending 
countries under investigation. The share of immigrants to the EU14 from this country 
in all EaP migrants varies between 68% and 82% depending on the respective 
scenario (Fertig and Kahanec, 2013). Another observation is that whether or not the 
EU will recover in the second half of the 2010s or its economy will remain sluggish 
plays little role for migration flows, also because of a relatively small difference in 
terms of GDP growth between the respective scenarios.28   
These flows compare well with the ones observed between countries from CEE that 
entered in 2004 and 2007 and EU15. We predict about 1.4 per cent of EaP countries’ 
populations to move to the EU14 during the period 2011-2020 in the baseline 
scenario. In addition to this, we predict essentially no incremental migrants under 
short-stay visa liberalisation only, and about 1.3-4.0 per cent of EaP population 
additionally moving to the EU14 over 2011-2020 in case of liberalisation of EU14 
labour markets (depending on the respective scenario). As a share in EU14’s 
population these figures represent just about 0.25 to 1 per cent over the decade until 
2020. These appear to be rather modest numbers, compared to the experience of 
EU2, where incremental outmigration over the decade preceding their accession 
(1997-2006) reached about 4 per cent of source countries’ population, and further 
accelerated after their accession.29 About 2.1 per cent of source countries’ populations 
left the EU8 over the period 2000-2009.  
For the purposes of evaluation of the effects of the projected migration flows, we 
narrow down the multitude of possible scenarios into a set of archetypal scenarios 
representing certain paradigmatic approaches to mobility in the European Union. We 
in particular consider three distinct scenarios assuming different degrees of labour 
mobility liberalisation in the medium term horizon (2010-2020). None of the 
scenarios assumes that any of the EaP countries will join the EU within the next 10 
years, which would imply a free movement of workers across borders. However, we 
allow for visa liberalisation and a gradual liberalisation of the access to EU labour 
markets for EaP citizens. The three scenarios we consider are specified as follows: 
(i) Closed Europe “Fortress” 
This is a “no policy change” scenario which envisages that all EU countries 
maintain restrictions on access of workers from non-EU countries, as is the 
case currently. With respect to economic developments, we rely on 
sustained EU recovery scenario with stronger job growth.30 This scenario 
best approximates the status quo in migration policy today. This scenario 
encompasses also the case with visa liberalisation, as it has been shown to 
                                                 
28 Compare e.g. scenarios 2+3 vs. 2+4. 
29 Own calculations based on Holland et al (2011) data.  
30 For example, the latest forecast by NIESR (as of Feb 2013) envisages a modest recovery in Europe over the 
next years, with an average growth rate at 1.7 per cent materialising over 2015-2019 in the Euro Area (and 1.9 
per cent for the EU27). 
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have no effects on incremental migration flows. In relation to Table 16 this 
scenario represents a combination of scenarios 1 followed by 1”.  
(ii) Cautious Europe 
It is assumed under this scenario that the EU members allow for selective 
liberalisation of their labour markets. Sustained economic recovery in the 
EU is assumed to characterise economic developments. This scenario 
corresponds to scenario 2 followed by 4 in Table 16. 
(iii) Progressive Europe 
This scenario assumes two periods of increasing liberalisation of labour 
markets: selective liberalisation until 2015, followed by full liberalisation 
over the period 2015-2020. Scenario 2 followed by 5 in Table 16 correspond 
to this scenario.   
Before we present the macroeconomic impacts, we discuss migration flows under the 
three archetypal scenarios in somewhat greater detail. We start with a no-policy 
change scenario – Closed Europe, and then introduce more liberal labour market 
policies which result in higher inflows of migrants. Under the “Closed Europe” 
scenario we generally observe modest inflows. In absolute terms, over the period 
2011-2020 one can expect about 1.45 million people migrating from the EaP 
countries to the EU25 (minus Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta), with about 120 
thousand of them choosing Germany as their destination country, 65 thousand 
potentially moving to the UK, and 35 thousand moving to Poland. The largest 
outflows of people are expected to materialise from Ukraine (see discussion above). 
In relative terms, expressed in per cent of domestic populations, the projected stocks 
of migrants from the EaP in the EU countries in 2020 are modest under “Closed 
Europe” scenario. They correspond to about 0.39 per cent in the case of Germany, 
about 0.51 per cent in the case of Spain, and about 0.70 per cent in the case of Italy in 
2020. The largest immigrant stocks in relative terms, over 1 per cent of domestic 
population, materialise in the case of the smallest countries – Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, as well as Slovenia and Ireland. The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Finland 
may expect migration inflows of slightly less than 1 per cent of their population until 
2020. See incremental cumulative flows over 2011-2020 in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11: Migration flows from EaP countries to the EU (cumulative), 
“Closed Europe” 
 
* Per cent of host country population 
Assuming a more liberalised policy towards potential movers from EaP countries, the 
number of migrants would increase. Figure 7.3 depicts the scale of potential 
migration from the EaP countries to the EU under the scenarios “Cautious Europe” 
and “Progressive Europe”. We observe several interesting findings. First, as can be 
expected, selective as well as full labour market liberalisations lead to additional 
migration flows. One exception is that EU-wide selective liberalisation does not 
increase migration flows to EU8 countries. The reason for the modest additional 
inflows to EU8 countries is the relatively low impact of selective liberalisation in 
combination with our assumptions on economic developments. The EaP countries 
are assumed to grow faster than the EU8; hence, the relatively small advantage of the 
EU8 countries vanishes sooner than that of the EU14 countries. From the EU-wide 
perspective, selective liberalisation is projected to lead to about two times larger 
migration flows than under the “Closed Europe” scenario. A more progressive 
approach to labour market liberalisation leads to larger but still moderate inflows 
when compared to other mobility in the EU. Importantly, under all scenarios 
migration flows will start to subside around 2018-2019, and thus the effect of 
liberalisation is temporary and migration flows are expected to stabilise after a 
relatively short period of time.     
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Figure 12: Projected inflow of EaP nationals to EU25 under three 
scenarios 
a. EU14 and EU8 as a whole 
 
Notes: Stocks, in million 
b. EU14 and EU8 as a whole 
 
Notes: Flows, in million 
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c. EU14       
 
Notes: Flows, in thousand 
d. EU8 
  
Notes: Flows, in thousand 
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9.3. Potential economic effects of projected flows  
Using an established NiGEM macroeconomic model, we simulate the effects of 
projected migration flows on EU Member States. In the baseline scenario “Closed 
Europe” we find  
- Positive effects on GDP and GDP per capita, reaching 0.129 percentage points in 
the EU14 and 0.296 percentage points in EU8 above the no-migration scenario 
by the end of 2020. 
- Anti-inflationary effects, attaining -0.15 percentage points in the EU14 and –
0.297 percentage points in the EU8 by 2020.  
- Very small effects on unemployment, increasing it by 0.009 percentage points in 
the EU14 and 0.058 percentage points in the EU8 by 2020.  
 Under cautious and progressive Europe scenarios the magnitude of the effects 
increases, yielding 
- 0.307 percentage point increase of GDP in the EU14 and 0.868 percentage point 
increase of GDP in the EU8 by 2020 under “Cautious Europe” scenario, 
- 0.490 percentage point increase of GDP in the EU14 and 1.919 percentage point 
increase of GDP in the EU8 by 2020 under “Progressive Europe” scenario. 
 
In this section we study the macroeconomic effects of migration from the EaP 
countries to the EU27 under the three archetypal scenarios selected above. A range of 
indicators is looked at, in particular the effect of immigration from the EaP on GDP, 
inflation and unemployment changes. The analysis is undertaken using a global 
macro-model NiGEM. The methodological approach is based on a series of model 
simulations, following the approach adopted by Holland et al. (2011), Barrell, Riley 
and Fitzgerald (2010), and Barrell, Gottschalk, Kirby and Orazgani (2009). NiGEM is 
a large-scale quarterly macroeconomic model of the world economy. The key parts of 
the model relevant to the simulations of migration flows from Eastern Partnership 
countries are the production functions and the labour markets in each of the 
countries (Barrell and Dury (2003), Barrell, Becker and Gottschalk (2003), Al-Eyd, 
Barrell, and Holland (2006)). 
Most OECD countries are modelled separately (about 50 countries), and the rest of 
the world is modelled through regional blocks: Latin America, Africa, East Asia, 
Developing Europe, OPEC and a Miscellaneous group mainly in West Asia. This 
means that almost all EU countries, which will be investigated in this section, are 
modelled individually; the only exceptions are Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta. 
Countries of the Eastern Partnership are modelled within the block of Developing 
Europe.  
By incorporating the models for individual countries and country blocks into the 
global context, we ensure that any international movements of labour or capital, or 
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any policy shifts have, via links between countries, their impacts on all economies. 
For example a migration-driven change in demand in one country will, through trade 
and competitiveness channels, affect GDP in all of its trading partners. The model is 
essentially New-Keynesian in its approach, in that agents are presumed to be 
forward-looking, but nominal rigidities slow the process of adjustment to 
equilibrium. The same theoretical structure is applied to all the countries in NiGEM, 
except where clear institutional or other factors prevent this. This ensures that 
variations in the properties of each country model reflect country specific differences 
only, emerging from estimation rather than different theoretical approaches. A fuller 
description of the model functionality, of the production functions and the labour 
market blocks of the model is provided in Annex E.  
 
Simulation results for potential macroeconomic effects 
Figure 13 shows results for our starting-point scenario “Closed Europe” as presented 
in details above. The inflow of migrants increases the population of the host 
country.31 As a result, GDP in the receiving countries increases. As the inflow of 
migrants results in a permanent increase of the number of immigrants, the change in 
output is permanent as well. Immigration puts a slight downward pressure on prices 
and a small upward pressure on unemployment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 For the purposes of the simulations we assume that all new migrants will be labour migrants and will find jobs 
in the destination countries. In this respect the reported effects are upper bounds of true effects. 
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Figure 13: Closed Europe – simulated migration effects 
a. GDP 
 
Notes: in percentage points 
 
b. Price level 
 
Notes: in percentage points 
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c. Unemployment 
 
Notes: in percentage points 
The response of aggregate output is directly proportional to the scale of the shock to 
domestic population. Smaller countries, whose populations increase most in relative 
terms, respond more strongly. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well as Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic are more responsive in relative terms than the big economies of 
Germany, Italy, France, Spain, and Poland. The average aggregate GDP increase in 
the smaller economies amounts to about 1.5-2 per cent in 2020, while the larger 
European economies expand by a mere 0.1 per cent – see Table F.1 in Annex F. 
In response to an increased supply of labour due to immigration, the unemployment 
rate initially increases. As immigration drives down inflation in the short run, 
monetary policy can become more expansionary and, as a result, the unemployment 
rate is driven down. The long run effects of the permanent inflow of people can be 
offset by monetary and fiscal policies. Absorption of the labour supply shock occurs 
earlier in larger countries, as the shock is smaller (and thus easier to absorb) in 
relative terms. The smaller countries (and the EU8 countries in particular) would 
require more active policies to absorb the shock, as the relative labour market 
impacts are much larger (and the shock is persistent). 
In Figure7.5 we show the results of our simulations for the largest EU countries: 
Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Poland and the UK, as well the EU14 and the EU8. We 
compare the results of the three scenarios in terms of GDP changes. While the Closed 
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terms of granting access to non-EU nationals, corresponds to very modest GDP 
increases, more labour access-friendly arrangements’ scenarios suggest that the 
European economy would be significantly boosted by immigration from the EaP 
countries. In the largest EU economies, the no policy change scenario is likely to lead 
to an increase in aggregate GDP of about 0.05-0.1 per cent in the long run. 
Introducing a limited degree of the labour market liberalisation results in a positive 
change in aggregate GDP of about 0.1-0.3 per cent, with potentially the biggest effects 
materialising in Italy (and Spain). Progressive policies may lead to an increase in 
aggregate GDP of up to about 0.4 per cent (in particular in Spain and Italy). 
Figure 14: The role of migration policies towards the EaP nationals for 
GDP growth in Europe 
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Notes: Percentage point deviations from no-migration benchmark  
 
Table F.1 in Annex F provides further details about the effects for the EU. It compares 
GDP results of our “Closed Europe” scenario with scenarios “Cautious Europe” and 
“Progressive Europe”. In the same Annex, Table F.2 reports changes to 
unemployment rates, whereas changes to inflation are shown in Table F.3. The 
results across the EU are similar to those presented in Figure 14.  
In conclusion, in medium-term horizon, 2010-2020, the projected migration flows 
from the EaP are likely to have a positive impact on the host countries’ aggregate 
GDP. There may be short-term costs in terms of higher unemployment, while in 
terms of short-term benefits migration results in lower inflationary pressures. An 
important message arising from these results is that higher degrees of labour market 
liberalisation result in higher increase in aggregate GDP in the receiving countries. 
Similarly, the effects on unemployment and inflation are larger under more liberal 
migration regimes. In Figure 15 we show results for the EU14 and EU8 as a whole.  
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Figure 15: The role of migration policies towards the EaP nationals for 
growth in the EU14 and EU8 as a whole 
 
Notes: Percentage point deviations from no-migration benchmark  
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10. Summary and recommendations on better 
matching of migrants to needs  
 
10.1. Fact, figures and findings about EaP migration to the 
EU to date  
 
Flows 
Current EaP migration to Europe is modest, growing in absolute 
numbers during the last decade, but slowed down since the inception of 
the Great Recession. In 2010, migrants from EaP countries represent only 3.58% 
of total immigration to EU25 countries, which equals a total of about 1.5 million EaP 
migrants. They are however distributed very unevenly across the EU countries. EaP 
migrants are a major immigrant group in Poland and Italy, but their presence 
compared to other migrant groups is rather negligible in the UK, Spain or Germany. 
From among the EaP countries, Ukrainian migrants typically constitute the largest 
migrant group both in absolute numbers and in percentage. In some cases, 
Belarusian or Moldovan migrants also have a significant share, suggesting that 
distance to the EU plays a significant role in migration decisions.  
The 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements have re-directed EaP migrant flows 
within Europe. As EU8+2 migrants have been filling low-skilled vacancies, some 
EU15 countries (e.g. UK) hardened the entry of EaP migrants. Legal frameworks in 
EU8 countries have on the other hand become more open towards EaP migrants. 
Compared to other immigrant groups, EaP migrant presence in EU8 countries is 
currently relatively more prominent than in EU15, which is partly due to the political, 
social and economic ties between these regions in the past.    
 
EaP migrant characteristics  
In all countries, the EaP migrants were found to be rather well educated, 
often exceeding the education attainment levels of natives and the other 
migrant groups. An important share of migrants was found to have technical and 
engineering degrees (Poland, Germany). Factors that have influenced emigration of 
highly skilled workers from EaP countries are a lack of opportunities at home and 
high risk of unemployment, but also skill mismatches between education systems and 
labour market demand in home countries.   
Most EaP migration appears temporary. Duration of stay of EaP migrants 
varies depending on legal framework, sector of employment as well as country of 
origin. For example, seasonal migration frameworks in Poland have facilitated legal 
seasonal employment of EaP migrants in construction and agriculture. Employment 
in domestic care sector seems to have had more durable nature, but does not appear 
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to be a stepping stone to permanent settlement in the host country. Migration plans 
of Moldovan migrants show up to have more durable nature while Ukrainian 
migration appears more short-term.  
EaP migration is gendered along sectors of employment. Where domestic 
and social/elderly care service sectors dominate EaP (mainly Ukrainian) migration, 
migrant women prevail (Spain, Italy, Germany). Where constructions or agriculture 
are the sectors where EaP migrants fill the gaps, male migrants dominate (Czech 
Republic, Poland). Many migrants also work in trade and services, where gender 
distribution is more balanced.  
 
Employment and downskilling 
In spite of their relatively high level of educational attainment, EaP 
migrants predominantly find employment in low-skilled and unskilled 
sectors, such as agriculture, construction and domestic and care services.  A small 
share of EaP migrants find employment in highly skilled sectors (e.g. financial 
services in the UK, IT industry in Poland). Allocation of EaP migrants to low-skilled 
sectors can be explained by the existence of demand in these sectors, which often rely 
on flexible labour or have become to be characterised as “migrant sectors” and are not 
attractive to natives due to lower wages and worse working conditions.  
While downskilling, defined as working in a job with lower qualification 
than formally attained, is a problem at the individual level, it needs to be 
considered in view of alternatives at home, which tend to be limited. 
Strong push factors for emigration from the EaP region are a risk of unemployment 
and poor career prospects even for highly skilled migrants.  
The key reasons for downskilling lie in institutional barriers, such as poor 
or complicated recognition of qualifications. This may be interacting with lower 
quality of education in the sending countries as well as poor knowledge of the host 
country language. Downskilling is also a function of the planned and actual length of 
stay in the labour market. Migrants may rationally underinvest in country-specific 
human capital if their time horizon does not provide for adequate returns on such 
investment. Migrants tend to integrate with time spent in the host country. The 
available estimates for both Spain and Germany suggest that closing the employment 
gap takes up to 10-20 years.  
 
Labour demand in the EU and labour market matching 
Labour market needs are currently very diverse across Europe. EaP 
migrants generally fill the existing skill gaps, especially in low-skilled 
sectors: agriculture (Poland), household services and personal care (Spain, Italy, 
Germany), construction (Poland, Italy) and retail and hospitality (UK, Germany).  
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A further shift towards the service sector and aging of EU societies will 
further increase the need for low-skilled (EaP) immigration. EaP migrants, 
primarily women, have played an important positive role in filling shortages in social 
and care services. While their wide-spread over-qualification remains a concern, their 
contribution to the host country labour market has been significant both through 
direct micro-level impact as well by enabling national, primarily female, labour force 
to participate in employment. 
Several countries in Europe are or will be in need for engineers, health 
professionals and other highly-skilled professions in management and 
business administration. As EaP migrants across the analysed countries represent 
one of the best educated migrant groups, they are generally well suited to fill in 
demand in the high-skilled sectors and represent a channel for further human capital 
development in the EU. However, currently only in some countries EaP migrants find 
employment in high-skilled occupations, if so it is mainly in IT and financial sectors.   
Poor matching of EaP migrants with tertiary education is therefore a 
problem from the perspective of EU needs for highly skilled migrants.  
 
Costs and benefits of EaP migration for Europe 
EaP migrants enter the EU predominantly for employment purposes, 
which is reflected in their favourable employment rates, especially when 
compared to immigrants from other third countries. Average employment rates are 
well above those of other foreign groups, in the range of 60-70% (Spain, Italy and 
Poland). EaP migrants in Germany suffer an employment disadvantage with respect 
to natives, although this gap is unexceptional and in line with the same outcome for 
other non-EU migrants. In this context, gender asymmetries in labour force 
participation rates play in favour of the EaP migrants. In fact, in Italy, Poland, Spain 
and the UK (but not Germany) EaP women are the breadwinners, with higher 
employment rates than males.  
EaP migrants cause no negative effect on wages of native workers. Our 
own analysis, in congruence with existing data and literature, show that EaP migrants 
have in general no negative effect on wages or employment of other groups of 
workers in receiving countries. The occupational distribution suggests the presence of 
complementarities rather than substitution between migrants and natives. In 
addition, labour market effects are limited also in view of the relatively small size of 
the EaP migrant populations relative to the host populations or other immigrant 
populations in receiving countries.  
The economic crisis worsened labour market outcomes of EaP migrants. 
This is a result of their employment in more crisis-prone sectors, especially 
construction. Return of EaP migrants was more likely in those countries and 
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contexts, where possibility of re-entry was easier (e.g. temporary migration 
frameworks in Poland).   
EaP migrants do not have disproportionately high welfare take-up rates 
than other migrants in terms of access to social assistance or family 
benefits. In Spain and Germany, migrants have relied on unemployment benefits to 
a larger extent than natives which, however, reflects their likelihood to work in the 
sectors affected negatively by the crisis. EaP migrants enjoy limited or no access to 
pension systems, while the transferability of their working period abroad towards 
right accruing access to pensions upon return are problematic.  
At the macro-level we find positive effects of recent post-enlargement 
labour mobility on EU’s GDP, GDP per capita, as well as employment. 
This result appears to be conditional on free access to EU’s labour 
markets, such as in the case of EU8+2 immigrants. We observe small 
negative effect of migration in case of restricted access to EU labour markets, as in 
the case of EaP immigration. This result could in part be driven by restrictive 
migration policy frameworks towards EaP migrants that appear to hamper migrants’ 
potential to integrate and improve the allocative efficiency across EU labour markets.  
 
Costs and benefits of EaP migration for EaP countries  
Costs and benefits for EaP countries and migrants themselves have been 
mixed, but overall seem more positive. While substantial emigration might 
reduce aggregate demand on the EaP countries, the current wave of labour migration 
represents a response to labour supply imbalances in the home countries, and has 
thus helped to reduce downward pressures on wages and to enhance productivity. 
Against the backdrop of the labour force, all EaP countries experienced rapid GDP 
growth, growth in real wages, and consequently growth in labour productivity.  
Negative externalities might affect mainly the left-behind, especially 
children. On this aspect we however found evidence that migrating parents typically 
leave only when other caring arrangements are in place. Potential costs stemming 
from the sending countries’ side lie in a possibility of a Dutch-disease resulting from 
the inflow of foreign currency and inflationary pressures. Moreover, corruption 
practices in the sending countries often absorb and divert remittances away from 
more productive use. Migration and remittances are tightly linked to growing 
inequalities and feeding corrupt infrastructures that provide services often within or 
parallel to the state-guaranteed provisions (education and health care in particular).  
 
Current migration framework 
The existing labour migration policy frameworks are diverse and differ in 
their scope and entry criteria. A stronger emphasis on more refined frameworks 
for skilled and highly-skilled migrants is notable, perhaps at the expense of 
123 
 
 
opportunities for low-skilled immigration. Overly complicated and pricy 
administrative procedures for gaining visa and/or work permits coupled with limited 
capacity of some Member States to control migrant entry seem to be increasing the 
share of illegal immigrant labour, especially if demand in low-skilled sectors is 
strong. 
With the exception of Poland, in most cases specific governmental 
programs do not target EaP countries specifically, but rather apply to 
third country nationals generally. This is partially due to different labour 
market conditions, migration histories vis-à-vis the EaP countries as well as the 
impact of the Great Recession which has in some countries led to more restrictive 
migration policies towards EaP migrants (e.g. the UK).  
Pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of entry for EaP migrants are very 
high. Administrative procedures or legal employment are costly and cumbersome. 
National visas for long-term purposes of employment require different sets of 
documents in various EU countries, visa processing duration is long, available 
information scattered and visa fees high. Due to cumbersome procedures, migrants 
often rely on intermediaries to assist them in visa access which further increases the 
costs of entry. Visa regimes as they exist currently tend to create  high barriers to 
circulation, through border controls, contract-dependent stay permits, lengthy 
bureaucratic processes of applications and renewal of documents. At the individual 
level all these obstacles translate into years of efforts in which migrants often develop 
various forms of dependencies on employers and intermediaries. 
There are strong indications that the expensive and burdensome visa 
issuance procedures and restrictive migration policies currently 
characterising most of the EU Member States are dis-incentivising 
migrants from seeking legal routes of entry and employment and 
diverting them into irregularity. This has important negative implications for 
migrants who then are more prone to exploitation in the labour market and less likely 
to return in fear of difficulties of re-entry, and on host countries, as illegal migrants 
do not contribute to tax and social security systems.  
Regularisations and amnesties targeting irregular migrants have served 
as interventions yielding ex post benefits to migrants as well as host 
countries, but may create an ex ante moral hazard problem. Countries with 
a limited capacity to control inflows of migrants have used these as a primary policy 
tool. Regularisations help both to prevent migrants from being exploited in the 
shadow economy and to generate welfare benefits for the receiving country. Their use 
may, however, create ex ante expectations of their future implementation and thus 
provide incentives to enter the country on an irregular basis, expecting to be 
regularised later, i.e. a problem of moral hazard. 
We evaluated temporary and circular arrangements as beneficial for 
receiving as well as sending countries; we however also identify a 
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number of policy challenges, mainly related to the sharing of migration 
costs between migrants and stayers, or tied migrants, within households. 
The country study experts evaluated the existing temporary frameworks as especially 
beneficial for managing and encouraging legal employment while enabling to respond 
to the particularities of labour market demand. Temporary migration needs to be 
governed not only in relation to the regulation of border crossings and work and 
residence permits, but also in its relation to economic sustainability, social security 
provisions and their portability, and risks and limitations it may inflict on staying 
family members or tied movers,  also in terms of their professional growth and social 
mobility.  
For temporary migration to bring most benefits to host countries as well 
as to migrants, supportive institutional framework is essential. This 
includes better access to information on migrant rights as well as improvements in 
the area of welfare systems (e.g. pension portability schemes), but also more 
flexibility in legal frameworks to facilitate entry, return and re-entry. 
Existing legal frameworks shape migration patterns by influencing length 
of stay, routes of and selection upon entry, and sectoral allocation. 
Receiving countries’ migration frameworks but also general institutional and 
structural environment, especially labour market regulation and available types of 
contractual arrangements, strongly impact upon the possibilities for circular 
migration, especially of migrants employed in low-skilled sectors. Migrants in general 
make efforts to optimise their migration plans and minimise their costs, also by 
adjusting their modes of entry, choice of destination countries, and choice of 
employment arrangements. Notably, imposition of stricter policies in one receiving 
country has spillover effects on migration trends elsewhere in Europe.  
 
Stakeholders’ views on EaP migration and its costs and benefits (expert opinion 
survey) 
Public attitudes towards and perceptions of EaP migration are generally 
negative, in spite of the fact that a significant share of surveyed expert stakeholders 
sees the public as a beneficiary of EaP migration.  
Nearly a half of expert stakeholders consider EaP migrants to be not at all 
or poorly integrated. The main factors attributed to poor integration are 
institutional barriers, lack of recognition of qualifications, discrimination and poor 
knowledge of official language. These factors were also indicated as causes of 
downskilling of immigrants.  
Among expert stakeholders, job dependent immigration based on labour 
market selection receives the highest support as the policy that can best 
address the economic and labour market needs of their country. This 
perspective is reinforced by a significant support (5th largest) for complete 
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liberalisation of migration policy, and essentially no support for a closed-borders 
policy. The next most favoured policies are positive selection on skills and education, 
and migration quotas, but also selection based on migrants’ needs (including e.g. 
refugees).   
Expert stakeholders identified employers and employers’ associations as 
the key beneficiary group and the most likely supporter of a more 
liberalised migration policy towards EaP countries. Workers, trade unions 
and employee associations are generally seen as opponents and non-beneficiaries of 
more liberalised policy framework. A third of experts see their respective 
governments as likely to oppose moving towards a more liberalised migration policy 
framework. 
 
Future migration from EaP region and its effects  
Expert stakeholders indicate the existence of migration potential in the 
EaP region towards the EU should migration policy be liberalised.  
Based on an established prediction model taking into account 
demographic, economic and policy variables as well as network effects 
we project modest migration flows from the EaP to the EU until 2020. Our 
analysis shows that between 2011 and 2020 we can expect the following migration 
flows from the EaP countries to the EU14:  
- under the baseline scenario of no policy change on average about 100 
thousand migrants per annum (1.03 million migrants over 2011-2020), 
- visa liberalisation leads to essentially no additional migration, 
- labour market liberalisation is projected to result in on average 100 to 300 
thousand additional migrants  per annum (0.96 to 3.03 million additional 
migrants over 2011-2020), depending on economic conditions as well as 
migration policies.   
Correspondingly, to the EU8 we can expect: 
- under the baseline scenario of no policy change on average about 40 thousand 
migrants from the EaP per annum (0.4 million migrants over 2011-2020), 
- essentially no additional migrants if visa is liberalised, 
- selective labour market liberalisation is projected to result in little additional 
migration, up to 8 thousand migrants per annum. Full liberalisation is 
projected to result in on average 37 thousand additional migrants per annum, 
i.e. between 0.08 and 0.56 million additional migrants over 2011-2020, 
depending on economic conditions as well as migration policies.   
Most of the migrants are predicted to go to Italy and Germany, and originate from 
Ukraine. Fears of massive inflows following liberalisation of labour 
markets are unjustified. 
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Policy framework has a key role in affecting observable migration flows. 
The most effectual variable affecting observable flows of migrants are policy 
indicators, while migration costs and economic conditions have a significant but 
smaller effect. Among policy factors, partial liberalisation is less powerful than full 
liberalisation. Visa liberalisation leads to no additional increase in migration. 
Observed flows follow an inversed U-pattern and after initial steep rise, they tend to 
decline.   
The projected migration from the EaP to the EU is likely to have a positive 
impact on host countries’ GDP in the medium-term horizon 2010-2020. 
There may be short-term costs in terms of slightly higher unemployment, 
but migration reduces inflationary pressures. 
In effect, a more liberal migration framework with EaP countries is likely 
to bring greater benefits to host EU countries, especially as concerns host 
countries’ GDP and inflation. Specifically, using an established NiGEM 
simulation model, under the baseline scenario “Closed Europe” we find 
- Positive effects on GDP and GDP per capita, reaching 0.129 percentage points 
in the EU14 and 0.296 percentage points in EU8 above the no-migration 
benchmark by the end of 2020. 
- Anti-inflationary effects, attaining -0.15 percentage points in the EU14 and –
0.297 percentage points in the EU8 by 2020. 
- Small effects on unemployment, increasing it by 0.009 percentage points in 
the EU14 and 0.058 percentage points in the EU8 by 2020.  
Under cautious and progressive Europe scenarios the magnitude of the effects 
increases, yielding 
- 0.307 percentage point increase of GDP in the EU14 and 0.868 percentage 
point increase of GDP in the EU8 by 2020 under “Cautious Europe” scenario, 
- 0.490 percentage point increase of GDP in the EU14 and 1.919 percentage 
point increase of GDP in the EU8 by 2020 under “Progressive Europe” 
scenario. 
We attribute these positive effects to better possibilities for allocative efficiency 
stemming from an easier mobility across the EU countries and between the EU and 
sending countries. 
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10.2. Synthesis of key messages, policy lessons and 
recommendations  
On the background of a review of adverse demographic trends, projections of labour 
market skill needs, and expert stakeholder evaluations, the European Union is likely 
to face skill shortages in its labour markets. Our analysis of past mobility between the 
EaP and the EU indicates that EaP migrants exhibit characteristics that make them 
well suited to address labour market shortages in the EU both at the high-skilled and 
low-skilled spectrum. Better labour market matching also reduces the risk of 
downskilling, and thus provides for increased benefits from brain circulation for the 
countries of origin. There thus appears to be a potential for a win-win scenario of 
increased EaP-EU mobility. More efforts invested into integration of migrants are 
thus likely to accrue additional benefits to mobility between the EaP countries and 
the EU. Institutional improvements are especially necessary in the areas of equal 
treatment, recognition of qualifications or transferability of social rights. 
 
The cross-cutting quantitative and qualitative analysis based on hard data presented 
in this report consistently shows that the economic effects of labor mobility are 
generally positive, and more so in case of more liberalised migration frameworks. The 
key reason is that such frameworks provide for better labour market matching and 
filling up of skill gaps in EU labour markets. Restrictive migration frameworks on the 
other hand tend to limit the potential for positive impacts of mobility in a number of 
dimensions.  
 
A number of findings support these conclusions. Firstly, the EU country studies 
report neutral-to-positive micro-level effects of EaP migrants in the host labour 
markets. A quantitative study of the effects of past migration flows on European 
economies shows that immigration from countries with which the EU maintained 
more liberal migration frameworks (EU8, EU2) positively impacted EU’s GDP, GDP 
per capita or employment; but this was not the case for countries towards which more 
restrictive migration regulation was applied (EaP). In a macro-simulation model we 
also find that projected migration flows can be expected to have long-lasting positive 
effects on GDP and price stability in the receiving countries, and only small effects on 
unemployment. Our analysis shows that migrants respond to existing labour market 
shortages more flexibly than the natives. Finally, more restrictive migration policies 
significantly reduce migration flows, and thus limit any potential benefits from labour 
mobility.  
 
Additional costs of restrictions arise at the micro level. Country studies and a 
qualitative household-level study show that restrictive migration policies increase 
costs of migration at the individual level and tend to push migrants to rely in 
irregular modes of entry and various intermediaries. More costly re-entry makes 
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circular migration less likely, bringing less benefits and greater costs to home 
countries and those left-behind, especially children.  
 
It is reasonable to expect increased migration flows from EaP countries over the next 
decade if a more liberal migration framework is implemented. At the same time, fears 
over uncontrollable inflows following liberalisation of labour markets are unjustified. 
Projections up to 2020 indicate only modest migration flows from the EaP to the EU. 
Importantly, we find that liberalization of short-stay visa leads to essentially no, and 
selective labour market liberalisation only little, additional migration. Based on 
assessment of EU’s labour market needs and on finding generally positive effects of 
EaP migration to Europe, we see increased mobility as a positive and desirable 
outcome.  
 
Core barriers to migration and better labour market matching currently lie in areas 
including recognition of qualifications, poor language proficiency of migrants, 
limitations of entry or employment of spouses, or the practice of tying of residence 
permits to work permits, which creates barriers to employment mobility among EU 
Member States. Even if migration policy status quo is kept, addressing these areas 
provides scope for mobilisation of human capital potential of EaP citizens who 
already are present in EU Member States. Visa policies represent an additional 
barrier, which does not seem to significantly affect labour mobility at the aggregate 
level, but it burdens migrants and their families, decreasing their quality of life. Visa 
policy instruments are currently complex and administratively burdensome, and 
migrants lack information about how to deal with various requirements in the 
process of obtaining visa.  
 
Based on these findings, we propose the following interventions which we structure 
into thematic areas. Combined these interventions can provide an effective impetus 
to better labour market matching of migrants.  
 
 
Migration policy options  
 
Based on the findings summarised above, we propose gradual liberalisation of 
mobility between the European Union and the Eastern Partnership countries as the 
first-best policy option. We evaluate gradual liberalisation as a win-win scenario, in 
regard of the economic benefits and improved allocative efficiency of labour markets 
in receiving countries, potential for brain circulation and remittances for the sending 
countries and increased range of career possibilities for migrants themselves. 
Additional benefits lie in the relative simplicity and low implementation costs of 
liberalisation policies (compared to current frameworks), lower migration costs for 
migrants and lack of rents for migration intermediaries. 
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Shifts towards more liberal migration framework can be conducted in different steps 
and at different levels to take into account country-specific labour market needs and 
political feasibility of changes across the EU member states.  We discuss these policy 
and legislative options in view of highlighting benefits and costs for different actors 
engaged in migration.  
 
Visa liberalisation  
A natural first step in gradual liberalisation is the liberalisation of visa regimes. Visa 
liberalisation would represent a concrete step towards ensuring an easier entry and 
re-entry of migrants and thus enhance short-term or seasonal mobility between the 
EU and EaP countries. Such mobility is much needed to mitigate existing internal 
labour market inflexibilities and provide for labour market adjustment. Beyond 
temporary or seasonal mobility, we find short-stay visa liberalization to have 
essentially no effect on the scale of additional net migration. This implies that 
additional instruments are needed to provide for long-term adjustment in European 
labour markets. The benefits of short-stay visa liberalisation, however, include more 
facile intra-family contact and thus easier reconciliation of migration trajectories with 
family life within migrant households and strengthened contact between diasporas 
and their home countries, leading to an improved potential for benefits from trade 
and business ties and exchange of information and technologies.  The decreased 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs for migrants and their families would be a benefit 
on its own, but an additional benefit may materialise in improved allocative efficiency 
of mobility, and more favourable selection of migrants to the EU, as opposed to 
competing destinations such as Russia or overseas. We therefore see liberalisation of 
short-stay visa as a first step on a more encompassing sequence of mobility 
enhancing policies, which would together provide for an increased potential for 
circular migration and improved economic efficiency and labour market matching in 
Europe.  
 
Transitional visa measures: Visa facilitation and harmonization 
As a transitional measure on the way towards full visa liberalisation, we propose visa 
facilitation. Under visa facilitation framework the costs of visa fees are reduced or 
eliminated, at least for some categories of migrants. Visa facilitation agreements can 
provide benefits of similar nature but smaller scale than those offered by visa 
liberalisation.  
 
We acknowledge that the regulation of visa policies rests with EU Member States. We 
however propose that multilateral and bilateral methods of coordination are utilised 
to harmonize requirements for short- and long-term visa across the EU to ease up 
orientation of migrants. This in particular concerns duplication of administrative 
procedures and documents in case of repeated visa application or application of 
holders of visa on one EU Member State in another Member State.    
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Skill-enhancing EU-level migration frameworks    
The demographic trends and preferences of EU citizens result in medium- and long-
term skill shortages across the EU. The current EU-level migration frameworks, such 
as the EU Blue Card, fall short of the mark, as they do not appear to have created 
incentives for greater labour mobility in Europe. We therefore propose to extend the 
Blue Card migration framework to encompass broadly-defined skilled workers, based 
on a transparent points system rewarding   qualifications, job experience, language 
skills and age. Of central importance are complementary provisions for immigration 
of family members, measures facilitating integration into the labour market but also 
social services and assistance, and transparent rules for long-term residence and 
employment in the EU. To truly contribute to intra-EU mobility, the Blue Card 
framework needs to provide for frictionless mobility of Blue Card holders and their 
family members across the EU member states.  
 
Selective liberalisation and bilateral and multilateral temporary migration 
frameworks  
Bilateral and multilateral programmes between EU Member States and EaP 
countries, especially concerning temporary and seasonal migration, would allow for 
targeted opening based on needs of receiving countries and possibilities of sending 
countries. Considerable scope exists for enhanced special migration provisions 
between the EaP countries and EU Member States which are in need of domestic and 
care service workers, or specific types of high-skilled workers. The existing bilateral 
frameworks on transferability of social rights need to be reviewed to identify 
functional mechanisms and possible bottlenecks for different types of migrant 
workers (by sector, age, type of employment contract, etc.). 
 
While concerted efforts at the EU level for more transparent and unified policies are 
desirable, due to different labour market needs across the EU labour markets 
bilateral frameworks may be provided in parallel. The strength of bilateral 
frameworks rests in the ability to adjust migration framework with respect to sending 
and receiving countries’ needs and possibilities. Bilateral schemes could be designed 
in particular for seasonal and short-term migration. The temporary migration scheme 
implemented in Poland with respect to a number of EaP countries is a good example 
of benefits of such schemes. 
 
Work-permit liberalisation and facilitation 
As a general recommendation we suggest to liberalize and facilitate acquisition of 
work permits with the objective of providing a flexible migration policy framework 
satisfying EU’s needs for temporary and permanent migration. Following good 
practice already applied by number of Member States, we propose abandoning the 
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policy of administrative labour market test in favour of labour market driven 
selection (i.e. of those obtaining a job offer in the country), possibly combined with 
general universally applied selection criteria. This approach would best serve the 
purpose of labour market matching, provide a transparent and credible policy rule, 
and reduce the costs of policy implementation. We also propose to adopt transparent 
policy rules for, and decrease the costs of, work permit acquisition, renewal or 
change. We outline a more concrete two-pronged approach in the Final Report of this 
project. 
 
Work and residence permit grace periods 
A related proposal is to provide for grace periods regarding expiration of work and 
residence permits. In cases where these permits are tied to each other, or tied to 
specific job or student status, work and residence permits should provide for a grace 
period upon discontinuation of any condition on which they are dependent enabling 
migrants to stay in the country and make effort to reinstate their status. This 
especially concerns loss of job or termination of student status, after which migrants 
should be provided time in the country to search for a suitable job. This would 
enhance labour market matching, and reduce the risk of irregularity and vulnerability 
of migrants.   
 
Tapping the existing potential of EaP migrants. 
In some countries, potential of EaP migrants which are already in the EU is not fully 
utilised. Some barriers which we identified lie in the legislation which prohibits 
spouses of migrants to enter employment or limits the possibilities of EaP students 
studying in the EU to seek employment in the EU upon graduation. Improvements in 
these areas would improve the labour market matching of EaP migrants already in 
the EU and help to fill up existing skill shortages.   
 
Increased transparency of migration intermediaries 
Cumbersome and expensive process of visa obtaining has strengthened the role of 
intermediaries which assist migrants. While some intermediaries provide migrants 
with needed information and services, the inherently asymmetric information 
favouring the intermediaries over migrants create a risk of rent-seeking and abusive 
conduct, or monopolization of access to regularised or legal employment Provisions 
increasing the transparency of the conduct of migration intermediaries would help to 
reduce the risk of such adverse conduct. This aspect of mobility could be regulated at 
the EU level. 
 
Full labour market liberalisation  
We see fully liberalised labour migration between the EU member states and EaP 
countries as the policy option, providing the greatest benefits to receiving and 
sending countries as well as migrants themselves, and as the long-term policy 
objective. Its key benefit lies in its simplicity and low implementation costs for the 
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countries, lower migration costs for migrants, lack of rents for migration 
intermediaries and best possibilities for allocative efficiency of migrants across the 
EU member states. We argue that the ensuing migration flows would be modest and 
the EU labour markets would absorb them to the benefit of increase labour market 
matching, but also to the benefit of migrants themselves. The removal of the barriers 
to enter and re-enter the EU labour markets would also provide conditions conducive 
to circular migration between the EU and EaP, thus providing for brain gain and 
other benefits for the sending countries.     
 
 
Migrant integration policies 
 
Although we consider liberalisation of access to EU labour markets for EaP, its 
successful implementation in terms of improved labour market matching requires 
complementary migrant integration policy frameworks. These relate to many spheres 
of life, including skill transferability, social rights, elimination or reduction of 
informational gaps, management of public opinion, and involvement of relevant 
stakeholders. The key areas of policy intervention are presented below.     
 
Facilitation of skill transferability 
An important factor limiting the potential for improved labour market matching is 
the donwskilling of migrants into jobs below their level of qualification. To overcome 
barriers leading to downskilling, we propose to facilitate recognition of qualifications 
in the spirit of the rules applying to intra-EU mobility. To overcome the discrepancies 
in the scope and quality of formal qualifications in the EaP and the EU, this includes 
the provision of a qualification recognition framework. Such a framework should 
stipulate correspondences between requirements applied in the EU and formal 
qualifications and educational institutions in the EaP countries. Automatic 
recognition of qualifications along such corresponding lines would provide for 
increased predictability of the recognition process, provide better incentives for 
potential migrants, and lead to an improved labour market matching in the EU.  The 
qualification recognition framework, including the whole set of correspondences, 
needs to be transparent and well-communicated to potential migrants already at the 
pre-departure stage, in order to properly inform their migration decisions and 
thereby strengthen the potential for improved labour market matching.  
 
Promotion and enforcement of equal social rights and working conditions  
A more balanced outcome of migration for migrants and for society as a whole can be 
achieved by better promotion and enforcement of equal social rights and working 
conditions of migrants. This would promote easier circulation of labour force present 
in a country and prevent establishment of migrant-dominated occupational enclaves. 
It is also likely to encourage matching of migrants to jobs that correspond to their 
qualification levels. Enforcement of equal social rights reduces the risk of social 
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exclusion or stigmatisation of migrants, and generally should provide for more 
positive mutual attitudes and beliefs in the interactions between natives and 
migrants.  
 
Improvement of access to and portability of social rights  
A more specific concern in the domain of social rights is the need for more inclusive 
and transparent mechanisms for easier access to paying contributions and claiming 
social benefits. During their migration spells regular migrants contribute to social 
security and pension schemes of host countries. For most migrants, however, access 
to their pension rights remains limited. This is not only inconsistent with the 
principle of equal rights; it also creates incentives to evade contributions and taxes. In 
particular, it is desirable to simplify the process of claiming social benefits and 
improve their portability to other EU Member States and third countries.  
 
Portability of social rights is the backbone of improved mobility and labour market 
matching in the context of mobility between the EU and third countries, EaP in 
particular. It is especially important in regard of temporary and circular migration 
trajectories. We therefore propose that regulations governing the access and 
portability of social rights for EU citizens are gradually extended to apply to EaP 
migrants as well.  An important advantage for receiving countries would be the 
increased incentives to contribute to pension schemes guaranteeing a high degree of 
portability, and thus improved collection of contributions. This proposal includes 
harmonisation of national regulations in the sending countries with EU regulations, 
including a provision that the period of employment abroad is recognised as a 
“pensionable work experience” which is taken into consideration in meeting the 
retirement requirements in home countries. Such measures are likely to incentivise 
regular migration as well as encourage high-skilled mobility and brain circulation. 
Bilateral frameworks on social rights transferability are a useful transitional 
approach; and the policy response needs to provide for evaluation mechanisms to 
identify functional mechanisms and possible bottlenecks in existing bilateral 
frameworks, providing for identification and dissemination of good practices. 
 
Improvement of knowledge about and transparency of existing frameworks for 
transferability of social rights  
Knowledge about existing schemes for transferability of social rights is very limited. 
While several Member States have already in place bilateral agreements on 
transferability of social rights, very little is known about specific aspects of their 
implementation and usage by migrants. Existing evidence suggest that migrants are 
not informed about these frameworks and even if they exists, they are not applied 
extensively. The policy response needs to provide for evaluation mechanisms to 
identify functional mechanisms and possible bottlenecks in existing bilateral 
frameworks on social rights transferability for different types of migrant workers (by 
sector, age, type of employment contract, etc.) 
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Provision of information and ‘one-stop shops’ for migrants  
Due to the nature of immigration, migrants enter host countries with informational 
deficiencies. These lead to limitations concerning their opportunities and choices. 
Lack of information also disempowers migrants and exposes them to risk of 
exclusions or abuse. Therefore, effective institutions of reach-out and social support 
should be developed to ensure dissemination of information, protection from abuse, 
and provision of shelters in the cases of violence and psychological counselling to 
migrants. It is important to make information and help services for migrants more 
flexible and proactive. The availability of free consultancy centres for migrants, hot 
lines, multilingual websites and outreach trainings would help reducing the risk of 
abuse of the migration system by some intermediaries. Offering these services under 
one roof as ‘one stop shops’ in the EaP countries and EU Member States would be 
convenient for migrants and cost-effective. One-stop shops could also be used as 
points of reference providing expert advisory services for EU and EaP 
administrations in case of specific questions that may arise in dealing with more 
complex migratory trajectories. One-stop shops should in particular integrate 
specialized services facilitating the process of recognition of qualifications.  
 
Provide better information about labour market opportunities for migrant labour  
In the labour market a lack of information about job opportunities results in poor 
labour market matching. Strengthening of the capacity of employment agencies to 
provide for the needs of migrants is needed to ensure better labour market matching 
of migrants in host labour markets. The paradigm should also become more pro-
active, providing better access to information already for potential migrants when 
they are making their decision about whether/where to migrate. Cooperation of EU 
and EaP employment agencies in cooperation can assist migrants in making informed 
choices with respect to destinations. Services similar to EURES should be supported 
in EaP countries, as publicly funded institutions and, exploring manifold synergies, 
placed within ‘one-stop-shops’ in the host countries.  
 
Invest into legislative improvements in employment and labour regulation in the 
geriatric and care sector  
The need for migrant labour in geriatric and care sector is likely to grow. More 
control and awareness-building over the work conditions (working hours, tasks and 
living conditions) and fair payments is desirable, especially in the care and domestic 
sectors. More supportive employment and labour regulations should be passed that 
would shelter the migrants in cases of the death of the employer and would allow 
migrants time, shelter and security needed to find a new job. Employers in the 
domestic and care sector should be actively encouraged to allow a possibility of 
circularity among hired migrants by accepting substitute employment.  
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Reward good behaviour of migrants  
The rules governing the acquisition of citizenship and permanent residency for 
migrants differ widely across the Member States. In order to attract skilled migrants 
to fill up labour market gaps, more stability and better prospects for possible full 
integration need to be available as an option. We propose to promote “best practices 
to citizenship/permanent residence path” to increase the transparency and 
predictability of migrants’ plans. We in particular suggest to reduce the costs of the 
procedures and to promote best practice concerning the minimum period of prior 
residence in the country required to obtain permanent residence or citizenship.  
 
Strengthen and mobilize diasporas 
Migrants in sending countries (diasporas) can build an important basis for the 
effective attraction of the needed additional temporary and permanent workers. 
Diasporas can support circularity, and strengthen the economic relationships 
between sending and receiving countries through trade (imports, exports), 
investment and innovations. Diaspora organizations can play an important role in 
this. To facilitate these benefits, we encourage Member States to consider the options 
of providing dual citizenship to migrants as a way to enable migrants to fully realize 
the potential of international business activities between their host and home 
countries. This also requires increasing administrative capacity and coordination 
among various state agencies to adequately deal with the diaspora agenda with the 
objective of tapping on the benefits from the linkages diasporas facilitate. 
 
Support actors who can assist migrants  
Involvement of a broad range of stakeholders who can assist migrants needs to be 
promoted. Governmental and non-governmental organisations, civil society 
organisations, trade unions and the business sector, and migrants’ representatives in 
particular can provide social fabric conducive to migrant integration in receiving and 
sending countries. These actors should be actively involved in design and 
implementation of migration and integration policies. Existing examples of the work 
of labour unions demonstrate that trade unions even in an institutionally adverse 
environment can assist migrants in important areas, such as the recognition of 
qualifications and information sharing on national labour law legal framework, and 
so facilitate better integration of migrants. Unions members should be better 
informed about existing evidence on outcomes and costs and benefits of migration 
and serve as special intermediaries for shaping workers’ generally negative attitudes 
towards migrants.   
 
Facilitation of return and integration after return  
Integration into home state labour market after absence due to migration can lead to 
loss of continuity, social ties and familiarity with the local environment from 
institutional or legal perspective (contractual arrangements, job opportunities, 
taxation and social rights). Sending countries could assist migrants in their 
integration by providing targeted information on various aspects of re-integration in 
order to facilitate return, circulation and integration. Integration of this service in one 
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stop shops in the EaP countries would provide for cost-efficiency and synergetic 
benefits.  
 
Inform public opinion about migration  
Negative public opinions about migration represent a key obstacle for Europe in 
benefiting more from EaP migration. EU committees which bring together member 
states and various stakeholders can play a positive role in sharing evidence from 
independent research relevant to the topic of migration to actively shape discussion 
on the impact of migration on EU, which has been generally positive.  Some aspects 
of migration are currently viewed negatively also in the sending countries. For 
example, we identified blaming discourses and negative images linked to female 
migration. A more balanced portrayal of migration can be achieved by opening up 
public and media space for discussions, direct self-representation of migrants and 
raising issues linked to migration. Further, focus could be dedicated to creating open 
access programs and spaces that would promote richer communication between 
migrants and their families, facilitate transnational communication and exchange of 
information. Improved dissemination of information about migration and its costs 
and benefits can help to break the vicious circle of negative attitudes towards 
migration leading to suboptimal policy reaction, which in turns results in adverse 
socio-economic outcomes, eventually further reinforcing the negative attitudes.   
 
In sum, there is much the EU, EU Member States, and EaP countries can do to enable 
all the involved stakeholders to benefit from increases labour mobility between the 
EU and EaP countries. An overarching paradigm should be that of transparent, 
participative and informed debate with stakeholders including the general public. 
Evidence-based policy making based on best practices should be a fundamental 
policy standard. The role of data collection, independent evaluation and 
dissemination of findings, as well as implementation of lessons from the gathered 
evidence in policy making, are essential in this process. As concerns practical policy 
making, the paradigm of migration mainstreaming, whereby all labour and social 
regulations are scrutinised for their effects on mobile workers and all categories of 
migrants, needs to be adopted. Concrete migration and integration policy measures 
as suggested above need to be effectively implemented. Under such approach the EU 
and EaP will mutually benefit from increased mobility between the two blocs, 
providing for sustainable prosperity and strengthened competitiveness vis-à-vis their 
global partners.  
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12. ANNEX A  
Table A.1: Stocks of migrants from EU8, EU2 and EaP in European destinations: 1995 and 2010. 
ORIGINS: EU8 EU2 EaP 
Total immigrant 
stock  
(all destinations) 
EaP share of total 
immigrant stock (%) 
EaP share of total host 
country population (%)  
DESTINA-
TIONS: 
1995 2010 1995 2010 1995 2010 1995 2010 1995 2010 1995 2010 
Austria 165478 185535 46083 79990 5144 16571 1003399 1315512 0.5 1.3 0.064 0.198 
Belgium 6972 58131 2909 39554 867 12853 891980 1057666 0.1 1.2 0.008 0.119 
Bulgaria 1165 1093 195 183 4966 4502 25634 23838 19.4 18.9 0.062 0.059 
Cyprus 1105 x 5816 x 2293 x 88640 x 2.6 x 0.234 x 
Czech Rep. 75744 91830 6331 11483 49018 141475 159207 426423 18.8 33.2 0.475 1.345 
Denmark 13010 42570 1803 11099 483 7969 249885 428904 0.2 1.9 0.009 0.144 
Estonia 7029 x 63 x 40946 x 262826 x 15.6 x 2.99 x 
Finland 7941 31870 850 2769 68 1457 106303 248135 0.1 0.6 0.001 0.027 
France 125377 120006 30164 64626 13239 46182 4308527 5342288 0.3 0.9 0.022 0.072 
Germany 423263 680314 148103 201405 50718 192815 7173866 6753621 0.7 2.9 0.062 0.236 
Greece 6772 2165 10373 55463 1177 47524 155453 621023 0.8 7.7 0.011 0.426 
Hungary 8539 11249 70151 73930 3522 18021 139953 197819 3.5 9.1 0.048 0.18 
Ireland 419 152452 738 12705 0 5906 251624 612169 0 1 0 0.132 
Italy 29031 143759 27792 1019710 2092 346163 991678 4570317 0.2 7.6 0.004 0.572 
Latvia 31333 27722 110 924 128575 110619 401974 343271 32 32.2 5.529 4.941 
Lithuania 13499 15624 60 180 80110 81707 246609 222447 32.5 36.7 2.301 2.433 
Luxembourg 1096 7118 468 2249 259 x 162285 221364 0.2 x 0.059 x 
Malta 176 468 232 1012 138 474 9751 15460 1.4 3.1 0.035 0.115 
Netherlands 22771 91271 4067 27099 86 2544 1284106 1735217 0 0.1 0.001 0.015 
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Poland 91519 20276 5047 4176 415330 167302 1358799 883480 30.6 18.9 1.086 0.438 
Portugal 368 3280 411 45004 66 67230 168316 443055 0 15.2 0.001 0.632 
Romania 7126 7757 19928 19036 53454 57648 133983 161597 39.9 35.7 0.245 0.268 
Slovakia 8127 18957 1784 1641 2792 6226 21907 62584 12.7 9.9 0.052 0.115 
Slovenia 1129 1791 189 758 301 1799 212458 253786 0.1 0.7 0.015 0.088 
Spain 8567 135433 4616 948384 1242 124840 1067478 6604181 0.1 1.9 0.003 0.272 
Sweden 76655 117131 14227 26393 694 11874 936022 1384929 0.1 0.9 0.008 0.127 
UK 179143 978792 6892 149780 660 18092 3828790 7317000 0.2 0.2 0.001 0.029 
Total 1313354 2946594 409402 2799553 858240 1491793 24758895 40437040 
3.46 3.68 
    
Source: Immigration: Pytliková (2012). Host country population: World Development Indicators, World Bank.  
Notes on migration data: Instead of year 1995, year: 1996 for  Ireland and Czech Rep., 1997 for Italy and Spain, 1998 for Belgium and Slovenia, 1999  for 
France, 2000 for Austria, Estonia and Luxembourg, 2001 for  Bulgaria, Lithuania and Malta, 2002 for Cyprus, Poland and Romania. Instead of year 2010, 
year: 2009 for Belgium, Bulgaria, Romania and Spain, 2008 for France, Lithuania and Malta, and year 2006 for Greece. 
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Table A.2: Stock of migrants from each EaP country in European destinations in 1995 and 2010 
ORIGINS: Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Georgia Moldova Ukraine 
DESTINA-
TIONS 
1995 2010 1995 2010 1995 2010 1995 2010 1995 2010 1995 2010 
Austria 451 2549 150 947 424 1434 504 2695 343 1504 3272 7442 
Belgium 130 5164 18 671 141 1417 90 1674 49 913 439 3014 
Bulgaria 1649 1360 11 11 122 116 105 96 796 787 2283 2132 
Cyprus x x x x 170 x x x 474 x 1649 x 
Czech Rep. 866 2183 45 698 400 4463 239 887 176 8877 28158 124367 
Denmark 105 595 44 292 56 554 31 207 8 299 239 6022 
Estonia x x x x 14883 x x x 878 x 25185 x 
Finland 5 72 1 83 10 219 2 34 1 91 49 958 
France 4778 14732 292 3417 822 2819 976 6507 628 5369 5743 13338 
Germany 9202 10344 1399 14038 2676 18703 4716 13465 2833 11972 29892 124293 
Greece 188 4173 3 60 7 1139 383 14368 142 9440 454 18344 
Hungary 71 128 46 71 188 185 106 159 59 237 4432 17241 
Ireland x 77 x 73 x 888 x 372 x 1788 x 2708 
Italy 99 666 12 324 306 6975 63 6520 158 130948 1454 200730 
Latvia 990 1003 2868 2645 71565 59580 1881 1756 2238 2218 49033 43417 
Lithuania 683 821 1344 1508 56232 56170 899 1091 849 1161 20103 20956 
Luxembourg 7 x 1 x 45 x 10 x 16 x 180 x 
Malta 7 10 1 2 13 20 20 131 12 30 85 281 
Netherlands 24 632 8 621 3 218 29 250 1 69 21 754 
Poland 832 1647 251 270 104463 39739 324 395 329 405 309131 124846 
Portugal 3 91 0 17 6 909 x 1094 x 15632 57 49487 
Romania 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 1 39440 44564 14014 13077 
Slovakia 87 69 12 20 28 204 18 58 20 89 2627 5786 
Slovenia 0 7 0 4 30 104 0 15 3 287 268 1382 
Spain 404 11138 x x 79 3587 148 10772 26 17457 585 81886 
Sweden   1672   2107 84 2049   859   446 610 4741 
UK x 1133 x 902 4591 1233 x 797 329 641 4164 13386 
Total 20581 60269 6506 28784 257344 202725 10544 64203 49808 255224 504127 880588 
Share on EaP 
total (%) 
2.4 4 0.8 1.9 30.3 13.6 1.2 4.3 5.9 17.1 59.4 59 
Source: Pytliková (2012)  
Notes: Instead of year 1995, year: 1996 for  Ireland, 1997 for Italy and Spain, 1998 for Belgium and Slovenia, 1999  for France, 2000 for Austria, Estonia and 
Luxembourg, 2001 for  Bulgaria, Lithuania and Malta, 2002 for Cyprus, Poland and Romania, 2003 for Latvia. Instead of year 2010, year: 2009 for Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Spain, 2008 for France, Lithuania and Malta, and year 2006 for Greece.
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Table A.3.: Overview of EaP migrant profiles based on country studies 
  UK Spain Poland Germany Italy 
Education Primary-Low 18.7*ab 8/9**b n.a. 20*d 7.2*e 
 
Secondary-Medium 14.7 34/44** n.a. 31 69.1 
  Tertiary-High 53.5 45/37** 25.9*f 44 23.7 
 
In Education 12.1 n.a. 18 20 n.a. 
Age Average Age n.a. 37g n.a. 44*h n.a. 
 
Age Groups 36.4*ij n.a. 
 
n.a. 13kl 
        (see notes) 44.5   53.3*mn   14 
  
12.9 
   
21.5 
    5.1       29.5 
    1   1.4   21.5 
Gender Female 59.0o 56p 57.7*q 61*r 67s 
  Male 41 44 42.3 39 23 
Occupation 
Low Skilled- 
Unskilled 
47.1*t 90/94**u 24.2*v 25*w 96.5*x 
 
Medium Skilled 31.2 6.3 35.8 41 2.5 
  High Skilled 21.7 4.3 1.4 34 0.9 
Economic 
Activity 
Employed 67.8*y 63/78** z 87.5*aa 31*bb 76/72* **cc 
  Unemployed 7.8 n.a n.a. 16 7.8 
  Inactive 24.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. 19/22** 
Sectoral 
Allocationdd 
Manufacturing-  
Production 
13.7*ee 0/10.24**ff 9.1*gg 16*hh 3.9/23.3* **ii 
 
Construction 6.5 0/42.19** 29.6 3 0/28.3** 
  Retail-Hospitality 28.8 23.73/2.88** 2.3 17 8.7/10** 
 
Transport- 2.9 n.a. 6.9 7 0.4/8.3** 
  Communications           
 
Business Services-
Finances 
24.5 n.a. 6.8 18jj 0/0** 
  Public Services 15.8 n.a. n.a. 33kk 0/0** 
 
Domestic Services n.a. 56.23/2.56** 20.5 
 
72.1/8.3** 
  Agriculture n.a. 3.71/4.15** 6.3 1kk 2.4/6.7** 
  Other Services 7.9 4.71/1.58** n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
 
Sources: Country studies: Biavaschi and Zimmermann, 2013; Clark and Drinkwater, 2013; Duszczyk, 
Góra and Kaczmarczyk, 2013; Farré and Rodríguez-Planas, 2013; and Marchetti, Piazzalunga and 
Venturini, 2013 
Notes: * Refers to Ukrainian migrants only.  ** Female/male 
a  Numbers for other EaP countries immigrants are comparable but differ slightly. 
b  Source: LFS (1999-2011) – Educational Categories of Working-Age Migrants from EaP Countries. 
c  Source: LFS (2000-2011) – The sample is restricted to individuals 16 to 64 years old who are heads 
of the household or spouses. 
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d  Authors’ calculations based on the German Microcensus 2008. In the education attainment data, ‘in 
education’ category includes people who are currently enrolled in some educational program but 
whose highest degree could be counted in the previous numbers. 
e  Authors’ elaborations based on Istat LFS, 2011 second quarter. 
f  RDS survey (CMR) (country report, p. 41).  
g  P.16, country report. 
h  Authors’ calculations based on the German Microcensus 2008. 
i  The age groups for the British country case study are: Under 25, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55 & Over. 
j  Source: Department for Work and Pensions – Age Group of NINo Registrants from EaP Countries, 
2002-2011. 
k  These numbers are based on estimates from the provided graph. 
l  Own calculations based on the authors’ elaborations which are based on Istat, Residence Permits 
(Home Office data), 2011. Includes EaP migrants from Moldova and the Ukraine. 
m  The two age groups for the Polish country case study are: 15-35, 60 & over. 
n  RDS survey (CMR 2010) (p. 41). 
o  Source: Department for Work and Pensions – Gender Groups of NINo Registrants from EaP 
Countries, 2002-2011. 
p  Source: LFS (2000-2011) – The sample is restricted to individuals 16 to 64 years old who are heads 
of the household or spouses. 
q  RDS survey (CMR 2010) (country report, p. 41). 
r  Authors’ calculations based on the German Microcensus 2008. 
s  Authors’ elaborations based on Istat LFS, 2011 second quarter. 
t  Source: LFS (1999-2011) – Occupation of Employed of Working-Age Migrants from EaP Countries. 
u  Source: LFS (2000-2011) – The sample is restricted to individuals 16 to 64 years old who are heads 
of the household or spouses. 
v  The authors’ elaboration based on the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy data, 2011.Only selected 
skill groups presented in the report. 
w  These numbers are based on estimates from the provided graph. 
x  Authors’ elaborations based on Istat LFS, 2011 second quarter.  
y  Source: LFS (1999-2011) – Economic Activity of Working-Age Migrants from EaP countries.  
z  Source: LFS (2000-2011) – The sample is restricted to individuals 16 to 64 years old who are heads 
of the household or spouses. 
aa  RDS survey (CMR 2010) (country report, p. 41). 
bb  Authors’ calculations based on the German Microcensus 2008. 
cc  Authors’ elaborations based on Istat LFS, 2011, second quarter. (country report, p. 37). 
dd  Due to different categorisation in the different country case studies, not all categories have a value. 
Also, numbers might not add up to one hundred. 
ee  Source: LFS (1999-2011) – Sector of Employment for Working-Age Migrants from EaP Countries. 
ff  Source: LFS (2000-2011) – EaP Immigrants employed in the most common low skilled occupations. 
gg  The authors’ elaboration based on the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy data, 2011. Note that the 
numbers for seasonal workers, the most important EaP migrant group in Poland, differs from this 
significantly. (country report, p. 45, 57).  
hh  Authors’ calculations based on the German Microcensus 2008. 
ii  Authors’ elaborations based on Istat LFS, 2011 second quarter. 
jj  This number pertains to activities in the Real Estate sector. 
kk  This number includes public & private services 
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13. ANNEX B  
 
Table B.1 Skill categorisation 
ISCO-1  Skill group 
1 Legislators, senior officials and managers high 
2 Professionals high 
3 Technicians and associate professionals high 
4 Clerks 
high 
intermediate  
5 Service workers and shop and market sales 
workers 
high 
intermediate  
6 Skilled agricultural and fishery workers  
low 
intermediate  
7 Craft and related workers 
low 
intermediate  
8 Plant and machine operators and assemblers low 
9 Elementary occupations low 
 
Table B.2 Industry categorisation 
NACE 
Code Group Nace 
C,D, E 1 Manufacturing, mining and quarrying and other industry 
F 2 Construction 
G 3 Wholesale and retail trade 
H,I 4 Transportation and storage, accommodation and food service 
J,K 5 
Information and communication, Financial and insurance 
activities 
M 6 Education 
N 7 Human health 
O, P, Q 8 Public administration, defence, and social work activities 
A, B 9 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
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14. ANNEX C 
TABLE C.1.: Visa policies: EU countries vis-à-vis EaP, as of September 2012  
 Type  Applicable to Duration Specific documents Costs (euro) 
Italy  Short term (Schengen) C 
type visa  
 
 Long term (national) D type 
visa for employment 
purposes 
  
 Schengen long term visa 
 
Third 
countries/ EaP 
countries 
 
Third 
countries/ EaP 
countries 
 
Third 
countries/ EaP 
countries 
- stay up to 90 
days within 
180 day 
period); 
 
 - stay over 90 
days 
 
 - stay up to 90 
days 
Proof of accommodation and financial means  (return 
ticket, employment contract), medical insurance, proof of 
social and economic status 
 
Copy of work permit and work contract, proof of 
accommodation 
 
Proof of accommodation 
medical insurance 
60/35 euro, 
for faster 
procedure – 
70 
 
105/70 
 
 
60 
Germany Schengen short term C type 
visa 
 
 
National D type Long term 
visas including with the 
purpose of employment 
Third-country 
nationals 
- stay up to 
90 days 
 
 
 
 
 - stay over 3 
months 
 
Proof of purpose of travel, proof of financial means, health 
insurance, proof of ties with country of origin – salary 
sheet/tax record/enterprise registration/bank 
statement/property statement/pensioner 
certificate/registration record 
 
Employment contract, medical insurance, company 
information (for self-employment), proof of qualifications 
60/35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 
Spain Schengen short term C type 
visa 
 
 
 
 
 
Long-term national 
residence visas, including 
employment purposes 
Third-country 
nationals/EaP 
countries 
 
 
 
 
Third-country 
nationals/EaP 
countries 
- Up to 3 
months 
 
 
 
 
 
 - Stay over 90 
days 
Accommodation reservation, letter of invitation, proof of 
transportation reservation, substantial financial means 
(specific amounts – up to 561.60 euro for 9 days), medical 
insurance/certificates, income certificate/private company 
registration copy, abstracts from employment history, bank 
statement 
 
Work permit, criminal record, medical certificate, 
employment contract; business project including potential 
investments and copies of licenses (for self-employment) 
35-visa 
facilitation 
agreement/65-
with visa 
center 
fees/76-faster 
issuance/ 
 
 
 
 
65 
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Poland Schengen short term C type 
visa 
 
 
 
 
Long-term national D type 
visa, including employment 
purposes 
Third-country 
nationals/EaP 
countries 
 
 
 
Third-country 
nationals/EaP 
countries 
 
- Up to 3 
months 
 
 
 
 
Stay over 90 
days 
Proof of purpose of the visit, proof of accommodation, 
medical insurance, proof of financial means, income 
certificate/company registration certificate 
 
Certificate about issuance of work permit once the 
applicant arrives to Poland; Proof of purpose of the visit, 
proof of accommodation, medical insurance, proof of 
financial means, income certificate/company registration 
certificate 
35/60 
 
 
 
 
20 (Ukraine32 
and 
Belarus)/60 
 
UK Short term (general visit, 
family visit, business visit, 
student visit, entertainer 
visit, marriage/medical 
purpose, sport visit ) 
 
Long term (study and work) 
Third-country 
nationals/EaP 
countries 
 
 
 
Third-country 
nationals/EaP 
countries  
- up to 6 
months 
 
 
 
 
1, 2, 5 or 10 
years 
Information about income, employment, accommodation 
and travel details, purpose of the visit or proof of financial 
means and accommodation registration of the host 
person/organisation 
 
Information about income, employment, accommodation 
and travel details, purpose of the visit or proof of financial 
means and accommodation registration of the host 
person/organisation 
106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106,370, 676, 
976 
Source: Own compilation based on information provided by relevant national ministries and agencies. Special attention was paid to visas for employment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 On June 6th, 2012 Poland agreed to waive fees for national visas for Ukrainian citizens 
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15. ANNEX D 
 
Model description  
The theoretical model is formulated in terms of individual utility maximization 
following the hypothesis of migration as an investment in human capital (Sjaastad 
(1962)). Hence, the individual migration probability depends on the difference in 
expected utility streams in the country of origin and the destination country minus 
the costs of migration. Utility streams are assumed to depend on expected income 
which is the product of the wage rate and the employment probability in each 
country. In forming their expectations on utility streams the model assumes that 
migrants give the most recent past the greatest weight and that this weight declines 
with time. Thus, the migration decision does not only depend on the current 
difference in utility streams but also on all expected future values. This implies that 
although for some migrants the current difference might be negative, the net present 
value of migration might become positive if they were to wait for an additional year. 
Furthermore, the model assumes that the employment rates in the destination 
countries follow a binomial distribution. Hence, the model explicitly accounts for 
uncertainty in employment prospects which leads to a greater weight of employment 
prospects in the destination countries than in the risk-neutral Harris-Todaro model. 
Finally, to be able to estimate the model using aggregate-level migration data the 
individual probability concept is approximated by the aggregate migration rate.  
In the reduced-form estimation equation of the model (for more details see Hatton 
(1995) and Fertig (2001) the dependent variable is the change in the migration rate 
(i.e. net-migration relative to the population) from country of origin h to the 
destination country d between the years t and t-1. For this variable a (log-)linear 
relationship is postulated to wage and employment rates in h and d, where changes 
over time as well as the levels of both economic variables enter the equation 
separately. This gives us the possibility to distinguish between short- and long-run 
determinants of migration flows.  
Furthermore, the stock of migrants from h in d as well as the population shares of 
individuals aged 20-40 living in h and d, respectively, enter the equation via 
migration cost. The model also contains country of origin-specific intercepts which 
again enter the equation via the modelling of migration cost. Finally, the model is 
extended by a set of dummy variables covering policy regimes. This set contains a 
dummy which is one for all years in which country d restricted the access of workers 
from country h to its labour market partially; and zero otherwise. It further contains a 
set of destination country-specific dummies indicating the number of years with free 
access to workers from h. 
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Table D.1: Estimation results final specification 
  Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 
  Coeff. 
t-
value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
Czech Republica 0.0086 0.94 0.014 1.61 0.036** 3.37 
Estoniaa 0.02 1.63 0.021* 1.68 0.017 1.13 
Hungarya 0.0059 0.66 0.0099 1.11 0.028** 2.81 
Latviaa 0.014 1.58 0.014 1.5 -0.0033 -0.31 
Lithuaniaa 0.03** 2.61 0.03** 2.54 0.0059 0.39 
Slovak Republica 0.012 1.19 0.013 1.27 0.01 0.62 
Sloveniaa 0.012 1.17 0.017* 1.74 0.042** 3.23 
Czech Republic after 
accession 
- - - - 0.000052 0 
Estonia after accession - - - - 0.033* 1.65 
Hungary after 
accession 
- - - - 0.0066 0.57 
Latvia after accession - - - - 0.046** 2.65 
Lithuania after 
accession 
- - - - 0.054** 2.18 
Slovak Republic after 
accession 
- - - - 0.0098 0.68 
Slovenia after 
accession 
- - - - 0.0035 0.19 
Lagged net migration 
rate 
-0.86** -4.14 -0.87** -4.12 -0.9** -4.21 
Free Movement** 0.026** 3.24 - - - - 
First year of free 
movement 
- - 0.0094 0.83 0.006 0.58 
Second year of free 
movement 
- - 0.028** 2.44 0.027** 2.56 
Third year of free 
movement 
- - 0.037** 2.84 0.039** 3.13 
Fourth year of free 
movement 
- - 0.041** 2.96 0.047** 3.47 
Fifth year of free 
movement 
- - 0.029 1.08 0.033 1.3 
Sixth year of free 
movement 
- - 0.026 1.1 0.033 1.5 
Post accession - - - - 
-
0.0089389 
-0.63 
Partial restrictions 
dummyb 
0.0046 0.88 0.0057 1.23 0.0038 0.69 
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(Log) Lagged PCI-ratio 
(in PPP) destination to 
home country 
0.018* 1.67 0.02* 1.91 0.031** 2.9 
(Log) Lagged 
employment rate home 
country 
-0.05 -0.58 -0.089 -1.07 -0.28** -3.11 
(Log) Lagged 
employment rate 
destination country 
0.084* 1.72 0.078 1.62 0.059 1.36 
(Log) Lagged share of 
20-39 years old in 
destination country 
0.11 1.32 0.11 1.34 0.11 1.32 
(Log) Lagged share of 
20-39 years old in 
home country 
0.0097 0.03 -0.043 -0.15 -0.067 -0.12 
Delta of (log) PCI-ratio 
(in PPP) destination to 
home country 
0.1 1.3 0.06 0.71 0.074 0.94 
Delta of (log) 
employment rate home 
country 
0.23 1.27 0.23 1.26 0.42** 2.08 
Delta of (log) 
employment rate 
destination country 
-0.034 -0.19 0.063 0.37 0.19 1.17 
Lagged stock of 
migrants from home in 
destination country 
2x10 -7 ** 1.98 2x10 -7 ** 2.12 2x10 -7 ** 2.29 
Constant -0.21 -0.51 0.0031 0.01 0.93** 2.24 
Number of 
observations 
1,204   1,204   1,204   
R-squared 0.361 
 
0.368 
 
0.38 
 
(Wald test for) 
common intercept 
rejected   rejected   rejected   
Reference categories: a Poland; b full restriction. * 10%, **5% significance level. 
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16. ANNEX E.  
 
NiGEM description 
NiGEM is a large-scale quarterly macroeconomic model of the world economy. Most 
OECD countries are modelled separately (about 50 countries), and the rest of the 
world is modelled through regional blocks: Latin America, Africa, East Asia, 
Developing Europe, OPEC and a Miscellaneous group mainly in West Asia.  
Domestic demand, supply and the external sector are linked through the wage-price 
system, income and wealth, the financial and government sectors and 
competitiveness. The supply side of the economy is based on a CES production 
function with labour and capital as factor inputs. Wages are determined through a 
bargaining process and prices are determined as a mark-up over production costs. 
The wage-price system affects competitiveness and income and wealth (which feed 
into the external sector and domestic demand), as well as the government sector. The 
internal feedback between the external sector and the domestic demand is realised 
through the impact of net foreign assets and interest income on household income 
and wealth, and domestic demand feeding back into the external sector as a 
determinant of imports and FDI. The financial sector feeds into domestic demand 
through the impact of interest rates, and into the government sector through interest 
payments. The government sector affects consumption through the stock of 
government debt, affecting household wealth and income tax, which feed into real 
disposable income. Economies are linked through trade, competitiveness and 
financial markets and all the country models are solved simultaneously. A full 
description of the model can be found in Barrell et al (2002) and Holland et al. 
(2011).  
Production and price setting 
Central to each of the country models is the specification of the aggregate production 
function. NiGEM incorporates a constant-returns-to-scale CES production function 
with labour and capital as inputs, and labour-augmenting technical progress. This is 
embedded within a Cobb-Douglas framework to allow the factors of production to 
interact with oil usage: 
    1/1 }]))(1()({[ MLeKY tech  
where Y is real output, K is the total capital stock, L is labour input, tech is the rate of 
labour-augmenting technical progress, and M is oil output.   
The production function constitutes the theoretical background for the specification 
of factor demand equations and provides a measure of capacity utilisation which 
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feeds into the price system. Demand for labour and capital are determined through 
profit maximisation of firms and this is associated with a unit cost (UTC) function: 
))1/(1()*1(11 )*))1((*)((*)/1(     techewageuserUTC , 
where the unit cost is a function of the cost of capital (user) and the cost of labour 
(wage).  
The above theoretical framework implies that the associated steady state price (P) 
equation is a mark-up over unit costs, with the dynamics of the mark-up depending 
upon capacity utilisation (cu): 
cueUTCP ***    
Labour markets 
In NiGEM we assume that labour markets embody rational expectations, and that 
wage bargainers use model consistent expectations. Firms determine the optimal 
level of employment according to their labour demand curves, derived from the 
production function. The bargaining takes place over real wages. Real wages (W/P), 
therefore, depend on the level of trend productivity (Y/L) and the rate of 
unemployment (U) and we can write the wage equation as: 
ULYPW   )/ln()/ln(  
An estimate of NAIRU, which is an equilibrium concept corresponding to the rate of 
unemployment that would prevail were the endogenous wage and price variables at 
their equilibrium levels, can be easily derived from the model, as the wage and price 
system is complete and the model delivers equilibrium levels of employment and 
unemployment.  
Labour supply is determined by demographics, migration and participation rate. 
Inward migration increases population.  
Labour demand is brought in line with labour supply via wage and employment 
adjustments and the speeds of adjustment of both wages and employment are 
estimated and vary across countries. 
  
158 
 
 
17. ANNEX F 
Table F.1. Three scenarios - GDP comparison (% deviations from no-
migration benchmark33) 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Scenario of no migration from the EaP countries. The benchmark is the same for all scenarios: Closed Europe, 
Cautious Europe, and Progressive Europe. 
Belgium Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany
closedcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressive
2011 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.11 0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
2012 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.22 0.22 0.12 -0.05 -0.05 0.05 0.12 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
2013 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.35 0.36 0.25 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.20 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
2014 0.05 0.14 0.15 0.05 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.48 0.52 0.43 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.28 0.30 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.05
2015 0.07 0.18 0.22 0.07 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.61 0.70 0.64 0.18 0.20 0.14 0.37 0.43 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.08
2016 0.09 0.23 0.31 0.08 0.25 0.29 0.22 0.73 0.92 0.87 0.28 0.36 0.18 0.47 0.58 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.11
2017 0.11 0.28 0.42 0.11 0.33 0.41 0.26 0.84 1.20 1.15 0.37 0.59 0.23 0.56 0.78 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.15
2018 0.14 0.33 0.53 0.14 0.42 0.55 0.31 0.96 1.53 1.48 0.44 0.88 0.28 0.66 1.01 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.13 0.19
2019 0.16 0.38 0.63 0.17 0.52 0.69 0.36 1.07 1.85 1.85 0.50 1.19 0.33 0.76 1.23 0.05 0.10 0.17 0.06 0.16 0.23
2020 0.18 0.42 0.72 0.21 0.63 0.82 0.40 1.16 2.11 2.27 0.55 1.50 0.37 0.84 1.44 0.05 0.11 0.20 0.07 0.19 0.28
Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Lithuania Latvia Austria
closedcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressive
2011 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.07 0.07
2012 0.08 0.14 0.15 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.05 -0.05 -0.06 0.07 -0.05 -0.05 0.03 0.13 0.13
2013 0.11 0.20 0.22 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.21 0.19 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.10 -0.09 -0.09 0.16 -0.10 -0.11 0.05 0.21 0.21
2014 0.13 0.25 0.29 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.33 0.32 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.17 -0.07 -0.07 0.28 -0.08 -0.08 0.08 0.30 0.32
2015 0.16 0.30 0.38 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.19 0.46 0.49 0.05 0.13 0.13 0.25 -0.04 -0.03 0.39 -0.03 -0.03 0.10 0.39 0.44
2016 0.19 0.34 0.49 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.25 0.60 0.68 0.06 0.16 0.18 0.36 -0.02 0.04 0.53 -0.01 0.01 0.13 0.48 0.60
2017 0.22 0.39 0.61 0.06 0.10 0.21 0.33 0.76 0.93 0.08 0.20 0.24 0.47 0.00 0.11 0.69 0.00 0.09 0.17 0.59 0.79
2018 0.25 0.44 0.73 0.07 0.11 0.27 0.41 0.94 1.23 0.09 0.25 0.31 0.60 0.02 0.20 0.87 0.02 0.24 0.20 0.70 1.01
2019 0.28 0.48 0.84 0.08 0.11 0.28 0.49 1.11 1.58 0.11 0.29 0.37 0.74 0.03 0.31 1.07 0.03 0.41 0.23 0.80 1.21
2020 0.31 0.52 0.92 0.09 0.10 0.26 0.58 1.29 1.96 0.12 0.33 0.43 0.90 0.03 0.42 1.30 0.03 0.56 0.26 0.89 1.39
Poland Portugal Sweden Slovenia Spain Slovakia UK
closedcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressive
2011 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01
2012 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.29 0.28 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.02
2013 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.59 0.57 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.02 0.05 0.05
2014 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.16 0.06 0.19 0.20 0.32 0.93 0.91 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.02 0.07 0.07
2015 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.18 0.23 0.09 0.26 0.30 0.46 1.27 1.27 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.03 0.09 0.11
2016 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.21 0.31 0.12 0.33 0.42 0.61 1.58 1.76 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.31 0.25 0.37 0.04 0.11 0.15
2017 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.17 0.25 0.41 0.15 0.41 0.57 0.77 1.88 2.49 0.11 0.17 0.24 0.39 0.27 0.56 0.05 0.14 0.19
2018 0.04 0.09 0.18 0.20 0.28 0.52 0.19 0.50 0.74 0.96 2.17 3.52 0.13 0.20 0.30 0.49 0.27 0.82 0.06 0.16 0.24
2019 0.04 0.10 0.21 0.23 0.31 0.63 0.22 0.58 0.91 1.17 2.45 4.73 0.14 0.23 0.36 0.59 0.28 1.15 0.07 0.18 0.28
2020 0.05 0.10 0.22 0.25 0.34 0.72 0.26 0.65 1.09 1.40 2.73 6.04 0.16 0.26 0.41 0.69 0.29 1.51 0.07 0.19 0.32
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Table F.2. Three scenarios – unemployment rate comparison (percentage 
point deviations from no-migration benchmark) 
 
 
 
 
 
Belgium Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany
closedcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressive
2011 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.07 -0.08 -0.08 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
2012 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.21 0.21 0.02 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
2013 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.30 0.30 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
2014 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.36 0.36 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
2015 0.04 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.40 0.41 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
2016 0.05 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.43 0.51 0.02 0.05 0.14 0.15 0.04 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02
2017 0.06 0.12 0.25 0.16 0.47 0.65 0.02 0.05 0.21 0.17 0.03 0.19 0.03 0.05 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02
2018 0.07 0.13 0.35 0.17 0.51 0.80 0.03 0.06 0.24 0.20 0.03 0.21 0.03 0.04 0.22 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03
2019 0.08 0.14 0.41 0.19 0.56 0.90 0.03 0.07 0.16 0.22 0.02 0.16 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03
2020 0.09 0.15 0.45 0.20 0.60 0.95 0.03 0.06 0.14 0.21 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02
Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Lithuania Latvia Austria
closedcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressive
2011 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.07 -0.07 0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.08 0.08
2012 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.12 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.06
2013 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03
2014 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03
2015 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05
2016 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.06 -0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.11
2017 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.07 -0.03 0.13 0.03 0.04 0.24 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.15
2018 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.07 -0.01 0.25 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.15
2019 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.30 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.10
2020 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.30 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.09
Poland Portugal Sweden Slovenia Spain Slovakia UK
closedcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressive
2011 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.19 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01
2012 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.23 0.23 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01
2013 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.21 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01
2014 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.18 0.19 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
2015 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.16 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00
2016 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.15 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.01
2017 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.02
2018 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.84 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.25 0.00 0.01 0.03
2019 0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.14 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.73 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.04
2020 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.13 0.12 0.63 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.04
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Table F.3. Three scenarios – inflation rate comparison (percentage point 
deviations from no-migration benchmark) 
 
 
Belgium Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany
closedcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressive
2011 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2012 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 0.07 0.07 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01
2013 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.13 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01
2014 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.08 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.17 -0.09 -0.09 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
2015 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.09 -0.10 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.19 -0.09 -0.08 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
2016 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 -0.12 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.20 -0.08 -0.09 -0.03 -0.09 -0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02
2017 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.13 -0.15 -0.02 -0.05 -0.14 -0.22 -0.06 -0.15 -0.04 -0.10 -0.14 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03
2018 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.15 -0.20 -0.02 -0.06 -0.19 -0.24 -0.05 -0.23 -0.05 -0.11 -0.21 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04
2019 -0.03 -0.06 -0.10 -0.06 -0.17 -0.24 -0.03 -0.07 -0.18 -0.26 -0.04 -0.27 -0.06 -0.12 -0.26 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06
2020 -0.03 -0.07 -0.13 -0.07 -0.19 -0.28 -0.04 -0.08 -0.16 -0.28 -0.04 -0.25 -0.07 -0.13 -0.30 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.08
Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Lithuania Latvia Austria
closedcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressive
2011 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.02
2012 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 -0.09 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.13 0.12 -0.07 0.14 0.13 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05
2013 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.09 -0.10 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 0.05 0.05 -0.15 0.06 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04
2014 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.09 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.10 -0.03 -0.03 -0.14 -0.08 -0.08 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04
2015 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.09 -0.10 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.12 -0.02 -0.01 -0.13 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05
2016 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.10 -0.13 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.12 -0.02 0.01 -0.16 0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07
2017 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.11 -0.20 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.12 -0.02 -0.03 -0.18 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.06 -0.11
2018 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.11 -0.26 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.13 -0.01 -0.11 -0.21 0.00 -0.16 -0.02 -0.07 -0.14
2019 -0.03 -0.06 -0.09 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.12 -0.28 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.16 -0.01 -0.17 -0.25 0.01 -0.20 -0.03 -0.08 -0.16
2020 -0.04 -0.07 -0.13 -0.03 0.00 -0.07 -0.07 -0.12 -0.28 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.19 -0.01 -0.17 -0.29 -0.01 -0.18 -0.03 -0.09 -0.17
Poland Portugal Sweden Slovenia Spain Slovakia UK
closedcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressiveclos dcautiousprogressive
2011 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.10 -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
2012 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 -0.32 -0.31 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.01
2013 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.14 -0.43 -0.43 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
2014 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.17 -0.44 -0.44 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
2015 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.17 -0.39 -0.40 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
2016 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.18 -0.34 -0.50 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.08 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.01
2017 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.07 -0.10 -0.20 -0.31 -0.88 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.08 0.02 -0.16 0.00 -0.02 -0.01
2018 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.15 -0.23 -0.30 -1.37 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.01 -0.32 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
2019 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.08 -0.19 -0.27 -0.29 -1.72 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.10 -0.02 -0.43 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03
2020 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.05 -0.09 -0.23 -0.30 -0.29 -1.76 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.11 -0.04 -0.43 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05
